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The importance of transitioning to a sustainable economy - one which safeguards ecological life-support 
systems and provides equity within and between generations - has become increasingly urgent. A 
crucial ingredient of such a transition is sustainable innovation by new or existing enterprises, to develop 
business activities that realise both societal and fi nancial value. However, obtaining fi nance for sustainable 
innovation is often a challenge due to both principal-agent and (double) externality problems. While 
society benefi ts from investments into sustainable innovation, the – fi nancial and societal - return for 
individual fi nanciers is highly insecure. 
This dissertation explores how to enable fi nance for sustainable innovation, with a focus on banks 
and crowdfunding platforms. It makes use of two theoretical lenses. First, it studies how to overcome 
principal-agent problems through di erent lending technologies. Second, and more novel, it takes 
a collective action perspective to address the double externality problem embodied in sustainable 
innovation fi nance. This research fi lls a gap because there exist empirically well-defi ned mechanisms for 
solving collective action problems that have not yet been applied to the fi nance domain. Furthermore, 
the dynamics of collective action appear particularly relevant in the emergence of technologically driven, 
decentralized fi nancial instruments like crowdfunding. 
This dissertation draws conclusions regarding the role of relationships, cash fl ows and assets as enablers 
of sustainable innovation fi nance, as well as regarding motivations of crowdfunders to undertake such 
investments. It highlights the challenge of enabling sustainable innovation fi nance while guarding the 
quality of the investment decisions in line with the motivation of the fi nancier. 
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onderzoekschool) in 
the fi eld of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are the 
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE). ERIM was founded 
in 1999 and is o  cially accredited by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The 
research undertaken by ERIM is focused on the management of the fi rm in its environment, its intra- and 
interfi rm relations, and its business processes in their interdependent connections.
The objective of ERIM is to carry out fi rst rate research in management, and to o er an advanced doctoral 
programme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three hundred senior researchers and PhD 
candidates are active in the di erent research programmes. From a variety of academic backgrounds and 
expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating 
new business knowledge.
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1 Introduction  
The call for a transition to a sustainable economy has become increasingly urgent in recent 
decades (IPCC, 2014; Stern, 2008). Such sustainable development1 has been more 
specifically defined as an economy which safeguards the ecological life-support system 
while satisfying basis human needs and providing equity within and between generations 
(Costanza & Patten, 1995; Holden, Linnerud, & Banister, 2014). This requires rethinking 
the way in which we live, work and organize to shift to an economy that functions within 
planetary boundaries (Wijffels & Toxopeus, 2014). The global challenge of lowering 
greenhouse gas emissions exemplifies the worldwide struggle to realize sustainable 
economic development (Ostrom, 2010b; Stern, 2008).  
While a transition to a sustainable economy requires action at multiple levels (Geels, 
Hekkert, & Jacobsson, 2008; Ostrom, 2010b), sustainable entrepreneurship has emerged as 
an important ingredient for such a transition (Hall, Daneke, & Lenox, 2010; Pacheco, Dean, 
& Payne, 2010; Shepherd & Patzelt, 2011). Sustainable enterprises can solve market failures 
by innovating so that business activities generate financial profits and simultaneously govern 
collective goods such as nature (biodiversity, ecosystems), sources of life support (clean air, 
global fish stocks) and communities (culture, networks, personal identity) (Shepherd & 
Patzelt, 2011).  
In order to engage in entrepreneurial activity and simultaneous deliver social and/or 
environmental benefits, enterprises must innovate (Hall et al., 2010; Hall & Vredenburg, 
2003; Shepherd & Patzelt, 2011). Both innovation and sustainability demands facing a 
certain industry need to be addressed (Hall & Vredenburg, 2003) and innovation in the form 
of new technologies and organisational/social practices are needed to address environmental 
or social market failures (Dean & McMullen, 2007).  
Sustainable innovation by entrepreneurs can be carried out in several ways. One approach is 
to address market failures by transforming institutions such as prevailing norms, property 
                                                          
1 While conceptualized in different ways, the most commonly used definition of what constitutes sustainable 
development is given in the Brundtland Report (1987:43): “Development which meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. 
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rights and government legislation (Pacheco et al., 2010). The redirection of technological 
progress towards sustainability objectives is another approach, where smart innovations and 
clean technologies that ‘close material loops’ aim to create win-win situations for 
entrepreneurs and society at large (Geels et al., 2008). A third perspective on sustainable 
innovation focuses on stimulating behavioural change and ‘green’ values, taking a social 
rather than technological perspective (Geels et al., 2008). Finally, sustainable or circular 
business models innovate the way in which firms define, deliver and capture value (Bocken 
et al., 2014; Boons & Lüdeke-Freund, 2013; Kortmann & Piller, 2016). For example, 
shifting from a sales to a product-service business model is expected to incentivize producers 
to extend the lifetime of their products (Tukker, 2015). Business model innovation based on 
sharing are often also viewed as sustainable, due to more efficient use of products and 
underlying materials (Frenken, 2017; Frenken & Schor, 2017). Finally, innovating to realize 
a sustainable economy is perceived as a larger, systemic socio-technological shift, requiring 
action by multiple actors to affect cultural change, consumer behaviour, technological 
adaptation, and regulation in parallel (Geels et al., 2008).  
While sustainable innovation is recognized as an important ingredient for realizing 
sustainable economic activity, financing such innovation is seen as an important constraint 
(Hall, 2010; Schumpeter, 1934). Independent of whether innovation is sustainable, the 
innovation finance constraint is diagnosed to have two main causes: a market failure – credit 
rationing - due to firm-financier principal-agent problems (B. H. Hall, 2010; Stiglitz & 
Weiss, 1981) and a market failure due to the public good nature of innovation (B. H. Hall, 
Moncada-Paternò-Castello, Montresor, & Vezzani, 2016). Furthermore, sustainable 
innovation finance faces a second externality problem due to the provision of (collective) 
environmental and/or social goods. We discuss each in turn, and give an overview of these 
different types of market failure in Figure 1-1. 
Principal-agent problems 
Firstly, credit rationing exists in the face of principal-agent problems such as adverse 
selection, moral hazard and asymmetric information (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981) and is 
especially problematic for high risk, innovative activity (B. H. Hall, 2010; B. H. Hall et al., 
2016). Firstly, adverse selection refers to the difficulty of using higher interest rates to 
compensate for the high innovation risk, since entrepreneur willingness to accept higher 
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interest payments could reflect higher probabilities of default (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). 
Second, moral hazard problems occur in high risk, innovative lending due to an incentive 
misalignment between entrepreneurs and external financiers: higher interest rates dampen 
business profits, which can incentivize entrepreneurs to choose high risk – high payoff 
activities with a lower probability of success (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Asymmetric 
information problems arise because the entrepreneur/manager requesting funds is better able 
to judge the probability of success of their business activity than a potential financier, in 
particular in the case of innovation (B. H. Hall & Lerner, 2010). Innovative entrepreneurs 
cannot display financial track record yet, their strategies are risky and firm assets are often 
intangible or firm-specific (Brancati, 2015; G. Giudici & Paleari, 2000; B. H. Hall & Lerner, 
2010).   
 
Figure 1-1 Three types of market failure embedded in sustainable innovation finance. 
Knowledge externalities 
For innovation finance, financial constraints are aggravated due to a second type of market 
failure, on top of the principal-agent problems described above. Investment into R&D and 
innovation generates knowledge externalities that easily spill over to others firms and sectors 
(Hall, 2010). Much of innovation spending goes to wages to develop knowledge with 
employees, an intangible asset which is lost in case of failure or if employees decide to leave 
(Hall, 2010). Although in the aggregate, investment into innovative entrepreneurial activity 
is a key factor driving economic growth (King & Levine, 1993), most innovations fail, 
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making individual investments unattractive and diversification difficult (Carpenter & 
Petersen, 2002a; B. H. Hall, 2010; Mazzucato, 2013). This difficulty to capture value from 
innovative entrepreneurial activity gives it public good characteristics, making it difficult to 
finance privately.  
Environmental and social externalities 
While building on insights from the innovation finance literature, this dissertations aims to 
address financing constraints of sustainable innovation, specifically. Sustainable innovation 
finance faces a third type of market failure, on top of the principal-agent problems and 
knowledge externalities that regular innovation finance is confronted with (Figure 1-1). 
Enterprises carrying out sustainable innovation aim to create environmental and/or social 
value, also referred to as ‘positive’ externalities, equivalent to collective goods such as clean 
air (lower greenhouse gas emissions), sustained natural resources and/or local cultures 
(Geels et al., 2008; Shepherd & Patzelt, 2011). Sustainable innovation therefore faces a 
double externality problem, producing both knowledge and social/environmental 
externalities (Faber & Frenken, 2009; Rennings, 2000).  
While the innovation finance literature often addresses the inherent principal-agent 
problems, an additional theoretical perspective is needed to address the externality problems. 
The double externality constraint in sustainable innovation finance can be best viewed as a 
collective action problem (Hardin, 1971; Olson, 2009; Ostrom, 2010a). If the majority of 
financiers would invest in sustainable innovation, this would, in the aggregate, create value 
for society on the long term since some of the innovations will be successful. However, the 
value creation and capture per investment is highly uncertain and benefits will spread over 
a larger community than just the financier. This lowers the incentive for individual 
financiers, in particular if uncertainty exists regarding the sustainable investment behaviour 
of others. This conditionality of returns of sustainable innovation on cooperative behaviour 
of others – incentivizing free-rider behaviour - characterizes a collective action dilemma 
(Ostrom, 2010a; Pacheco et al., 2010). 
Since innovation is a crucial ingredient for a shift to a sustainable economy (Geels et al., 
2008; Hall & Vredenburg, 2003) and access to finance a key enabler of such innovation 
(Mazzucato, 2013; Schumpeter, 1912) the market failures that constrain sustainable 
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innovation finance need to be addressed. Based on the problem analysis above, this 
dissertation sets out to understand, and where possible, alleviate principal-agent and 
collective action problems that constrain sustainable innovation finance. Its urgency and 
importance is high: if most innovations are bound to fail (Mazzucato, 2013), a successful 
sustainability transition is in need of a large diversity of sustainable innovations.  
There are two main reasons that this research is timely and fills a gap. First, there exist 
empirically well-defined mechanisms for solving collective action problems that could be 
applied to sustainable innovation finance (Ostrom, 2010a). While this cross-fertilization 
towards the financial sector has been suggested (Cauwels & Sornette, 2012), it has not yet 
been applied in this specific context. Second, technological developments are driving the 
emergence of new players in entrepreneurial finance (Block, Colombo, Cumming, & 
Vismara, 2017; Mollick & Robb, 2016), which could improve access to finance for 
sustainable innovation, both by overcoming principal-agent problems and by enabling 
collective action. It is therefore that this dissertation addresses the research question: What 
factors enable enterprise access to finance for sustainable innovation?  
 
Figure 1-2 Applying the IAD Framework to sustainable innovation finance 
To address this research question, the institutional analysis and development (IAD) 
framework, developed to structurally analyse action situations (Ostrom, 2010a) is applied to 
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the action situation ‘financing sustainable innovation’. This allows for a novel perspective 
on financing sustainable innovation, taking into account participants and contextual 
(exogeneous) variables (Ostrom, 2010a). This framework indicates that biophysical 
conditions, attributes of the community, rules and participant characteristics may affect 
outcomes of the financing decision (Figure 1-2).  
While Figure 1-2 (based on Ostrom, 2010a) gives a broad overview of potential enablers of 
sustainable innovation finance, Figure 1-3 further specifies the action situation “financing 
sustainable innovation” to represent the analytical framework for this dissertation. Within 
the action situation financing sustainable innovation, three participant types are described: 
funders, innovating enterprises, and financial intermediaries. Additionally, this framework 
specifies the two main theoretical lenses that will be used to find enablers of sustainable 
innovation finance. First, principal-agent theory for financial intermediation will be 
employed to address regular finance constraints that innovative enterprises face, with a main 
focus on overcoming asymmetric information. Second, collective action theory will be used 
to address the double externality problem by uncovering mechanisms that improve the 
willingness of financiers to contribute. Furthermore, within each theoretical lens we engage 
with other relevant theories, such as signaling or motivational theory, whenever they seem 
instrumental in uncovering enablers for financing sustainable innovation from either 
theoretical lens. 
 
Figure 1-3 Analytical framework: addressing sustainable innovation finance constraints 
Enablers for sustainable innovation finance will result from an interplay between 
participants in the defined action situation: funders, innovating enterprises and financial 
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intermediaries. Different financial players provide finance in different stages in a venture’s 
lifetime, depending on size, risk level, duration and debt/equity finance (Polzin, 2017). In 
this dissertation I focus on banks and crowdfunding, even though other important financial 
players for innovation finance exist, as well including venture capitalists, philanthropists and 
governments (e.g. in the form of subsidies and tax breaks). Although their importance is 
recognized, they lie largely outside the scope of this dissertation. I explain my choice below. 
Firstly, this dissertation studies banks because they are an established player in the field of 
SME lending, where the largest financing constraint also lies for innovation (Brancati, 
2015). Even though debt-based finance is generally not well-suited for high-risk activities 
such as innovation, in practice banks still play a large role due to lack of alternatives, in 
particular in bank-based Europe (Cincera & Santos, 2015). Furthermore, the lion’s share of 
research about overcoming principal-agent problems such as informational asymmetries and 
moral hazard has been undertaking in the field of bank lending (Berger & Black, 2011; 
Stiglitz & Weiss, 1988), offering a rich background based on which to further understand 
how to enable sustainable innovation finance in the face of these constraints.  
Secondly, this dissertation studies crowdfunding, a fast growing type of entrepreneurial 
finance, which allows many - often small – investors to pledge money to an enterprise or 
project via internet (Mollick, 2014). The relevance of crowdfunding for sustainable 
innovation finance can be explained from both the innovation and the sustainability 
perspective. Firstly, crowdfunding has evolved as a promising source of finance in particular 
for innovative ventures (Mollick & Robb, 2016). Some research suggests that crowdfunders 
are able to select high-quality ventures as well as experts, in particular in sectors where they 
are end users (Mollick & Nanda, 2015). From a sustainability perspective, recent conceptual 
and empirical studies point towards crowdfunding as an enabler of sustainability-driven 
entrepreneurship in particular (Calic & Mosakowski, 2016; Lehner, 2013; Lehner & 
Nicholls, 2014; Polzin, Sanders, & Täube, 2017). Due to the collective nature of 
crowdfunding, this type of finance is interesting to study from a collective action perspective 
to address the double externality problem. Also, research on overcoming principal-agent 
problems in crowdfunding is evolving. The high failure rate of (in particular early stage) 
innovation underscores this challenge - indeed regulators fear that (non-professional) 
crowdfunders may underestimate the risk of their investments (AFM, 2014; Friesz, 2015). 
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Therefore, crowdfunding is chosen due to its potential role for addressing both principal-
agent and collective action problems. This could make crowdfunding a promising 
intermediary for sustainable innovation finance, in particular, and allows us to study it using 
both theoretical lenses. Furthermore, since crowdfunding-related policy is currently 
evolving, insights regarding its potential to finance sustainable innovation can provide input 
to such governance decisions.    
While this dissertation focuses on finance for sustainable innovation as a general concept, 
not all types of sustainable innovation are the same and this will affect the type of financing 
they can attract. This dissertation builds on existing research to decide which types of 
sustainable innovation to address. Classifications of sustainable innovations are applied from 
a sustainable / circular business model perspective (Bocken et al., 2014; Boons & Lüdeke-
Freund, 2013; Roome & Louche, 2016) and from a product / process innovation perspective 
(Achterberg et al., 2016; Ewen, Ossenblok, Braam, Karen Maas, & Toxopeus, 2017). The 
type of sustainable innovation that an enterprise chooses to focus on will affect their need 
for finance as well as its duration, risk level and asset base. This in turn affects which 
financial intermediaries best fit the enterprise and what lending/financing techniques 
(technologies) are most likely to provide successful finance.  
Finally, a decision needs to be made how to pinpoint enablers for sustainable innovation 
finance. Using the two theoretical lenses, we look for fine-grained approaches in the 
literature to overcome principal-agent problems on the one hand, and collective action 
problems on the other. This is elaborated in the different chapters of this dissertation using 
principal-agent theory and collective action theory. Building on the finance literature 
(Berger & Udell, 2006), three main lending techniques are differentiated: cash-flow, asset 
and relationship-based lending. Banks employ (combinations of) different lending 
techniques depending on the types of ventures/firms and financing needs (Berger & Black, 
2011; Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, & Stein, 2005). Similarly, existing empirical and 
theoretical findings are used to build insights into overcoming collective action dilemmas in 
innovation finance (Ostrom, 2010a, 2010b).  
This dissertation aims to be the start of a framework of enablers through which sustainable 
innovation can be financed, by addressing both principal-agent and collective action 
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problems. Furthermore, this is used as a basis to suggest innovation in financial techniques 
and structures that can speed up financing of sustainable innovation. By increasing collective 
understanding of the provision of sustainable innovation finance, in particular through 
crowdfunding and banks – two major players - sustainable enterprises and financiers alike 
obtain a tool for financial decision-making to accelerate the transition to a sustainable 
economy.   
 
Figure 1-4 Schematic overview of this dissertation 
Figure 1-4 gives a schematic overview of this dissertation. In the first part of this dissertation 
(Ch 2, 3, 4) the conceptual work is presented. Chapter two discusses financial innovations 
that enable impact investing (Toxopeus, Liket, & Maas, 2015). In chapter three, both 
relationship-based and transaction-based credit allocation approaches are analysed for their 
ability to provide loans that serve society (Toxopeus & Blom, 2016). In chapter four, an 
institutional rule-based analysis of crowdfunding is carried out to understand how collective 
action can be enabled when crowdfunding sustainable enterprises (Toxopeus & Maas, 2018).  
The second part of this dissertation (Ch 5-8) consists of empirical work aimed at furthering 
our understanding of sustainable innovation finance. Chapter five analyses how different 
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lending technologies can be employed for extending bank credit to enterprises with 
undertake different types of sustainable (business model) innovation. This article includes 
qualitative field work with banks and enterprises who applied for bank credit to finance their 
business model innovation. In the next three chapters, this dissertation studies crowdfunding, 
a financial tool that is expected to be particularly well suited for financing sustainability 
(Calic & Mosakowski, 2016; Lehner, 2013). In chapter six, we obtain insight into the role 
of social networks (relationships) for overcoming informational asymmetries in financing 
decisions of crowdfunders, an analysis which we extend towards sustainable enterprises 
(Polzin, Toxopeus, & Stam, 2017). Chapter seven looks into the role of societal impact 
motivation and financial motivation of sustainable enterprise crowdfunders in their 
investment decisions. Chapter eight analyses a successful crowdfunding campaign of a 
sharing platform to understand the role of users as funders of sustainable ventures, and how 
this relates to overcoming informational asymmetries for the funding decision.  
Based on both the conceptual work (part one) and empirical work (part two) main 
conclusions are drawn (chapter nine) regarding promising mechanisms and enablers for 
financing sustainable innovation in the conclusion of this dissertation. Furthermore, this 
chapter provides practical insights for financial intermediaries, enterprises wishing to 
finance sustainable innovation and crowdfunders, as well as limitations of the current 
dissertation and further research directions. 
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1.1 Declaration of contribution and co-authorship 
In this section, I declare my contribution to the different chapters of this dissertation and 
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promotor Karen Maas contributed by providing guidance and feedback throughout the 
dissertation process.  
Chapter 1 and 9 were written independently by me, with guidance and feedback from my 
promotor Harry Commandeur. Chapter 2 was developed conceptually together with my co-
author Kellie Liket and my co-promotor and co-author Karen Maas. It was mainly written 
by me with input from my co-authors. Chapter 3 was conceptually developed with my co-
author Peter Blom. I developed the theoretical background and wrote the chapter, with 
feedback from my co-author. Chapter 4 was conceptually developed and written by myself. 
My co-promotor and co-author Karen Maas helped structure the paper and provided 
extensive feedback. 
Chapter 5 was developed conceptually and written by myself together with my co-authors 
Elisa Achterberg and Friedemann Polzin, (I took a lead role). Data collection at banks 
(interviews and workshops) was carried out by the three authors with help from Rens van 
Tilburg and Aglaia Fischer. Data collection at firms (interviews) was split between members 
of the author team of the management book Route Circulair: notably Dionne Ewen, Lieke 
Ossenblok, Guido Braam and myself. I coded all the data and carried out the data analysis. 
I wrote the discussion and conclusion, which my co-authors in multiple feedback rounds 
contributed to which improved the focus of the paper.  
Chapter 6 was developed conceptually by myself and my co-authors Erik Stam and 
Friedemann Polzin. Erik Stam pointed us to the (existing) dataset and helped develop a frame 
for the paper. Friedemann Polzin and I wrote the theoretical framework and carried out the 
data analysis (based on an existing data set) and wrote the results, discussion and conclusion 
section with approximately similar efforts. We both carried out the revisions that were 
required for publication in Small Business Economics.  
Chapter 7 was conceptually developed by myself with input from Karen Maas. The data 
collection (Nationaal Crowdfunding Onderzoek) was a joint effort between the Hogeschool 
van Amsterdam, Universiteit Utrecht (Sustainable Finance Lab), CrowdfundingHub and 
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Impact Centre Erasmus. I took a lead role in developing the survey and collecting the data. 
I wrote most of the paper, Karen Maas provided written input on the theory section. 
Chapter 8 was developed conceptually by myself. I carried out the literature review and 
wrote the theoretical framework. I carried out the data collection and analysis and wrote the 
results and discussion. My co-author Friedemann Polzin helped structure the paper, wrote 
part of the methods section and provided feedback on all sections.
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2 Innovating for impact investing: financial institutions and 
beyond2 
 
Abstract 
Financial institutions can create positive impact for our society by allocating capital and 
spreading risks. However, in many cases, financial institutions fail to optimally invest in 
maximizing society’s wellbeing. Impact investing has arisen as a supplement to traditional 
financial institutions in order to direct capital allocation more towards society’s wellbeing. 
We define three main conditions under which financial institutions invest with impact and 
we explore directions in which financial innovations may cause more effective allocation of 
capital to impactful investments. We distinguish four areas of impact investing: 1) 
investments that meet individual needs, thereby increasing wellbeing (regular finance), 2) 
mechanisms to reduce investment in products and services that individuals purchase but 
which decreases their or other people’s wellbeing (e.g. carbon credit trading, 3) Investments 
which increase wellbeing of those who possess no purchasing power (e.g. Social Impact 
Bonds), 4) Investments that contribute to the common good (e.g. through crowdfunding). 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Money makes the world go round. In the wrong hands, it brings down countries, finances 
wars and degrades environments. But, in the right hands, it finances sustainable sources of 
energy, spurs innovation and saves lives.  
Impact investing is the deliberate allocation of capital in initiatives that positively impact the 
world. Moreover, we focus specifically on the capital allocation of financial institutions, thus 
not including the investments of other institutions such as philanthropic foundations and 
governments. 
                                                          
2 This chapter is joint work with Karen Maas and Kellie Liket and was published as a book chapter: Toxopeus, H., 
Liket, K., & Maas, K. (2015). Innovating in impact investing: financial institutions and beyond. In Principles and 
Practice of Impact Investing: A Catalytic Revolution. Greenleaf Publishers. 
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The responsibility of financial institutions to take into account the impact of their 
investments is an increasingly hot topic of debate (Borgers & Pownall, 2014; Scholtens, 
2006; Scholtens, Cerin, & Hassel, 2008; G. Williams, 2007). Traditionally, financial 
institutions focus on maximising financial return when making investments, and often argue 
that they are kept to this objective by fiduciary duty (for a discussion, see Amalric, 2006). 
Therefore, financial institutions often invest in activities that are, in their current form, not 
beneficial to society, because of externalities such as environmental damage or because they 
are unbeneficial to the wellbeing of individuals, such as unhealthy or addictive foods. As a 
result of this, an increasing number of scholars investigate the inclusion of social and 
ecological criteria into the capital allocation decision (Borgers & Pownall, 2014; Scholtens, 
2006). 
While many have argued that impact investing is a distinct activity from regular investing 
based on its ‘intent’ to create such an impact (Global Impact Investing Network, 2015; 
Graham & Anderson, 2015) we believe that the term ‘impact investing’ is most useful as a 
concept when it refers to investments which actually make a positive impact compared to a 
relevant benchmark investment, based on research and evaluations. Actual positive results, 
by some pre-defined standard, are what define impact investments in their core, not only 
their (self-reported) intention to create such results.  
Defining impact investment as being results-based should not be confused with definitions 
that include measurability (i.e. World Economic Forum, 2013). When impact measurement 
is included in the definition of impact investment, this still leaves us with two important 
uncertainties. First, an impact investment defined this way could mean both measuring 
output or results (i.e. measuring the number of mosquito nets distributed versus actual 
decrease in malaria incidence as a result of net distribution), Second, by including just impact 
measurement in the definition of impact investing, we also include investments as being 
impact investments where results are measured, but, after measurement took place, turn out 
not to have the positive impact they envisioned. 
We realise that defining an impact investment ex post, by its actual realised result, is a strict 
focus, and that results evaluation is costly. However, we believe this narrow focus to be 
necessary in order to steer resources where they are used most effectively in reaching what 
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we think is the goal of most impact investors—maximising the amount of impact. We also 
see a clear role for the financial sector as an intermediary in this definition of impact 
investing. 
How can financial institutions innovate to increasingly engage in impact investing? Since 
we define impact investing as those investments with actual positive impact, some regular 
investments with a positive impact may count as impact investments. However, this is not a 
carte blanche to financial institutions to put an ‘impact’ stamp on their investments because 
they ‘add value’. Many investments that regular financial institutions undertake may 
produce profits for their investors but are detrimental for either individual wellbeing or the 
common good. As an answer to these shortcomings, alternative financing structures have 
emerged that are able to undertake impact investments that regular financial institutions 
cannot make. The two key topics for our chapter are therefore (1) the role of the regular 
financial sector and (2) financial innovations in impact investing. 
In the first part of this chapter we analyse impact investing by regular financial institutions. 
We expose three conditions under which we classify their investments as impact 
investments. We then focus on two types of misalignment under which regular financial 
institutions have difficulty making impact investments due to insufficient expected financial 
return on investment. In the second part we discuss financial innovations that may widen the 
amount of impactful investments beyond what regular financial institutions are able to do 
within their regular financial investment process. Finally, we give some recommendations 
for future financial innovation that may increase the positive impact of investments.  
2.2 Focusing on impact investing in regular financial institutions 
Financial institutions add great value to our society. The financial sector provides us with 
deposit, payment and insurance services. They ascertain which individuals or enterprises are 
worthy of credit, in the case of banks (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1988) or capital, in the case of banks 
and many types of investment funds. Financial institutions create trust for individuals and 
organizations by taking on, and spreading risks. This allows individuals and businesses to 
coordinate their actions across time and space. In this way, productive activities are 
developed, such as new medications, technological innovations and sustainable energy 
sources, increasing the individual and collective wellbeing in our society. 
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However, we cannot classify all investments by financial institutions as impactful. Financial 
institutions also invest in activities that have a negative impact on society. At the same time, 
other, potentially impactful, investments are not made because they do not fulfil expected 
profit requirements of financial institutions. Both the investment in activities with negative 
impact and the lack of finance for potential impact investments with lower direct financial 
profit result in suboptimal capital allocation from a wellbeing perspective (and in the long-
run, even from a financial perspective). 
Based on our experience in the field of impact evaluation and the financial sector, we 
identified three general conditions that should be met by an investment to be classified as an 
impact investment: (1) the investment is channelled towards non-speculative activity; (2) the 
activity contributes to the wellbeing of its consumers or users; (3) in the course of production 
and consumption, the activity underlying the investment has a neutral or positive effect on 
collective wellbeing (in particular, the environment). We classify investments made by 
financial institutions as impact investments when they fulfil all of these three conditions. We 
will discuss each condition below. 
Non-speculative activities 
Financial institutions finance both productive and trading activities. When financing 
productive activity, the expected future sale of goods and services is the basis of the 
investment. Trading activities include speculation on financial and commodity markets, but 
also financing of the transfer of existing assets to new end users (such as houses, using 
mortgages). In practice there can be a thin line between the two. We define speculation as 
the purchase of a good or asset for later resale (rather than for use), in the expectation of 
profiting from an intervening price change. The main societal function of speculation is that 
it improves the functioning of markets by creating market liquidity by providing 
counterparties to trade with (Mehrling, 2011). This liquidity can potentially improve the 
efficiency of trade of goods and services in global markets. However, in practice, speculation 
can entail large risk-taking and herding by financial parties, leading to prices moving away 
from underlying value, potentially harming that same trade or, in the worst case, leading to 
finance-induced economic crises (Rajan, 2005; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). 
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Not all trade is speculative, however. When issuing mortgages for existing housing stock, 
financial institutions are financing individual trades on the housing market. Mortgages add 
value by enabling households to take an advance on future incomes, thus providing them 
with a long-term place to live. By re-allocating the existing housing stock efficiently and 
passing them down to following generations, houses are sustainable, long-term assets that 
contribute to a basic need. Of course, mortgages need to be issued in line with the income 
generating capacity of its owners, and do carry risks. Large house price fluctuations driven 
by excessive mortgage financing and ensuing financial volatility lead to harmful wealth and 
debt redistributions, as in the case of The Netherlands or Ireland, where 30% and 50% of 
house mortgages were higher than the market value of the house in 2014, respectively (De 
Nederlandsche Bank, 2014). Under these circumstances, investment in mortgages cannot be 
automatically assumed to have only a positive effect on society’s wellbeing, and the housing 
markets needs to be watched with scrutiny to protect its positive impact.  
Based on the arguments above, we classify the financing of productive activity and the 
financing of trade, when connected to an end-user, as potential impact investments. In result, 
our first condition for any impact investment that it is directed towards non-speculative 
activity.  
Contribution to wellbeing 
Even when financial institutions invest in non-speculative activities, these activities may not 
be impact investments when they are detrimental to their consumers’ wellbeing. Examples 
are the adverse long-term effects of some products, such as health deteriorations resulting 
from the consumption of sugary soft drinks or addictive drugs. Most countries have 
regulatory institutions that prohibit their financial institutions to invest in products and 
services that result in overwhelming negative impact, such as coal, tar sands or doubtful 
humanitarian regimes. Unfortunately, it does not follow automatically that investments that 
are allowed, are automatically beneficial to its users or stakeholders. There exists ample 
political lobbying to allow productive activities even if their long-term negative effect on 
wellbeing has been scientifically proven, like in the case of tobacco (Palazzo & Richter, 
2005). Investment in tobacco is not prohibited, even though the World Health Organisation 
(2002) estimates that tobacco kills about half of its users during their lifetime. It is up to 
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financial institutions themselves to decide to refrain from investing in this type of health-
detrimental production. 
The reason that we cannot only leave it up to consumers themselves to decide what is good 
for them is that people are often unable to make rational decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981). Their preferences change, unrelated to the underlying value proposition, simply as a 
reaction to the ‘framing’ of the product (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002). 
Furthermore, consumers are able to choose between products and services that have made it 
to the market, which are for a large part those activities which financial institutions were 
willing to finance. Consumers cannot buy products that did not make it to the market in the 
first place.  
We therefore argue that financial institutions play a shaping role in the direction of economic 
development, not just consumer demand. Schumpeter, (1912) is often cited as the first 
economist to pinpoint the powerful role of the financial sector as an enabler of 
entrepreneurial innovation. Although much discussion on the topic exists, evidence shows 
that financial intermediation and markets indeed affect economic growth (Levine, 2005). 
For financial intermediation to not only increase economic growth, but lead to impactful 
growth, we argue that the wellbeing of consumers should be taken into account in the 
investment decision.  
If financial institutions select those investments that do not only enable non-speculative 
activity for which there is demand, but also add to wellbeing of consumers, two of the 
conditions of impact investing are fulfilled.  
Contribution to common goods  
Productive activities that contribute to the wellbeing of their consumers might still not be 
impact investments if they negatively affect common goods. We define common goods, or 
common-pool resources, as goods from which it is difficult to exclude others, unlike private 
goods, and which are subtractive, unlike public goods (Ostrom, 2010a). Clean air, wild fish 
stocks and public drinking water basins are examples of common goods. Their consumption 
leaves less for others to consume, both in the short term and sometimes in the long term, if 
consumption is above regeneration levels. Many productive activities, even if they represent 
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private goods and cater to important basic demands, affect our common goods negatively at 
some point in their production or consumption process.  
We illustrate this with two of our basic needs, energy and food production. Energy 
production results in increased economic activity and mobility but, in the case of fossil fuels, 
affects our air quality and contributes to climate change (Stern, 2008). Food production, such 
as livestock or wheat, is a productive activity that usually adds to the wellbeing of its 
consumers, but when produced at the detriment of common-pool resources (through air 
pollution and deforestation) at scales that create climate change (Stern, 2008) should still not 
be classified as an impact investment.  
At the same time, innovative, sustainable production and consumption of both energy and 
food can create a more positive impact on our commons that regular production processes 
do. Sometimes this sustainable innovation may even lead to more profit as well, but not 
always.  
In conclusion, financial institutions can increase the impact of their investments by screening 
and searching for projects that fulfil these three conditions—non-speculative activities, 
contribution to wellbeing, and a contribution to common goods—next to their own criteria 
on financial profitability. 
2.3 Innovating for more impact investing  
In the first part of this chapter, we have outlined the conditions that need to be met to classify 
investments by financial institutions as impactful. However, to improve society’s wellbeing 
we need to increase the amount of impact investments beyond what financial institutions can 
do by redirecting their portfolios within their current structures, and focus on the impactful 
investments that could potentially be made.  
In this second part of the chapter, we therefore focus on financial innovations that could 
enable us to create more impact through impact investing. We describe potentially impactful 
investments that adhere to the three core conditions (non-speculative activity, contribution 
to wellbeing and contribution to commons) but will not be financed by financial institutions 
due to inadequate financial returns. This lack of profit is due to two types of misalignment 
between purchasing power and wellbeing: 
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1. Willingness to pay for common goods is missing. The benefits of the activity that 
seeks financing accrue partly to the common good, and consumers are unwilling to 
pay the extra costs that allow for governance of the common good during production 
and consumption. 
2. Ability to pay for wellbeing is missing. The benefits of the activity that seeks 
financing accrue largely to the benefit of its potential consumers, but those in demand 
of this productive activity lack the purchasing power to pay for it.  
Impact investments that suffer from one of the above misalignments (or the combination of 
the two) often lie beyond the scope of mainstream finance. Financial institutions cannot 
invest when consumers are unable or unwilling to use their purchasing power to pay for the 
product or service being financed. Financial institutions operate within solvency, liquidity 
and (often) shareholder requirements, forcing them to focus on financial benefits that flow 
back to them directly. Therefore, expected (or real) purchasing decisions of consumers are 
the dealmaker or –breaker in investments, not the level of contribution to wellbeing or the 
commons of these investments.  
Some argue that investment in products and services that contribute to wellbeing and the 
common good, that individuals cannot or are unwilling to pay for, is the responsibility of 
government and philanthropic organizations. Indeed, these large financiers are less stringent 
on financial returns and aim for wellbeing or common good governance at some 
geographical level. They therefore present important solutions. However, when applying 
financial innovations to these two misalignments, financial institutions can play a role in 
allocating capital to impactful investments, in addition to government and philanthropy.  
Below (Table 2-1) we illustrate how innovations in finance can help the financial sector to 
make impactful investments even when individual ability or willingness to pay for individual 
wellbeing or the common good, are missing. On the horizontal axis, we distinguish between 
investments that contribute to individual wellbeing or common goods. On the vertical axis, 
we distinguish between the type purchasing power that is addressed to pay for the impactful 
investments: individual or collective purchasing power.  
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This creates four scenarios in which different types of financial innovation may be employed 
to organise impactful investments through the financial sector. We will describe the financial 
innovations that answer to each of these scenarios.  
Table 2-1 How financial innovations may solve purchasing power misalignments 
 Individual Wellbeing Common goods 
Individual purchasing 
power 1. Regular impact investing  2. Pricing the commons  
Collective purchasing power  3. Public – Private Finance  4. Community Finance 
 
1. Regular impact investing 
In the first of these four scenarios (top-left quadrant), individual purchasing power is 
available and used to improve individual wellbeing, and sufficient expected financial return 
is generated by the enterprise involved. Here, regular finance provides impact investments 
by fulfilling the three core conditions: non-speculative activity, contribution to wellbeing 
and the common good. This is the type of impact investment we described in the first part 
of this chapter. Under these conditions the investment can be made without financial 
innovation.  
2. Pricing the commons 
In the second quadrant (top-right), individual purchasing power is addressed to pay (extra) 
for collective wellbeing. The strategy here is to incorporate the cost of sustaining our 
common goods into the price of products and services and ask companies and consumers to 
pay for this cost on an individual basis. We give two examples of this strategy. Firstly, 
markets are created to create a price tag for externalities such as CO2 or sulphur dioxide 
emissions. Companies trade carbon credits depending on their pollution levels, thereby 
entering (decreased) emissions into economic calculations by giving them a price 
(MacKenzie, 2009). This translates the cost of sustainable governance of our commons into 
a price in terms of currency (euro, dollars).  
In other instances, the costs of creating a positive impact on collective wellbeing is 
quantified and integrated in the price of a product by producers, themselves, without a 
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market where this impact is traded. Consumers are asked to pay extra for products that have 
no negative impact or even a positive impact on collective wellbeing, such as biological 
eggs, milk and meat; carbon compensation for flights; sustaining rainforests by buying 
certified wood; fair trade chocolate. Furthermore, by either institutionalizing communicating 
this additional aspect of the product convincingly to the consumer, producers ask consumers 
to pay extra for this. The success of this strategy is dependent on the ability and willingness 
of the individual to pay a premium for this positive impact (i.e. De Pelsmacker, Driesen, & 
Rayp, 2005). 
3. Public—private finance 
In the third quadrant (bottom-left), collective purchasing power is addressed to improve 
individual wellbeing. This quadrant is of importance when a product or service can improve 
the wellbeing of individuals, but these individuals have no purchasing power available to 
invest in their wellbeing, themselves. Regular financial institutions cannot finance this 
productive activity without some type of purchasing power. Traditionally, this is the 
quadrant of government spending (i.e. welfare payments). By combining private and public 
investment in an innovative way, private sector financing can play a role and potentially 
make the investment more impactful than if made solely through the government. The main 
example in this category is the Social Impact Bond (SIB). Here, a private investment is made 
to reach some public goal (Jackson, 2013; Warner, 2013), such as higher levels of youth 
employment through a mentoring programme. If the investment turns out to obtain the 
intended result (i.e. a higher level of employment is achieved due to the intervention), the 
government pays a results-based financial return to the private financier. In this way, 
collective purchasing power via the government is only spent when results are achieved and 
unnecessary costs are saved while obtaining impact for society. Also, the risk of the 
investment and part of the return is shifted to the financial sector. Individual wellbeing of 
the youth improves, because they move from receiving unemployment benefits to being able 
to generate their own income, and costs are saved for government due to lower 
unemployment benefit payments.  
These types of investments allow wellbeing of those with little purchasing power to be 
improved by solving or preventing problems (investing in training, developing a vaccine), 
instead of collectively paying for problems that are not being solved (high unemployment 
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benefits and high healthcare costs). Using collective purchasing power to improve individual 
wellbeing in an innovative way through the financial sector allows investments to be results-
based and give a financial return. It links the improvement of individual wellbeing to 
financial return by using the public funds more efficiently than otherwise if continuously 
needing to deal with persisting problems. 
4. Community finance 
In the fourth (bottom-right) quadrant, collective purchasing power is addressed to contribute 
to common goods. Again, often governments provide funds to improve our common goods, 
such as infrastructure or governance of ecological systems. Nevertheless, governments, due 
to political priorities and lack of public funding, do not fund many potential improvements 
in collective wellbeing, even if they may lead to lower public spending needs on the longer 
term. Also, governments are not always able to identify and execute the most impactful 
investments at community levels. At an individual level, people may be unwilling or unable 
to reach some threshold investment needed to organise a common good.  
Through community finance, the financial sector is able to make impactful investments 
happen that individuals and governments cannot. Crowdfunding is the main example of this 
type of innovation where financing is provided through a network or community. It refers to 
efforts by entrepreneurial individuals and groups—cultural, social, and for-profit—to fund 
their projects online by drawing on relatively small contributions from a relatively large 
number of individuals in exchange for financial and/or in-kind return (adapted from 
(Mollick, 2014). Although crowdfunding can be used for funding all kinds of initiatives, 
there are elements in its structure that seem to increase willingness to invest in common 
goods (adapted from Toxopeus & Maas, 2017):  
a. Diversity of payoff structures creates room for coordinated investment in the 
commons based on tailor-made, hybrid payoffs, two-way information flows and 
specific matching of costs and benefits. Due to the ability to give in-kind return or 
‘community benefits’, it might be easier to convince stakeholders to fund, even when 
expected financial return is lower (for a theoretical model see (Belleflamme, Lambert, 
& Schwienbacher, 2014). 
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b. Its flexible project-based investment structure makes it very suitable for adjusting to 
different levels and sizes of cooperation needed that lead to collective impact. 
Bringing benefits and costs in line with each other at the level where in-kind benefits 
are received or judged important (depending on preferences), is a way to create a ‘fair 
share’ financing structure, where everyone contributes to provide a larger good. 
c. The public nature of the investment process, where potential investors can view who 
has invested already, can improve individual propensity to cooperate in financing the 
commons. Behavioural research shows that almost half of the population can be 
described as ‘conditional co-operators’, meaning that they mimic cooperation levels of 
other individuals around them (S. S. Levine & Prietula, 2014). A public list of 
previous investors can therefore influence the investment behaviour of others. 
Since investment of this kind is voluntary, not all who benefit will contribute. As long as a 
significant group carries the cost of the investment in common goods together, some free 
riding will be tolerated. However, if not enough ‘co-operators’ emerge, cooperation is likely 
to break down (Vollan & Ostrom, 2010). Creating smart financial structures that increase 
the willingness to financing the commons, using behavioural economic insights, can 
contribute to the amount of impactful investments that are made. 
2.4 Conclusion and discussion 
Money makes our world go round, but it does not automatically create its optimal amount 
of impact. In this chapter we have outlined conditions under which regular financial 
institutions allocate capital to investments that have a positive impact in our world. However, 
because of the current form of financial institutions, there are limits to which they can engage 
in impact investing. Therefore, we have also shown how financial innovations, such as social 
impact bonds and crowdfunding, can extend the ability of the financial sector to allocate 
capital in an impactful way.   
Describing ways for regular and innovative financial institutions to make impact investments 
is only the starting point. The next question is how this can be extended to new innovations, 
scaled up, and improved. We suggest two main directions in which progress could be made.  
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1. Create a well-organised learning loop for optimizing impact. Money has a natural 
learning loop (if we aim to earn more money, we know ex post if we succeeded or 
not). If we want to improve the impact of our investments, we need to know which 
investments, ex post, actually turned out to really be impact investments (and why). 
Building up, sharing and applying impact knowledge, through evaluations and 
research, will make investments more impactful. This impact knowledge will help 
regular financial institutions and financial innovations (such as social impact bonds 
and crowdfunding) to improve the causality between their capital allocation decision-
making to real impactful results.  
2. Continue to develop financial innovation that increases and improves credit and 
capital allocation to create impactful results. For instance, impact investing can also 
take place in other types of money systems than the one we are used to (euro’s, 
dollars). Complementary currencies and mutual credit systems have existed for 
decades, often aimed at providing purchasing power to those individuals and 
companies that lack this in the dominant money system, in cash-poor regions or 
during economic downturns (Stodder, 2009). Alternative money systems allow 
productive activity to take place by creating an alternative form of trust. The 
development of information technology and ensuing lower transaction costs involved, 
has given a boost to the development of a diversity of alternative currencies and credit 
systems, such as the Blockchain-based Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008) and mutual credit 
systems such as Sardex (Littera, Sartori, Dini, & Antoniadis, 2014). Regional mutual 
credit systems like Sardex in Sardinia and more historically, the Wirtschaftsring 
(WIR) in Switzerland, have a focus on regional, productive activity by design (Littera 
et al., 2014; Stodder, 2009). Intuition suggests that some of these credit systems may 
support production and trade that adheres to our core conditions: non-speculative, 
contributing to wellbeing and positive effect on our commons. Speculative activity is 
excluded by design, and production and trade is regional which means that wellbeing 
effects will be more transparent to buyers and producers, possibly leading to higher 
considerations of individual and collective wellbeing. Other innovative currencies, 
such as the bitcoin, are currently highly volatile and speculative. More research is 
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needed to find out whether new types of innovations could help us make impactful 
investments and under what circumstances.  
Despite our attempt to illustrate the wide range of impact investments that financial 
institutions, through smart innovation, can allocate capital to, some impact investments will 
remain out of scope for them. Here, philanthropic organizations or governments are needed 
to act as (co-)investors. In spite of all efforts to bring enough stakeholders with purchasing 
power aboard to bear the costs of investment, beyond doubt there will remain cases where a 
country, region or sector is so devoid of stakeholders with purchasing power that 
government, civil society and philanthropy are needed, or that they are best positioned to 
make an investment. But in an increasingly interconnected world with growing opportunities 
for networks, and increasingly smart technologies, the evolving role of innovative, impactful 
finance may fill more gaps than we can currently imagine. 
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3 Credit that serves society requires relationships3 
 
Abstract 
Good credit provision involves not only a successful transaction but also requires taking into 
account the larger context in which this credit is granted. The authors describe this as ‘credit 
that serves society’ and follow the literature that assigns a broad societal responsibility to 
credit, not only from a social and sustainable point of view but also in terms of a well-
functioning economy in the longer term. They substantiate the concept of ‘credit that serves 
society’ in terms of knowing, trusting and serving (Rupert et al., 2016). The authors explore 
the conditions under which knowing, trusting and serving can be developed within both 
relationship banking and transaction banking. Their conclusion is that in order to serve 
society, it is crucial to embed the credit in a relationship. 
3.1 Introduction 
A Buddhist community in Great Britain recently obtained a loan at a bank. This was possible 
because they were able to demonstrate to the bank that they contributed to the lives of their 
members in a meaningful way and that stable cash flows from the members had been 
contributed (voluntarily) to this community for many years. Had the credit application been 
based on a standardised credit model, it would probably have been rejected. In banking 
terms, the loan was sound because the social embeddedness of this credit was recognised as 
an important security instrument for the bank. By focusing on the larger picture in which the 
credit application took place, the ‘relationship banker’ was able to literally value the existing 
relationships, while a ‘transaction banker’ might have assessed the non-contractual cash 
flows as too risky. For a bank, extending credit that serves society means being willing and 
able to assess the significance of an organisation in a larger context. 
                                                          
3 This essay was published (in Dutch) in Management & Organisatie as Toxopeus & Blom (2016) “Dienstbaar 
krediet kan niet zonder relaties”. It is based on conversations between the authors about credit allocation and on a 
joint presentation at the ERGO III Conference in September 2015. Many thanks to Thomas Steiner and Christine 
van Waveren for their contributions. 
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Spotcap, an online business credit provider, recently entered the Dutch market. On the basis 
of company data provided online, an entrepreneur can – within two working days – get 
access to a line of credit which can be flexibly drawn down and repaid. The credit is provided 
on the basis of an algorithm that analyses current business data and publicly accessible 
information about the entrepreneur. No meetings or conversations are required. 
Since the rise of transaction banking in the 1980s the playing field of banks has changed 
significantly due to deregulation, internationalisation, new forms of capital provision and 
technological developments that continuously reduce the costs of storing and processing 
information (Rajan, 2005). It is no coincidence that the term ‘relationship banking’ arose 
around the time when other forms of banking were introduced (Boot, 2000). Today, 
relationship banking is only one of several possible lending techniques to provide credit. 
Credit decisions can, for example, also be made primarily on the basis of financial data, a 
company’s credit score or valuation of the collateral (Berger & Udell, 2006). If the theologist 
and philosopher Augustine had known about transaction-based lending, he would probably 
have wondered where the ‘love’ was in this credit decision. We are also asking that question 
here, only we are replacing the notion of ‘love’ in the context of bank lending with the notion 
of ‘serving society’. Our research question is as follows: does credit that serves society 
emerge both from relationship banking and transaction banking, and if so, under which 
circumstances? 
In this article, we first describe the credit function of banks and go into detail about how 
relationship banking and transaction banking are different institutional settings for the credit 
process. We then define the concept of ‘credit that serves society’ and further specify this 
into the three qualities of knowing, trusting and serving. We then use this interpretation of 
credit that serves society and our understanding of relationship lending versus transaction 
lending to answer our main question. We close the article with a discussion and the 
conclusion that without relationships, credit that serves society is not possible.  
3.2 Banks as lenders 
One of the most influential roles of banks in our society is determining who is creditworthy 
and thus which of the applicants can carry out the economic activity they had planned. This 
was formulated by Stiglitz & Weiss (1988) as follows: “To gain access over current 
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resources (...) one simply has to convince others that one will fulfil one’s promise to deliver 
goods (money) in the future in return for what one receives today – that one is, in other 
words, creditworthy. And it is natural, given the economic importance of ascertaining 
whether individuals or firms are creditworthy, that institutions develop which specialize in 
ascertaining creditworthiness.”  
In practice, determining creditworthiness means dealing with asymmetric information 
between lender and borrower (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Lenders assess the quality of the 
borrower (to counter adverse selection) and monitor whether the credit is used in the agreed 
manner to prevent moral hazard (Berger & Udell, 2002).  
In this article, we focus specifically on the bank as a lender. Banks are not the only 
intermediaries that provide credit – credit can also be raised on financial markets by issuing 
corporate bonds – but they can be considered influential because of the possibility to create 
‘new credit’ by increasing their balance sheet (Bernanke, 2007; McLeay, Radia, & Thomas, 
2014). Financial markets are also often inaccessible to smaller companies, so banks are often 
the only possible source of credit for these companies (Berger & Udell, 2002; Brancati, 
2015), although the growth of peer-to-peer and crowdfunding markets is changing this 
(Forbes, 2015; Massolution, 2015).  
3.3 Instrumental credit or credit that serves society? 
Creditworthiness is often determined solely on the basis of the probability of repayment. 
However, we go one step further and use the term ‘credit that serves society’ in line with the 
literature that assigns broader responsibility to lending (Campiglio, 2016; Scholtens, 2006; 
Weber, Diaz, & Schwegler, 2014). 
Lending influences the success of credit providers and credit applicants, but also steers the 
type of economic activity that takes place. Wider developments in society, such as the 
amount of clean air, high-quality jobs, products, services, cultural development and how we 
develop the living environment are indirectly determined by who receives credit and who 
does not. 
How far does the responsibility of banks reach when it comes to the broader effects of their 
lending? We distinguish two visions – a narrow responsibility and a broad responsibility. 
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Narrow responsibility (instrumental credit) 
From this perspective, banks are responsible for keeping their own balance sheet financially 
sound. Any externalities arising from operations, whether financed or not, are the 
responsibility of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or public authorities. NGOs do 
this through philanthropy and actions in the public domain on topics that affect people, 
groups and society as a whole.  
The government can address externalities through taxation, subsidies or establishing 
markets. A price can be assigned to public goods through regulated markets, which means 
that they are handled more carefully in business operations (as in the case of CO2 emissions; 
see MacKenzie, 2009). 
Markets are thus the regulatory mechanism; the government corrects imperfections exposed 
by NGOs and market players – including banks – are expected to follow the market 
according to the laws of supply and demand. 
Broad responsibility (credit that serves society) 
In addition to the narrow responsibility mentioned above, banks also bear indirect 
responsibility for the externalities of the companies they finance. Therefore, they should 
include the impact on society – of which the company is part – in credit decisions, even if 
the externalities do not affect the company’s repayment capacity (Campiglio, 2016). 
This way of thinking and acting can, for instance, be found among banks that are members 
of the Global Alliance of Banking on Values (GABV) and among banks that subscribe to 
the Equator principles, a covenant for responsible project financing (Scholtens & Dam, 
2007; Weber, 2013). The Bankers’ Oath, a moral code developed by the Dutch banking 
sector, also aims to appeal to a broader responsibility of banks towards customers and society 
(Boatright, 2013).  
In this article, we define a broad responsibility in lending by judging the significance of the 
credit in society as a whole - including those effects that do not directly benefit the bank or 
the borrower - as credit that serves society. We see this interpretation of the bank balance 
sheet as a critical ingredient for socially engaged banking. We examine what credit that 
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serves society means in practice and whether – and if so, how – this can be achieved through 
both relationship banking and transaction banking. 
3.4 Relationship lending versus transaction lending 
A bank loan can be granted in various ways; the lending technique used often depends on 
the bank itself and the type of enterprise applying for credit. Banks’ lending techniques can 
be classified according to the following four factors (Berger & Udell, 2006):2946): 
1. Primary information source (such as relationship or financial reporting); 
2. Screening and underwriting policies/procedures (such as track record and assessed 
collateral value); 
3. Structure of the loan contract (such as ownership and collateral); 
4. Monitoring strategies and mechanisms. 
Relationship banking is characterised mainly by establishing and maintaining a relationship 
with the borrower as a primary source of information and monitoring strategy. (Boot, 
2000):10) defines relationship banking as ‘the provision of financial services by a financial 
intermediary that (i) invests in obtaining customer-specific information, often proprietary in 
nature; and (ii) evaluates the profitability of this customer-specific time investment on the 
basis of multiple interactions with this customer over time and/or across products’. In the 
case of relationship lending, the information is often difficult to transfer (‘soft’) and can also 
be gathered through direct contact with the stakeholders connected to the entrepreneur, such 
as suppliers, customers and related companies (Berger & Udell, 2006).  
Within transaction lending several different lending technologies can be distinguished 
(Berger & Udell, 2006). Banks obtain the information for transaction-based credit decisions 
primarily by gathering various types of transferable (‘hard’) information. The best known 
transaction lending technology is financial statement lending, where, as a primary source of 
information and risk assessment, consideration is given to financial reporting – in particular 
the relationship between equity and debt – and the ability to repay the credit from expected 
future cash flows. In credit scoring, the credit history of (the owner of) the company is 
obtained, often via credit registration agencies, and the personal repayment capacity is seen 
as security. In asset-based lending, credit is provided primarily on the basis of the value of 
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a subset of the assets of a firm, such as property, inventories and receivables. The value of 
this collateral is monitored during the term of the loan and determines the credit amount. 
Fixed-asset lending is similar but only involves assets that are not sold in the normal course 
of business, such as vehicles and real estate. In factoring, accounts receivable are sold to 
generate liquidity for a borrower based on the value of the borrower’s accounts receivable. 
Finally, leasing is a transaction lending technique strongly linked to the property, where the 
lender becomes the owner and leases the property instead of financing it, with all possible 
intermediary forms (Berger & Udell, 2006). 
All these lending technologies, based either on transactions or relationships, are ways of 
dealing with asymmetric information and ensure that the bank can properly assess credit 
risk, such as the probability of default and loss in case of default for the bank. 
3.5 Credit that serves society in relationship banking and transaction 
banking 
Can credit that serves society be provided in relationship banking and transaction banking, 
and if so, how? To answer this question, it is necessary to further substantiate the concept of 
‘credit that serves society’. In order to do this we draw inspiration from Rupert et al., (2016), 
who study Augustine’s concept of ‘caritas’, and apply it to the firm as an entity (p. 23): “As 
part of society, a firm serves the interests of various groups in society and is, at the same 
time, dependent on those groups. It is therefore necessary to know those groups and to have, 
place and maintain trust in them. Reciprocity is most explicitly expressed in the ability to 
serve these groups, as this encompasses a service to oneself.” 
We thus apply the concepts of knowing (‘to know’), trusting (‘to trust’) and serving (‘to 
serve’) as key requirements in defining the concept of credit that serves society. This is in 
line with the introductory article of this theme issue (van Geest, Commandeur, & Langerak, 
2016). We examine whether and how these conditions can be shaped in the lending process 
for both relationship banking and transaction banking. 
To know 
Augustine interpreted ‘knowing’ in a much broader sense than rational or intellectual 
knowledge; he referred to knowing what goes on in others’ minds, such as desires, fears, 
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plans, thoughts, emotions and reflections (Rupert et al., 2016). ‘To know’ originates from 
love and respect for the other, rather than it being merely an instrument of self-interest. 
Knowing the borrower is the first step in a process of lending characterised by overcoming 
asymmetric information (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). The key requirement for knowing the 
entrepreneur is therefore: does the lender have access to the information needed to make a 
credit decision that serves society? 
In relationship banking, ‘knowing’ arises through building a relationship with the 
entrepreneur. As a result, the bank will understand the significance of the credit in a larger 
context, i.e. not only from the bank’s experience but also from the perception of the 
entrepreneur and his surroundings. The entrepreneur will respond to unexpected 
circumstances in the context of his surroundings; understanding this is essential for the bank 
when it comes to trust. 
Information about the broader context of the credit will logically become part of the 
information-gathering process of the bank. It seems impossible to limit the provision of 
information to hard facts and figures when banker and entrepreneur are in a one-to-one 
conversation. In theory, a conversation can be limited to the transmission of hard facts that 
are important from the perspective of collateral for the bank, but the question is whether this 
makes the conversation worthwhile. Meaningful ‘knowing’ arises when the relationship is 
also about discussing ‘what goes on in the other person’ (Rupert et al., 2016). What 
motivates the entrepreneur to develop the company? What is the worldview of the 
entrepreneur? What is the entrepreneur’s  relevance in the larger context in which he 
operates? How does the entrepreneur experience this? In what way are opportunities created 
for others and for future generations? 
In relationship banking, ‘knowing’ involves both instrumental information and information 
about the broader significance of the credit. The art of lending is to relate these different 
information types to each other. Where and how is the entrepreneur’s passion expressed in 
the figures? Examples are overly high expectations of an ambitious, opportunistic 
entrepreneur, or excessive buffers and too little ideas and innovation when there is fear of 
entrepreneurship and associated risks. 
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Insight into repayment capacity is a prerequisite for providing credit. Moreover, 
understanding the socio-economic context in which the loan is given can provided more 
certainty about how the entrepreneur will deal with unexpected circumstances, whether he 
is well embedded in the market and whether he has a good relationship with relevant 
stakeholders. It is important for the entrepreneur that the bank, too, provides insight into the 
larger context. The bank is often better placed to identify sector-wide and macroeconomic 
developments and the challenges facing the sector in which the entrepreneur operates. 
We conclude that obtaining information about the broader embeddedness of the credit and 
about the entrepreneur in relationship banking occurs naturally, provided that the 
relationship banker seeks this information in his contact with the entrepreneur and relevant 
stakeholders and that the entrepreneur shares this information. 
Within transaction banking, information about the broader significance of the credit and the 
entrepreneur must first be expressed in hard, transferable facts to facilitate knowing the 
broader societal context. But is this possible? We believe, to a certain extent, that it is, but 
that it is a major challenge. Measurable environmental factors are, for instance, indicators 
like CO2 emissions, the number of jobs created by the company, or the weight and 
composition of the company’s waste streams. There are countless initiatives, companies and 
scientists that focus on rigorously researching the environmental and societal effects of 
companies, striving to make this measurable and reporting on such impacts (Maas & Liket, 
2010, 2011)  so that lenders can use this information to inform their credit decisions. 
At the same time, the way in which the loan will impact the broader context in which the 
entrepreneur acts, is often so diverse and complex that many of these effects cannot (yet) be 
quantified. If we want to get a grasp of ‘knowing’ during transaction-based lending, with 
attention for the broader context, gathering factual, transferable information will often be 
insufficient. 
In transaction banking, information about the broader impact of the credit is not 
automatically obtained during the information-gathering process, unlike in relationship 
banking. When information is gathered – sometimes through external parties – for instance 
about credit history, value of the collateral or debtors, no information is provided about 
matters such as the entrepreneur’s motives or the expected societal impact of his company. 
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The lender should therefore be prepared to look beyond existing sources of information or 
involve external parties (such as specialised credit bureaus) to gather information about the 
broader significance of the credit. 
The extent to which this contextual information can be made hard and transferable, as well 
as the question of who will gather this information and bear the associated costs, are major 
challenges in transaction-based banking for assessing whether the entrepreneur is 
sufficiently capable of undertaking meaningful action in a changing economic reality. 
To trust 
Trust is an important prerequisite for truly getting to know each other: it allows people to 
open up and let their guard down. At the same time, trust stems from the process of knowing, 
which ‘creates a relationship on the basis of an intrinsic motivation to be meaningful to the 
other’ (Rupert et al., 2016). Trusting draws on vulnerability and courage based on love, 
rather than on fear (Bovenberg, 2014).  
We formulate the central condition of trust as follows: is the lender able, given the 
information available, to make an embedded credit decision that takes the societal context 
into account? Dealing with facts and figures in a manner that serves society is a key 
requirement. In this case, trust builds on the future and how the entrepreneur will deal with 
this uncertain future. 
Trust is the cornerstone of every credit relationship and can have different origins, ranging 
from the valuation of the collateral to the assessment of the company’s financial projections 
and the quality of the entrepreneur. When does this trust serve society? For trust that ‘serves’, 
it must arise for both parties out of motivation to be meaningful to the other. This means that 
the bank not only makes its decision based on availability of guarantees (such as collateral) 
but is confident that the loan serves the entrepreneur and that the company or project for 
which it is intended has a real chance of success. 
During the lending process, trust needs to emerge regarding the significance of the economic 
activity for others. This includes the trust that the enterprise that receives the bank credit will 
make a positive difference for consumers and maintain a good relationship with suppliers, 
and is meaningful for future generations through consideration of the environment in which 
the enterprise operates. By embedding the credit transaction in the dimensions of space and 
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time, its significance for society and future generations, such as issues like climate and the 
relationship between rich and poor, will be considered naturally by bankers and 
entrepreneurs. 
An important condition for granting a loan in this way is the lender’s ability to develop well-
founded trust in the entrepreneur, given the context for which the loan is granted. The lender 
must first be able to obtain this information (to know) and then to interpret it carefully (to 
trust). 
In the case of relationship banking, the relationship banker is the appropriate person to assess 
the impact of the credit on the larger context in which it is provided. During the relationship 
with the (prospective) borrower, information is collected based on which the relationship 
banker’s understanding and trust can grow. These may involve personal conversations or 
company visits, but also getting to know the direct stakeholders and the sector in which the 
company operates. 
Although valuation of collateral, financial reporting and other factual information are all part 
of the credit process in relationship banking, extending credit that serves society requires a 
process in which the lender should not only trust the entrepreneur’s ability to repay but also 
the added value of the economic activity that is undertaken with the credit. Precisely when 
hard, predictive data are lacking, the relationship banker’s individual judgement becomes 
crucial. From this point of view, the most experienced relationship bankers should focus on 
start-ups and younger entrepreneurs, for whom it is often difficult to demonstrate 
creditworthiness. The recruitment, training and development of high quality relationship 
bankers is therefore an important condition for extending trust for credit that serves society. 
In the case of transaction banking, hard transferable information is gathered during the loan 
application process, on the basis of which trust is (or is not) created. This is usually done by 
processing this information according to standardised models. The development of 
serviceable trust in transaction banking depends on the ability of credit decision models, and 
the bankers who construct these models, to carefully weigh the available contextual 
information in the credit model. Stakeholder references and data provided by the 
entrepreneur and public online information can be a surrogate for a relational approach and 
can, in part, be effective because such information can deliver objective insights. As soon as 
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the information about the larger context in which entrepreneurs operate can be digitised and 
transferred, this information can serve the transaction. 
The significance we attach to this information, for example by programming algorithms into 
credit models, remains highly important. It is a challenge to quantify the expected value to 
society and to take this value into account in models, even if this increases the risk or lowers 
the short-term financial return. Without a careful and broad interpretation of such hard, 
transferable information, trust can become focused too much on data and not enough on 
people, the environment and the relevance of the economic activity, and their 
interrelationships. 
To serve 
Serving others involves giving others the opportunity to develop their talent while helping 
them learn from their mistakes (Rupert et al., 2016). In a broader context, ‘to serve’ means 
facilitating and doing justice to mankind’s cultural mandate. This aspect is also strongly 
reflected in the definition of ‘agapè’ of Govert Buijs (2012), as being a person’s concrete 
commitment to the flourishing of someone or something else, on the way to shared joy (also 
and especially when this flourishing and joy are threatened). 
We formulate the central condition for serving society in the credit process as follows: are 
the lender and borrower willing to enter into a mutually beneficial credit process and to carry 
it out in such a way that knowing and trusting are constantly verified? This predominantly 
involves a process that serves each other and society, an interaction between two parties and 
the pursuit of a common larger goal, with mutual understanding of each other’s interests. 
For a long time, economic theory was focused on markets and how subjects behave in these 
markets. The rational pursuit of self-interest would, ultimately, be in everyone’s interest. In 
recent decades, however, relational principles have increasingly become a part of economic 
theory, such as the principle of cooperation (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Vollan & Ostrom, 
2010). 
The mutual aid model was introduced much earlier by ecologist Kropotkin (1908) in 
response to the Darwinist ‘survival of the fittest’ theory. Mutual aid is, in essence, an 
economy that has cooperation, with and for each other, as a starting point. Understood in 
this way, the economy is a social phenomenon. 
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The concept of ‘to serve’, defined as ‘the needs of one’s fellow human beings as a motive 
for one’s own actions’, goes back to the social gesture that underpins every economic 
activity (Brüll, 1984). Joy is shared when serving the other is mutual; by making interests 
run parallel, both parties benefit from the exchange (Bovenberg, 2014). Intentionally 
pursuing both one’s own and the other’s well-being results in good relationships and 
institutional forms of cooperation, and leads to a well-functioning economy at a macro level 
(Bovenberg, 2015). 
When we define the economy as serving mutual interests, banks fulfil a special role in this 
respect. Banks are not ordinary enterprises; as a sector, they have obtained an unwritten 
social contract of mutual service. Banks provide financing for the real economy and, 
implicitly, society acts as a lender of last resort for banks – but only in extreme situations 
and when capital buffers are exhausted. The 2008 crisis has shown that these buffers were 
not strong enough. The Committee for Dutch Banking Structure’s main recommendation is 
therefore to strive for a stable banking system that serves society, where the Committee 
defines serving society as ‘banks operating in the Netherlands are to provide all banking 
products and services required by the Dutch economy, citizens and businesses in their 
development in a socially responsible manner’ (Commissie Structuur Nederlandse Banken, 
2013). 
Banks serve society when they enable (business) activities by providing credit on the basis 
of careful information-gathering, credit assessment and entering into a credit agreement, 
taking into account both the transaction and the significance of the credit in the broader 
context. 
Finally, credit also needs to serve society when dealing with unexpected circumstances. 
Credit contracts are never complete, and in the event of setbacks, win-win situations should 
be sought within a credit agreement – within the possibilities of both parties – rather than 
focusing solely on self-interest. An important condition for ‘serving’ in credit provision, 
therefore, is that banks must be willing to be of service to society and that both parties to the 
credit agreement should interact with each other in a way that serves the other. This also 
implies that entrepreneurs take out a bank loan in a responsible way. By financing itself 
through a bank and becoming part of a larger loan portfolio, the entrepreneur allows risks to 
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be taken on, spreading them and making them acceptable, thereby enabling society to 
develop further. 
Within relationship banking, willingness to take into account the contextual significance of 
the loan is positively influenced by a long-term embeddedness of the banker in the 
community, as well as in the sector in which the entrepreneur operates. Serving the 
entrepreneur during the credit relationship, including in adverse circumstances, is facilitated 
when the credit relationship is embedded in a long-term relationship, allowing the situation 
to be placed in a broader context and enabling help. Serving each other in the credit process 
evolves from long-term involvement in the entrepreneur’s development and the goals the 
bank achieves in doing so, for example for savers and shareholders. With a good knowledge 
of each other’s motivation and ambition to serve the larger whole, there is a greater chance 
that win-win situations will naturally be sought during the credit process. The success of 
both parties is intertwined. 
The ability to serve each other and society in transaction-based banking is highly dependent 
on the way in which, in spite of its transactional orientation, a bank is prepared to include 
the long-term societal ambitions of both the bank and the company in the credit decision. 
This may be at the expense of short-term financial profits. Moreover, banks and companies 
do not always have a long-term relationship in the case of transaction-based banking. This 
willingness to serve each other and society does not arise automatically in a transactional 
credit and it is difficult to implement because of current limitations of quantifying the 
broader impact of the credit. Given the data-driven way in which credit is provided, there is 
the pitfall that a bank does not handle unexpected circumstances (such as collateral that is 
downgraded) in a way that takes into consideration the larger context of the loan, due to a 
lack of insight and involvement with the entrepreneur.  
Based on the analysis above, we summarise the conditions that credit decisions in 
relationship-based banking and transaction-based banking must meet in order to serve 
society (Table 3-1). 
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Table 3-1 Conditions for credit that serves society in relationship and transaction banking 
Conditions for credit that 
serves society Relationship-based banking Transaction-based banking 
To know  
(the ability of getting to know 
the credit applicant) 
The banker explores the 
broader significance of the 
entrepreneur and the credit, 
and the entrepreneur and 
stakeholders are willing to 
share information. 
Information on the broader 
significance of the credit is 
standardised, made 
transferable (hard figures) and 
gathered, for instance through 
new sources of information. 
To trust  
(the ability to take the broader 
significance of the credit into 
account in credit decisions) 
The banker has the expertise 
to carefully judge the broader 
significance of the credit in the 
decision. 
Credit decision models are 
designed and programmed in 
such a way that the broader 
significance of credit is 
carefully considered in the 
decision. 
To serve  
(willingness to maintain the 
relationship in the long term 
and also bear the associated 
uncertainty) 
Embedding the credit in a 
relationship ensures long-term 
commitment and insight into 
the broader impact of the 
credit. 
Information-gathering and 
decision models are purposely 
organised in such a way that 
the broader impact of the 
credit is measured and taken 
into account (both when 
taking out and during the term 
of the loan). 
3.6 Discussion: the future of credit that serves society 
This article aims to answer the question: can relationship and transaction banking both 
provide credit that serves society, and if so, under which conditions? We define credit that 
serves society as taking on a broad responsibility by judging the significance of the credit in 
society as a whole, including those effects that do not directly benefit the bank or the 
borrower. We distinguished relationship-based banking and transaction-based banking by 
means of the primary source of information used for extending the credit, namely the 
relationship with the entrepreneur (relationship-based banking) on the one hand and 
transferable data about the entrepreneur (transaction-based banking) on the other. By 
operationalizing ‘credit that serves society’ into the three underlying concepts of ‘to know’, 
‘to trust’ and ‘to serve’ for both relationship-based and transaction-based banking, we obtain 
three conditions for credit that serves. A bank must: 
(a) be able to gather information about the broader significance of the credit (to know) 
(b) have the capacity to carefully integrate this contextual information in the credit 
decision (to trust) 
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(c) be prepared to grant and maintain the credit in a way that serves both parties and 
society (to serve). 
When we perceive relationship-based and transaction-based lending from these three 
conditions, we find a natural match between credit that serves society and relationship-based 
banking. This is due to the embeddedness of the information-gathering and credit process in 
the relationship between bank and entrepreneur and also because the long-term engagement 
with the entrepreneur can facilitate a serving attitude of the bank. An important point of 
attention in relationship-based banking is the banker’s ability to gather information and 
integrate this into credit decisions using his or her own judgment. If the aim is to provide 
credit that serves society, it is therefore crucial to invest in the development and training of 
relationship bankers. 
Meeting the conditions of ‘credit that serves’ in transaction banking is more challenging. 
First, due to limited data availability it is complicated to really know a business based on 
hard data describing the broader context of the credit, especially in the case of start-ups or 
small companies. There are many initiatives aimed at making ‘hard’ information about 
societal effects of companies more widely available and more meaningful, such as True 
Price, which integrates societal costs and benefits into pricing (De Pelsmacker, Driesen & 
Rayp, 2005; True Price, Deloitte, EY & PwC, 2014). This might provide improved 
understanding. The actual significance (impact) of the entrepreneur for his context often 
remains difficult to assess, in spite of ongoing development of such measurements (Maas & 
Liket, 2011). 
The second condition for credit that serves society is that the credit decision must be made 
thoughtfully (trust) and contextual information must be carefully incorporated into decision 
models, even if this is at the expense of short-term financial returns. This requires a 
conscious strategic decision on the part of the bank. Finally, the same applies to mutual 
serving between the bank and the borrower: without a long-term relationship with the 
entrepreneur, there is no natural involvement of the bank, and investments in the customer 
relationship cannot be spread over the longer term. Isolated events that call for commitment 
on the part of the bank – for example if the entrepreneur runs into financial difficulties – are 
often circumstances in which the ‘numbers no longer add up’. In that case the bank must be 
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prepared to make an assessment of the situation that takes the interest of all parties into 
account. At the same time, we are aware that increasing availability of data - if carefully 
interpreted and integrated into the decision making - can also result in transaction-based 
banking increasingly extending credit that serves society. 
What does this analysis mean for the future of credit that serves society? We pinpoint three 
societal developments that can contribute to the future of credit that serves: technological 
support, robust but non-rigid regulation and cultural change and increasing awareness of role 
on the part of banks. 
Technological support 
By lowering transaction and information costs, technology can facilitate ‘looking the other 
into the eyes’. Information costs continue to decrease, which leads to Big Data but also to 
inexpensive one-to-one contact (such as a personal loan interview via Skype). When 
companies’ production, consumption, distribution and waste chains – and information about 
the impact of their products and services – become transparent, it automatically becomes 
easier to take this information into account in a credit decision. However, technology can 
also lead to anonymity, which decreases the importance of insight into the larger context of 
a credit. 
The way technology impact credit decisions depends on how we use it: what information is 
made available and what information is taken into account in credit decisions? Do our 
decision models ‘serve’ society? When algorithms are developed to enable fast credit 
decisions based on personal credit scores, different credit decisions are made than when 
investors watch personal video messages (as is common on many crowdfunding platforms). 
The first is useful from the point of view of the transaction and the second – if properly 
applied – can help financiers interpret the broader context in which an entrepreneur operates. 
Technology can support credit that serves society when it ensures that information about the 
broader significance of the credit is taken into account in a credit decision and when it can 
bring together parties who, by entering into a credit agreement, want to strengthen each 
other’s goals. For example, users of SnappCar, a car share company, were able to purchase 
subordinated bonds through crowdfunding and were perhaps willing to take more risk 
because of their involvement. 
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Successfully completing a crowdfunding campaign can, for transaction-based banking, also 
be considered ‘hard’ information about the broader relevance of the entrepreneur for a 
subsequent credit application with a bank. After all, the entrepreneur has shown the ability 
to get people committed to his company. In transaction-based banking, the importance of 
relationships may thus come in again through the back door. 
Robust but non-rigid regulation 
Regulation is a natural consequence of the mutual dependence of banks and society. Society 
needs banks and banks need the government. Credit that serves society in relationship-based 
banking specifically requires principle-based supervision, with a strong focus on culture. 
Transaction-based banking requires more attention to the integrity of the underlying data 
and models. 
Setting higher capital requirements for banks has societal advantages and disadvantages. 
One advantage is less risk to society in the short term, and one disadvantage is a risk-averse 
society with less development in the longer term. The stacking of regulations is detrimental 
to the dynamism and diversity of the banking system. Banks can become large and sluggish 
and in danger of turning into protocol machines, with little room for focusing their credit on 
serving society. 
A level playing field does not mean a uniform playing field, but an equivalent starting 
position for small and large, specialised or general. In this respect, supervision is about 
proportionality, while allowing for diversity. While robust regulation is needed, the pitfall 
is wanting to control the reality of credit allocation in all its aspects. 
Cultural change and increasing awareness of purpose 
Greater awareness of the societal relevance and potential for initiating change in banks and 
credit allocation, both among the general public and banks themselves, helps realise credit 
that serves society. Without a clear sense of the purpose of banks, cultural change cannot be 
steered in the right direction. When banks feel a shared responsibility for combating climate 
change, for instance, they can help achieve this by adjusting their credit allocation process 
accordingly. 
Risk models will become more focused on systemic long-term risks related to credit 
provision, reflecting the growing importance of the broader significance of the credit 
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(UNEP, 2015). If banks invest in improving their assessment of the broader context of a 
credit, both through the relationship and the transaction, this can lead to better insights and 
perhaps also better choices. 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this article, we have examined the possibility of extending credit that serves society in 
relationship-based banking as well as transaction-based banking, operationalised in terms of 
‘to know’, ‘to trust’ and ‘to serve’ (Rupert et al., 2016). We see a natural role for relationship 
banking in providing credit that serves society. Taking into account the impact on the larger 
context is self-evident when the credit decision is made on the basis of a longer-term 
relationship with the entrepreneur; moreover, contextual information becomes available 
naturally through relationships. 
Whether or not a relationship-based loan is provided in a way that serves society, depends 
to a large extent on the quality and individual judgment of the relationship banker. 
Transaction-based lending requires transferable and proactively gathered information about 
the broader relevance of the credit, even if this information does not directly affect 
creditworthiness. The challenge lies in willingness – and ability – to take this information 
into account, while in many cases the societal impact of a credit is not (yet) properly 
measurable. Technological development, regulation and cultural change, if used effectively, 
can lead to greater willingness on the part of banks, smarter information-gathering and more 
credit decisions that serve society. 
Ultimately, if credit is not about people and what happens between people when they work 
together with genuine interest, it cannot serve society. “For where two or three are gathered 
together in my name, I am there among them” is a promise made by Jesus (Matthew 18:20) 
which indicates this condition for love and serving. Relationship-based banking brings 
people together; transaction-based banking brings information and models together. Without 
relationships, credit that serves society is not possible. This in no way precludes the 
emancipatory and technological possibilities inherent in transaction-based banking, but 
these possibilities should not become an end in itself. Currently, data-driven development is 
so powerful that it requires renewed attention on and appreciation of the human relationship 
– where it can be known, results in trust and leads to mutual serving.
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4 Crowdfunding sustainable enterprises as a form of collective 
action4 
 
Abstract   
Crowdfunding is viewed as a promising source of finance for sustainable enterprises. We 
apply collective action theory to crowdfunding to better understand its expected potential 
for financing sustainable enterprises. By carrying out a rule classification analysis, we find 
three main mechanisms through which crowdfunding seems to facilitate collective action in 
funding, namely through (1) use of social networks (2) heterogeneity of contributions and 
payoffs and (3) aggregation within thresholds. Our findings improve the conceptual 
understanding of sustainable entrepreneurial finance and provide guidance for social 
enterprises looking to obtain funds as well as for sustainable crowdfunding platforms as 
intermediaries.  
4.1 Introduction 
The necessity of transitioning to a low carbon, sustainable economy has become more urgent 
in recent years (Andersen, 2006; Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2012; Stern, 2008). Existing 
or nascent enterprises are increasingly trying to change or set up their business in a 
sustainable manner to contribute to global sustainability goals. However, one of the main 
impediments of building a sustainable enterprise is finding external financiers willing to 
carry the risks of transitioning to doing business in a low carbon, sustainable way 
(Campiglio, 2016; O. Mont, Dalhammar, & Jacobsson, 2006; Scholtens, 2006; Tukker, 
2015). Different approaches can be taken to stimulate investments towards sustainability, 
such as regulation, taxes and subsidies, and influencing consumer preferences. Many studies 
aim to find out whether sustainable investments deliver higher financial returns for the 
investor in comparison to non-sustainable investment, which would provide a 
straightforward argument to invest in sustainable enterprises. A recent study, based on 
                                                          
4 Joint work with Karen Maas. Published as Toxopeus, H., & Maas, K. (2018). Crowdfunding sustainable 
enterprises as a form of collective action. In T. Walker, S. D. Kibsey, & R. Crichton (Eds.), Designing a Sustainable 
Financial System: Development Goals and Socio-Ecological Responsibility. Palgrave Macmillan. 
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established US firms, shows that sustainable companies attain better financial results 
compared to a comparable non-sustainable set of firms, but that it takes on average five to 
seven years to achieve this (Eccles et al., 2011).  
However, inevitable to any transition, many sustainable enterprises are early stage, 
innovative businesses, trying to change the way business is being done in a certain sector. 
These smaller, early stage sustainable enterprises arguably face a more difficult financing 
constraint than established firms moving towards sustainability. One part of the financing 
constraint of sustainable small and medium-sized enterprises is related to general 
innovation-specific issues such as lack of track record and collateral, high technological risk 
and risk of spillover of R&D investment to other firms (Brancati, 2015; Cincera & Santos, 
2015; G. Giudici & Paleari, 2000). The second part of the financing constraint is specific to 
sustainable enterprises and relates to their objective of creating societal impact (positive 
externalities) in their course of business. Rational choice theory predicts that financiers are 
not willing to invest in collective payoffs unless they can be fully appropriated, thus creating 
a ‘double externality problem’ (Faber & Frenken, 2009; Rennings, 2000). This means that 
the time horizons for small-scale sustainable enterprises to appropriate financial payoffs 
from their innovative, sustainable activity are generally long-term and uncertain. 
Nevertheless, sustainable innovation by small and midsized enterprises is crucial for 
transitioning towards a sustainable economy. Due to the small scale and high-risk nature of 
these type of businesses we believe that the ‘higher financial return’ argument, used as 
rationale for investment in established sustainable firms, cannot be the sole driver behind 
investments in these enterprises.  
We argue it is time to shift focus away from monetary payoffs as the main driver for investors 
in sustainable investments and towards a more complex and behavioral view on how 
investment decisions for sustainable enterprises can be supported. In order to better 
understand how to move towards a sustainable financial system supportive for sustainable 
enterprises, we direct our focus towards crowdfunding, which has been argued to be 
especially well positioned to financing sustainable enterprises (Calic & Mosakowski, 2016; 
Lehner, 2013). This can be partly explained by the fact that crowdfunding is a particularly 
suitable financing tool for early ventures (J. H. Block et al., 2017; Bruton, Khavul, Siegel, 
& Wright, 2015), referring back to the innovation-related part of the financing constraint. 
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However, on top of that, some authors suggest there to be a particularly good match between 
crowdfunding and sustainable enterprises, which has been mainly explained using 
legitimacy theory (Calic & Mosakowski, 2016; Lehner, 2013). This feeds back into the 
second – sustainability – part of the financing constraint, which we focus on in this chapter. 
More work is needed to understand what may drive sustainable enterprise crowdfunding. 
Legitimacy theory argues that individual crowdfunders may be particularly willing to fund 
sustainable enterprises in line with growing societal support for social entrepreneurship 
(Calic & Mosakowski, 2016). Although this explanation takes into account the 
decentralization of the financing decision to small non-professional investors, it lacks a more 
structured analysis of crowdfunding as different institutional setting which leads to a 
different type of decision-making than in traditional financial institutions.  
In the current chapter, we therefore use collective action theory (Olson, 2009; Ostrom, 
2010a) to analyze the institutional setting of crowdfunding to understand how this can be a 
potential successful way of funding sustainable enterprises. We believe collective action 
theory allows for a structured answer to the question of why crowdfunding can be a good fit 
with financing sustainable enterprises. This therefore leads to the core question of this 
chapter: How does collective action theory help us explain the potential success of 
crowdfunding for sustainable enterprises?  
We continue this chapter as follows: First, we give an overview of the existing literature on 
crowdfunding for sustainable enterprises. Next, we give an overview of the findings of 
collective action theory in order to apply this to sustainable enterprise finance. We explain 
our methodological framework and undertake a rule-based analysis of crowdfunding to find 
matches and mechanisms that can drive successful collective action in crowdfunding. We 
conclude with recommendations for the design of financial decision-making for collective 
action based on our current analysis of crowdfunding. 
4.2 Why do crowdfunders invest in sustainable enterprises? 
In the past ten years, the development of crowdfunding markets has raised the question of 
whether crowdfunding is particularly well suited to finance sustainable enterprises, and if 
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so, why? Current research suggests several mechanisms that could explain why 
crowdfunders might be particularly willing to fund sustainable enterprises.  
The legitimacy theory perspective argues that the focus of crowdfunders on the mission and 
core values of an enterprise, as well as the ‘democracy’ of having many small funders, fits 
finance social enterprises well (Calic & Mosakowski, 2016; Lehner, 2013). In the case of 
renewable energy crowdfunding, a combination of normative, gain and hedonic motivations 
is found  (Dóci, Vasileiadou, & Petersen, 2015; Vasileiadou, Huijben, & Raven, 2016). Also, 
the limited monetary motivations of social entrepreneurs can be a strong signal that they are 
more outcome-focused, reducing the risks of moral hazard and increasing legitimacy of the 
investment as perceived by the crowdfunder (Lehner, 2013).  
Obtaining community benefits has also been proposed as a motivation for crowdfunders to 
invest in a crowdfunding project (Belleflamme et al., 2014). The utility of crowdfunders 
increases through the consumption/investment experience that they undergo as part of their 
funding decision (Ordanini et al., 2011). A prerequisite for this additional utility is that they 
become part of the community of the enterprise and are thus in some way connected to its 
social network (Belleflamme et al., 2014; Ordanini et al., 2011). Arguably, creating a 
community around an enterprise is easier if some collective benefit is to be created, which 
is implicitly the case for sustainable enterprises.  
Contract failure theory predicts that non-profit oriented sustainable enterprises are more 
focused on quality and outcomes and therefore are better at obtaining funds from the public 
(Belleflamme et al., 2014; Hörisch, 2015). Rational choice theory, on the other hand, 
predicts that crowdfunders will not prefer sustainable enterprises to general enterprises based 
on any other motivation than that they deliver at least competitive financial payoffs. From 
this perspective, enterprises that focus (partly) on providing or contributing to a common 
good that investors cannot capture in the form of individual financial return, will be less 
successful in finding investors compared to purely for-profit enterprises.  
Empirical evidence about the potential of crowdfunding to finance sustainable enterprises 
show mixed results. Calic & Mosakowski (2016) find that technological and film/video 
crowdfunding projects on Kickstarter with an environmental or social focus are funded more 
successfully than projects without such a focus, partly mediated by creativity and third party 
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endorsements. On the other hand, (Hörisch, 2015), finds no significant relationship between 
environmental focus and funding success of projects on the crowdfunding website Indiegogo 
(www.indiegogo.com). Our current understanding of crowdfunding for sustainable 
enterprises is still in its infancy and begs refinement. With this study we aim to build on 
existing knowledge by developing an enhanced model to understand the different routes to 
sustainable finance by analysing crowdfunding through a collective action lens.   
4.3 Collective action theory as a lens for sustainable enterprise 
crowdfunding 
Collective action theory, based on work by Olson (2009) and Hardin (1971) departs from 
rational choice theory by empirically identifying three behavioural types (S. S. Levine & 
Prietula, 2014; Vollan & Ostrom, 2010): (1) co-operators, who will unconditionally add their 
share to provide a collective good, (2) conditional co-operators, who copy the (expected) 
behaviour of others; and (3) free or easy riders, who will contribute (next-to) nothing – 
behaviour predicted by rational choice theory. Field and lab experiments show that the 
second type, conditional co-operators (also referred to as reciprocators) are usually around 
half of the population (Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001; Frey & Meier, 2004). They play 
a crucial role in generating either low or high levels of collective action, since their behaviour 
is conditional upon the behaviour of others. The incidence, visibility and expectations of the 
share of co-operators and “free riders” in the population will affect whether they cooperate, 
or not (Vollan & Ostrom, 2010).  
Collective action theory has increased our understanding about institutional arrangements 
that improve our ability to organize collective action (Ansell & Torfing, 2016; Ostrom, 
2014). In the area of natural resource management, for example, design principles have been 
identified that improve the ability of groups to successfully undertake collective action (Cox 
et al., 2010; Ostrom, 2010, 2014; Vollan & Ostrom, 2010). More generally, empirical studies 
have shown that some institutional arrangements, such as face-to-face communication 
between participants in a social dilemma, improve cooperative outcomes (Balliet, 2010; Fehr 
& Gächter, 1999; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Nowak, 2006).  
The willingness of crowdfunders to finance sustainable enterprises can be framed as a social 
dilemma. Collective payoffs created through the investment cannot be appropriated by the 
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enterprise and nor by the individual investor. Nevertheless, funders seem willing to invest 
in sustainable enterprises through crowdfunding. This fuels our hypothesis that 
crowdfunding is an institutional arrangement which fosters collective action, such as 
sustainable enterprise funding. Therefore, we structurally analyze what aspects of the 
institutional structure of crowdfunding could be driving successful collective action. If we 
find institutional arrangements for collective action in crowdfunding, this can be applied 
strategically in order to successfully obtain funding for sustainable enterprises.     
We give an overview of the most important institutional arrangements that have been 
empirically shown to lead to increased collective action (Table 4-1). For each arrangement, 
we provide the most relevant (if available, meta-analytical) source. Not all of these 
arrangements will be applicable to crowdfunding. We use this overview of design principles 
for collective action as a starting point for an institutional analysis of crowdfunding.  
4.4 Methodology: Rule classification of crowdfunding  
Following literature on cooperation for the commons (Kitsing & Schweik, 2010; Vollan & 
Ostrom, 2010), we apply the rule classification approach to crowdfunding. The rule 
classification method was developed by Ostrom and Crawford (2005) as part of the 
Institutional Analysis and Development framework (Ostrom, 2010a). Rule classification 
allows for a structured analysis of an institutional setting. Rules are defined as ‘shared 
understandings among those involved about what actions are required, prohibited or 
permitted’ (Ostrom, 2010a). Crawford and Ostrom (2005) distinguish seven types of rules 
that can be used to describe the institutional arrangements of any type of action situation:  
1. Position rules: what positions can be taken by participants? 
2. Boundary rules: how can participants enter or exit positions? 
3. Choice rules: who has the authority to make decisions? 
4. Aggregation rules: are there any joint decisions in the decision process? 
5. Information rules: what information flows between participants? 
6. Payoff rules: what rewards exist for different actions?   
7. Scope rules: what outcomes are accepted? 
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We apply rule classification to crowdfunding, describing the different rules for 
crowdfunding to understand how crowdfunding may facilitate sustainable enterprise finance  
through collective action. Figure 4-1 indicates how the different rules influence different 
aspects of any action situation. A classification of rules allows us to analyze the playing field 
for collective action in crowdfunding. We analyze the seven different types of rules for 
crowdfunding in turn (Ostrom & Crawford, 2005). We base our rule description on 
international peer-reviewed academic literature about crowdfunding (Belleflamme, Omrani, 
& Peitz, 2015; Mollick, 2014; Moritz & Block, 2016; Polzin, Toxopeus, et al., 2017).  
 
Figure 4-1 Rules as exogenous variables affecting the elements of an action situation (illustration from 
Ostrom, 2010a) 
4.5 Analysis: rule classification and potential for collective action  
Our analysis consists out of two steps. First, we carry out a rule classification of 
crowdfunding. Second, we match existing findings from collective action theory to the rules 
found in crowdfunding to understand the potential of crowdfunding for bringing about 
collective action in finance. 
Description of rules in crowdfunding 
There are three types of positions that can be taken by participants in crowdfunding (position 
rules). The first position is that of the entrepreneur looking for funds. The second position 
is that of the funders who pledge money. The third position belongs to the crowdfunding 
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platform who acts a financial intermediary by brokering the relationships between 
entrepreneurs and funders.  
The entry requirements (boundary rules) for each position are similar or lower compared 
to other financial intermediaries (such as banks). Entrepreneurs are screened by the 
crowdfunding platform before being permitted to attract funds via their website. For 
crowdfunding platforms, there are national legal requirements but these are generally less 
stringent than for other financial intermediaries and depend on jurisdiction, the type of 
crowdfunding and the size of the funds being attracted. For funders, the most important entry 
requirement is that of having a minimum amount of funds available to pledge.    
The authority to make decisions (choice rules) which generate the final funding decision is 
divided between the three types of participants in crowdfunding. Platforms decide which 
entrepreneurs get to present their enterprise on their website, based on pre-screening on 
aspects such as risk/return profile and scope of the enterprise. Entrepreneurs choose which 
platform they want to fund on for which amount, and what they want to offer their funders 
in return (i.e. interest rate, size of equity stake, type of reward). Crowdfunders decide per 
enterprise whether they want to invest and what amount (against what return).  
Crowdfunding is a typical case of joint decision-making (aggregation rules) since 
crowdfunders invest sequentially and in the aggregate decide whether an enterprise obtains 
funds, and how much. Most platforms employ a threshold (all-or-nothing) mechanism for 
campaigns. Only if a group of funders jointly commits enough funds to reach the minimum 
amount that the enterprise needs is a positive funding decision reached, usually within a 
timeslot (i.e. thirty days). If this threshold is not reached, the enterprise receives no funds, 
not even those that were pledged.  
Information rules in crowdfunding affect this aggregation process, since potential 
crowdfunders have real-time publicly available information about how many funders have 
pledged what amounts up to that moment (per person and in total). This information often 
includes the identity of funders who have already pledged to participate, depending on 
whether funders choose to be anonymous or not. Furthermore, funders are able to ask 
questions in public to the entrepreneur; these Q&As become publicly available information 
on the crowdfunding website and/or social media. Furthermore, entrepreneurs provide 
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potential funders with information about the enterprise and the project to be funded using a 
project description including information about the entrepreneurs, an investment sheet, a 
video and information about the payoff offered per amount pledged.  
The costs and benefits for each of the three participants (payoff rules) depend on the type 
of crowdfunding that the entrepreneur chooses to employ: donation, reward, debt or equity. 
In general, platforms obtain a success fee for each successfully funded enterprise, framed as 
a percentage of the amount pledged, in exchange for the cost they make in screening the 
enterprise and marketing the enterprise to their crowd. Entrepreneurs incur costs to be 
screened by the crowdfunding platform, market themselves to the crowd and answer 
questions. Also, they pay for the brokering services of the platform and commit a certain 
return to the crowd. Crowdfunder payoff is heterogeneous and can consist of both tangible 
and intangible benefits. Tangible benefits can include a product or service, a fixed interest 
payment, profit sharing or buy-out but also provision of a collective/public good. Intangible 
benefits include warm glow (Andreoni, 1990), community benefits, such as feeling part of 
a group or being allowed to give input to production decisions (Belleflamme et al., 2014), 
and build-up of social capital (Colombo, Franzoni, & Rossi-Lamastra, 2015).  
Finally, scope rules in crowdfunding define what types of enterprises or projects can be 
funded on certain platforms, which often have criteria based on type of crowdfunding, 
amount funded, sector or risk level. Based on their funding scope, i.e. only rewards 
(www.kickstarter.com) or only an impact-focus (www.oneplanetcrowd.com), we find many 
different types of crowdfunding platforms who each facilitate different types of investment 
decisions.   
Matching collective action theory to crowdfunding rules 
Although rule classification applied to a new institutional setting in itself is insightful 
(Kitsing & Schweik, 2010), our goal in this chapter is to use this rule classification to find 
overlap between crowdfunding rules on the one hand and institutional arrangements which 
improve collective action, on the other. Through a literature search on collective action and 
social dilemmas we create an overview of arrangements that are found to increase collective 
action or cooperation between actors (Table 4-1). Next ,we match these collective action – 
enhancing institutional arrangements with crowdfunding rules (Table 4-2). 
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Table 4-1 Overview of institutional arrangements for collective action 
Institutional 
arrangement 
Design principle or mechanism Main 
source(s) 
Clear boundaries 
for users and 
resources 
Clear and locally understood boundaries between legitimate 
users and nonusers. Boundaries separate a specific common-pool 
resource from a larger social-ecological system. 
Ostrom, 
2010a 
Balanced 
provision and 
appropriation  
Appropriation rules are congruent with provision rules; the 
distribution of costs is proportional to the distribution of 
benefits. Appropriation and provision rules are congruent with 
local social and environmental conditions. 
Ostrom, 
2010a 
Collective choice 
arrangements 
Most individuals affected by a resource regime are authorized to 
participate in making and modifying its rules. 
Ostrom, 
2010a 
Monitoring (users 
and resources) 
Individuals who are accountable to or are the users monitor the 
appropriation and provision levels of the users and the condition 
of the resource.  
Ostrom, 
2010a 
Graduated 
sanctions 
Sanctions for rule violations start very low but become stronger 
if a user repeatedly violates a rule. 
Ostrom, 
2010a 
Conflict resolution 
mechanisms 
Rapid, low cost, local arenas exist for resolving conflicts among 
users or with officials. 
Ostrom, 
2010a 
Minimal 
recognition of 
rights 
The rights of local users to make their own rules are recognized 
by the government. 
Ostrom, 
2010a 
Nested enterprises When a common-pool resource is closely connected to a larger 
social-ecological system, governance activities are organized in 
multiple nested layers. 
Ostrom, 
2010a 
Group size In smaller groups/communities, more frequent interaction allows 
for increased trust through reputation building and mutual 
monitoring, and participants are more likely to believe their 
contribution will make a difference. However, group size needs 
to be large enough to enable natural resource provision even if 
only a subset of the group participates. 
Poteete & 
Ostrom, 
2004 
Group 
heterogeneity 
Shared social, cultural or economic characteristics increase 
predictability of behavior and imply common interest and/or 
higher trust levels which can improve collective action. 
However, resource and interest heterogeneity can also lead to 
better collective action by a subset of the population when some 
participants have higher benefits from cooperating and/or more 
resources to share. 
Oliver, 
Marwell, & 
Teixeira, 
1985; 
Poteete & 
Ostrom, 
2004 
Communication  Communication prior to and during social dilemmas increase 
cooperation levels between participants, in particular for larger 
group sizes and for face-to-face (versus written) communication 
Balliet, 
2010 
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Sequential 
decision-making 
Participants take account of whether and how much others 
contribute to determine their own contribution to a collective 
action. 
Granovetter, 
1978; 
Oliver et al., 
1985 
Contribution size For smaller endowments / effort sizes, contributing to collective 
action is more likely.  
Ostrom, 
2014 
Activation 
thresholds 
All-or-nothing mechanism ensures risk-free commitment; a 
contribution is only activated if the minimally needed 
commitment is pledged.  
Cheng & 
Bernstein, 
2014 
 
From this full overview of ‘matches’ between crowdfunding and institutional arrangements 
that foster collective action, we find quite some overlap and combinations to be made 
between the different aspects of the institutional arrangements. Many matches between 
crowdfunding rules and collective action arrangements are partly driven by the same 
underlying rules. In particular, the low boundary rules for becoming a crowdfunder (low 
amount of funds needed per investment decision) in combination with a funders ability to 
make enterprise-specific funding decisions (choice rules) seems to create ample opportunity 
for collective action, simply because direct provision of finance for enterprises is opened to 
more individual participants than before.  
For a comprehensive overview of our findings as described in Table 4-2, we combine them 
into three mechanisms through which crowdfunding can foster collective action for 
sustainable enterprise finance: (1) use of social networks (2) heterogeneous contributions 
and payoffs, and (3) aggregation within thresholds. Also, we indicate which rules are driving 
each mechanism (Table 4-3).  
Mechanism 1: collective action through social networks 
Since crowdfunding is often network-based, collective action can be enhanced in several 
ways. Information distributed about the enterprise, especially for early backers, often comes 
from the entrepreneur who mobilizes existing strong and weak ties (family, friends, clients, 
previous investors or business relations). First, knowing the person(s) behind the enterprise 
has been shown to affect the information used for the decision-making and can decrease 
fears of moral hazard (Granovetter, 2005; Polzin et al., 2017). Secondly, the homogeneity 
of actors within a social network may be larger, which increases trust about expected  
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Table 4-2 Overview arrangement for collective action matched to rules in crowdfunding 
Rules Matching rules in crowdfunding to collective action mechanisms 
Clear 
boundaries for 
users and 
resources 
Enterprise-specific crowdfunding campaigns makes it very clear what money 
is pledged for (and which sustainability goal is addressed) 
Boundaries to enter as crowdfunder are low due to small starting amounts 
Boundaries to become a crowdfunding platform are relatively low, leading to a 
heterogeneous crowdfunding market with each platform defining its scope 
Balanced 
provision and 
appropriation  
A large crowd of potential funders (low entry boundaries) allows for selection 
of funders who have a higher payoff / preference from a certain type of 
collective action based on region, network, sector or interest which can 
improve willingness to fund 
Different types of payoff can be formulated in order to best address the 
preferences of potential funders and investment sizes 
Collective 
choice 
arrangements 
Low boundaries to fund “democratizes” the funding decision making it a 
potential collective choice (but depends on spending power) 
Spread of information in regional or thematic networks involves a large group 
of potential funders 
Monitoring 
(users and 
resources) 
The inclusion of an entrepreneur’s social networks and/or users in the funding 
community allows for informal monitoring through repeated interaction  
Graduated 
sanctions 
Not applicable 
Conflict 
resolution 
mechanisms 
Crowdfunding platform provides legal contracts defining agreements made 
regarding use of money and payback period or profit sharing, but not regarding 
sustainability milestones 
Minimal 
recognition of 
rights 
Most jurisdictions have officially created laws for crowdfunding as a financial 
tool.  
Nested 
enterprises 
Sustainable enterprises often address one specific sustainability need, located 
within a sector or business lines (creating a sustainable version of an existing 
product). This enterprise-specific approach leads to multiple governance layers 
each addressing a subset of existing sustainable goals.  
Group size The low entry boundaries for crowdfunders in general allow for a large 
potential group of funders, of which only a small part needs to participate to 
provide enough funding for the enterprise 
When a crowdfunding campaign targets a specific crowd (i.e. local 
neighborhood or client group), repeated interaction can increase reputation 
building, trust and/or mutual monitoring; furthermore participants are more 
likely to believe their contribution with make a difference 
Group 
heterogeneity 
Low boundaries to entry and heterogeneous potential funding participants 
means that funders can self-select into a sustainable enterprise funding 
campaign that best fits their preferences  
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Network or interest-based crowdfunding around a common sustainability goal 
addressed by an enterprise can increase predictability of behavior and therefore 
mutual trust through homogeneity within the funding community 
Communication  Cheap talk can occur both face-to-face in social networks surrounding the 
sustainable enterprise as well as online on social media and on the 
crowdfunding page of the enterprise, where crowdfunders can communicate 
their (intent to) pledge to other potential funders.  
Sequential 
decision-
making 
Crowdfunding makes it transparent in real-time how many other funders have 
already contributed, the amounts and in which time period. Furthermore, 
identities of previous funders are sometimes known  
Contribution 
size 
Crowdfunding allows for contributions to specific enterprises starting at very 
small amounts (for enterprises usually between 100-250 Euro).  
Activation 
thresholds 
All-or-nothing mechanism means a pledge is only activated if a minimum 
amount of funding has been reached, lowering the risk that the money will not 
be spent well. A timeslot (i.e. 30 days) increases the urgency to contribute 
within a fixed time period (deadline).  
 
behaviour and can therefore facilitate collective action, if participants fund based on the 
expectation that others will put in their share of the funds as well (Poteete & Ostrom, 2004). 
Third, smaller, well-defined group size is argued to be conducive to collective action because 
a single contribution is expected to make a real difference (Olson, 2009; Ostrom, 2010a) and 
opportunities for frequent interaction rise as group size decreases, which leads to a higher 
importance of reputation (Poteete & Ostrom, 2004) . However, the group size of the potential 
funding community still needs to be large enough to include enough contributors and to 
allow for self-selection of funders who receive  the highest payoff from contribution to 
collective action i.e. due to preferences or reputation (Oliver et al., 1985). Furthermore, 
resource heterogeneity within a potential funding network can be useful since higher 
resource endowments make it easier to pledge funds (Oliver et al., 1985).  
Mechanism 2: Collective action through heterogeneous contributions and payoffs 
Heterogeneity of choice and payoff rules in crowdfunding may improve collective action for 
sustainable crowdfunding by allowing for fine-grained matching of investor contribution 
and payoff preferences in line with enterprise characteristics. By designing the contribution 
and/or payoff structure of a crowdfunding campaign based on specifically targeted funders 
such as users, clients, believers or regional inhabitants, the benefit for a funder of joining a 
campaign can be maximized, enhancing collective action. Bringing appropriation (benefits) 
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and provision (costs) in line with each other by locating costs within the community that will 
profit from shared benefits, is one of Ostrom’s design principles for governing natural 
resources (Ostrom, 2010a) and may also facilitate collective action in crowdfunding. For 
example, consumers or players in a certain value chain that wish to use a sustainable product 
or want to be part of an inspiring community, may be willing to invest in or pre-purchase 
the product since they are motivated to bring it to market. Crowdfunding platforms are able 
to offer multiple types of payoff (i.e. products) to create niche markets targeted at specific 
segments (such as users). Furthermore, size of contributions to a crowdfunding campaign 
may vary considerably, depending both on a participant’s financial endowment and 
willingness to contribute. In general, more people are willing to make smaller contributions 
(Ostrom, 2014), therefore the option to pledge heterogeneous amounts is likely to facilitate 
collective action in crowdfunding.  
Furthermore, crowdfunding platforms can define their scope by selecting enterprises that fit 
the preferences of a specific crowd, making it easier to match funders to sustainable 
enterprises based on their preferences and payoff expectations. As an example, 
Oneplanetcrowd, a Dutch sustainable crowdfunding platform, invited all funders of a car 
sharing initiative to invest in a tool sharing platform based on their previously revealed 
funding preferences (type of enterprise and type of payoff).  
This payoff-mechanism is likely to interact with the first network-mechanism, since 
increasing individual payoffs through niches can mean that individuals who benefit most 
from a collective cause are already part of an enterprise’s existing social network as 
members, clients, believers or local inhabitants. However, we need to distinguish between 
them because the underlying rules driving the two mechanisms are different. The network-
mechanism is relationship-driven, conveying information, trust and reputation to stimulate 
collective action; the payoff-mechanism is driven by heterogeneous payoff (cost and benefit) 
rules that can positively affect the willingness to contribute.  
Mechanism 3: Collective action through aggregation within thresholds 
The sequential, online and transparent aggregation and information rules of crowdfunding 
in a threshold model may improve collective action due to conditional cooperation between 
individual crowdfunders (Cheng & Bernstein, 2014; Frey & Meier, 2004; Keser & Van 
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Winden, 2000). Crowdfunders who observe the investment of others may decide to add their 
funds to contribute to societal impact in a similar way as communication between actors can 
lead to cooperation in common-pool resource dilemmas (Vollan & Ostrom, 2010). Within 
this mechanism, the legitimacy argument can play a role: if others choose to invest, this 
creates a quality signal that the enterprise may be effective in reaching its goal (Lehner, 
2013).  
Furthermore, information about previous funder decisions is skewed: potential funders see 
only the ‘cooperating’ funders who decided to invest, not the ones who considered funding 
but decided not to join the funding initiative. There is therefore a larger chance that 
conditional co-operators will follow the example of the previous funders if they feel that 
many funders have joined within a short time frame (proxying for a high percentage of 
funders that considered funding that actually funded), even though they do not know how 
many funders decided not to fund. This selective information provision can help collective 
action come based on the behaviour of the unconditional co-operators, namely early backers. 
Mirroring this process, low numbers of funders during the first time period of a 
crowdfunding campaign means collective action will probably not come about, since 
conditional co-operators will gauge there to be too little cooperation going on and fail to add 
their funds. 
Table 4-3 Three main mechanisms for collective action in crowdfunding 
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4.6 Discussion: What rules lead to collective action in crowdfunding? 
In this paper, we apply findings from collective action theory to the institutional 
arrangements of crowdfunding in order to explain why and under what circumstances 
sustainable enterprises are more likely to be successfully funded than mainstream 
enterprises. Previous work on sustainable enterprise crowdfunding uses (mainly) legitimacy 
theory to explain why sustainable, social or environmental enterprises could be more 
successful than mainstream enterprises at crowdfunding, despite predictions from rational 
choice theory (Calic & Mosakowski, 2016; Hörisch, 2015; Lehner, 2013). However, 
empirical evidence on this question is scarce and mixed.  
We apply collective action theory to understand the potential contribution of crowdfunding 
to sustainable finance. We discuss what institutional arrangements within a crowdfunding 
campaign can lead to successful funding based on institutional arrangements that foster 
collective action. Our analysis results in three main mechanisms that can explain why 
sustainable enterprises may be crowdfunded easier than mainstream enterprises. Each 
mechanism consists of several rules embedded in crowdfunding. Here, we briefly discuss 
our findings and their implications.  
The easy access to crowdfunding for individual participants, due to the small starting 
amounts, creates a large diversity of potential crowdfunders. We find that the boundary and 
choice rule architecture of crowdfunding is a key institutional driver behind all three 
mechanisms for collective action in this type of finance. Increased access to financial 
decision-making, starting at small amounts, has been framed as ‘democratization of finance’ 
by some (Shiller, 2013), although it diverts from real democracy since participation depends 
on individual resources (Hörisch, 2015). Nevertheless, investment decision-making is 
opened to a much larger ‘crowd’ compared to when this was restricted to traditional financial 
players. This in itself is likely to influence which enterprise gets funded. 
The first mechanism, network-based funding, builds on this increased access to create 
circumstances for collective action. Information about the crowdfunding campaign is 
distributed through existing ties and becomes embedded in a longer term relationship, which 
changes the incentive structure of the financing decision and increases trust levels. We are 
not the first to conclude that crowdfunding is a network-based. On the contrary, it has been 
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brought forward as a defining aspect of crowdfunding (Moritz & Block, 2016; Wal, Alexy, 
Block, & Sandner, 2016). However, the link between crowdfunding being network-based 
and its potential for organizing collective action/sustainable finance is novel.  
The second mechanism, collective action through heterogeneous contributions and payoffs, 
links back to one of the design principles from successful collective action in natural 
resource management, namely balanced provision and appropriation (Ostrom, 2010a). It is 
also in line with the concept of ‘fairness’, which has been studied empirically in the 
cooperation literature (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). The larger flexibility to create niche matches 
between entrepreneurs and specific groups of funders creates an opportunity to increase the 
individual payoffs to a funder who can then value a particular mix of (non-financial) payoffs 
that fit a specific enterprise (Geobey et al., 2012). Renewable energy projects are an example 
of sustainable entrepreneurial projects that can generate financial payoff, climate change 
mitigation and community benefits for its crowdfunders (Dóci et al., 2015). 
Finally, the third mechanism, collective action through aggregation in thresholds, is 
dependent on the aggregation and scope rules in crowdfunding. This mechanism can be 
traced back to research carried out on critical mass (P. Oliver et al., 1985) and to findings on 
conditional cooperation (S. S. Levine & Prietula, 2014; Ostrom, 2014; Vollan & Ostrom, 
2010). Furthermore, aggregation in thresholds has been pinpointed as a successful strategy 
in the context of crowdfunding (Cheng & Bernstein, 2014). The tendency of crowdfunding 
campaigns to either succeed in bringing together the money or fail to do so with a wide gap 
is generally attributed to information cascades and increased trust through signaling by early 
backers (Colombo et al., 2015; Vismara, 2015). Signaling by early backers, influencing the 
investment decision of subsequent funders, is also commonplace outside sustainable 
enterprise funding. However, if we find that sustainable enterprises are more successful at 
bringing together funds than mainstream enterprises – all else being equal – our hypothesis 
is that an additional part of this ‘herding’ behaviour in crowdfunding can be attributed to 
collective action surrounding sustainable goals. Empirical evidence is needed to unravel 
these two different relationships.  
Another aspect that needs further attention is distinguishing between collective action for 
innovative entrepreneurship, in general, and sustainable innovative entrepreneurship 
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specifically. The provision of innovation to a society can also be framed as a collective 
action, since more people benefit than just the investors, and the high-risk levels of 
innovation finance are often not compensated by its returns. In particular, for a transition 
towards a sustainable economy, which needs a lot of product and service innovation, an 
argument can be made that the collective action being organized here is partly due to 
sustainability, and partly due to innovation in general. This also links back to the argument 
made by (Calic & Mosakowski, 2016) that the willingness of funders to invest in social 
enterprises is partly mediated by creativity levels, and this split is also pinpointed in the 
double externality problem (Faber & Frenken, 2009).  
One important practical finding from our analysis is that collective action for sustainable 
enterprise finance does not happen automatically by opening a project page on a 
crowdfunding platform. In order to ‘put to work’ the rules and mechanisms in crowdfunding 
for a sustainable enterprise, a campaign strategy needs to be well thought through and 
targeted towards a specific audience. Also, some sustainable enterprises will be better suited 
for crowdfunding than others. For one, building up a community that is committed to the 
sustainable enterprise for idealistic or practical reasons, such as users or fans, is a key 
ingredient. Building up a social network is important in general, since the entrepreneur can 
inform individuals personally about their campaign thereby greatly improve collective 
action both from a network-based and payoff perspective. Getting early backers within this 
community to commit, preferably with their identity known, will stimulate conditional co-
operators to follow. The bigger an entrepreneur’s community or network is, the easier it is 
to get at least a small part of them to participate. Also, crowdfunding of a sustainable 
consumer product or service is likely to be easier than a business-to-business product or 
service, since individuals are more likely to become involved if they see themselves as 
potential consumers and therefore understand/support the value proposition (Ordanini et al., 
2011).  
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter is a conceptual exercise to understand potential mechanisms that enhance 
sustainable finance by applying collective action theory to crowdfunding. We use a rule 
classification framework to indicate which institutional arrangements in crowdfunding 
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appear conducive to organizing collective action. By diverting from rational choice 
behavioural assumptions and combining collective action theory with the growing body of 
academic literature on crowdfunding, we argue that understanding the application of rules 
embedded in crowdfunding can foster increased investments in sustainable entrepreneurship 
through network-based funding, heterogeneous contribution and payoff and aggregation in 
thresholds. Below, we provide limitations and future directions of our research.  
Limitations 
Our study has some important limitations. For one, the conceptual analysis is conducted for 
crowdfunding in general, whereas in practice, rules between platforms can differ. Also, since 
this is an industry that still needs to mature, rules may evolve. Also, we focus on 
crowdfunding via intermediary platforms, whereas not all projects are mediated, leading to 
different funding incentives (and lack of screening) if there is no platform involved.  
Secondly, by undertaking a rule classification of crowdfunding we leave out other external 
variables that strongly affect the ability of an institutional setting to create collective action, 
such as biophysical conditions and attributes of the community (Ostrom, 2010a). These 
variables need to be taken into account in further research. 
Third, we lean strongly on theory and evidence from common-pool resource research – 
notably the work of Elinor Ostrom – whereas collective action for crowdfunding sustainable 
enterprises concerns many different types of social or environmental payoffs that are not as 
clearly defined as many common-pool resource dilemmas. Although we limit ourselves to 
analysing collective action (which can involve commons), more work needs to be done to 
understand how the specific social and environmental payoffs produced by sustainable 
enterprises affect the ability to create collective action. A further step is to improve our 
understanding regarding what type of sustainable enterprises and business models are well 
suited for crowdfunding using collective action dynamics.  
Future directions 
Conceptually applying existing insights from collective action to finance is just a first step. 
We briefly state three main research directions from which to continue from here. 
First, empirical evidence is needed to test the hypothesis that collective action is indeed 
taking place in sustainable enterprise crowdfunding. It is particularly important to be able to 
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distinguish collective action from other dynamics in crowdfunding such as herding, since 
early backers also play other important signaling roles (Colombo et al., 2015; Vismara, 
2015). One way to do this is through a field or lab experiment with two versions of a project: 
one framed as ‘sustainable’ and one with no mention of sustainability at all, and analysing 
participation rate of funders.  
Second, existing insights about collective action should not only be applied but also further 
developed in new innovative institutional settings. As technological advancements increase 
the speed and ease of information transmission and lower transaction costs, crowdfunding 
(and other financial innovations) can improve and develop as new institutional settings for 
collective action that were previously not possible in an offline environment. If designed 
smartly, financial innovation could pave the way for intelligent collective action for 
sustainable enterprise finance. Crowdfunding and other types of decentralized financial 
innovation can be used to empirically test and improve upon collective action mechanisms. 
The next step is to collect and create empirical evidence that can give more insight into how 
we can improve collective action in finance in order to speed up a transition towards a 
sustainable economy. This goes beyond collective action in crowdfunding, which will not 
suffice as a solution to creating sustainable finance but is an important step, in particular for 
understanding increased decentralization in financial decision-making. Smart use of 
technology to improve collective action should not only be understood through 
crowdfunding but also through other types of ‘fintech’, such as development of local and/or 
blockchain-based currencies and innovation by traditional players like banks and pension 
funds.  
Furthermore, there is a diversity of sustainable enterprises that will have different abilities 
to fund themselves using collective action dynamics in crowdfunding. We need to improve 
our understanding of how different mechanisms to obtain finance for sustainable 
entrepreneurship can be best applied in practice, including these collective action 
mechanisms. This can relate to the type of business model that the enterprise is setting up, 
as well as its stage of growth or the level of involvement of its customers. A better 
understanding for sustainable enterprises of when to search for what type of finance will 
increase the number that make it to the market. 
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Finally, the ultimate goal of more sustainable finance is the actual societal impact of the 
enterprises and projects being financed. More research is needed to reach a better prior 
understanding of whether a decision to finance a sustainable enterprise is likely to lead to a 
positive societal impact so that this can be included as a criterion in the investment decision 
(Maas & Liket, 2010; Toxopeus et al., 2015).  
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5 Unlocking bank finance for circular business model innovation5 
 
Abstract 
In the current wave of circular business model innovation (BMI), access to finance for BMI 
emerged as a key constraint but remains unaddressed in the literature. We fill that gap by 
studying access to bank finance for BMI using the current wave of circular BMI as an 
empirical base. We study the importance of different business model components for bank 
lending techniques using qualitative data obtained from banks and firms engaged in circular 
BMI. On the one hand, we assess bank willingness and lending technologies used to lend to 
enterprises that innovate towards circular business models. On the other hand, we document 
financing challenges of circular enterprises that applied for bank credit. Our results show 
that finance for circular business model innovation creates a shift from assessment based on 
(standardized) assets towards (future) cash flows in bank lending. We also find that 
depending on the lending technology, different components of the business model are 
assessed by banks. Banks mostly assess BMI based on proof of future cash flows (ability to 
capture value) and, in the case of account receivables, on contract terms and quality of 
customers. Furthermore, building relationships with banks, suppliers and customers emerges 
as a promising route for financing BMI. Asset-based lending for BMI is underdeveloped due 
to innovative firm- and context-specific assets (resources) but can be improved by 
standardization, modularity and flexibility as well as secondary market development. Our 
findings have strategic implications for innovative firms looking for bank finance and banks 
aiming to finance (circular) BMI. 
5.1 Introduction 
Business model innovation (BMI) is a crucial activity for firms to sustain competitive 
advantage in the market place under changing circumstances (Chesbrough, 2010; Schneider 
& Spieth, 2013; Teece, 2010; Wirtz et al., 2016). Much of the BMI literature emerged during 
                                                          
5 Joint work with Elisa Achterberg and Friedemann Polzin. It was presented and discussed at OIKOS sustainable 
finance academy and at the PHD workshop of ARCS at RSM, June 2017. 
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the shift towards internet-based companies in the 90s and 00s (Achtenhagen, Melin, & Naldi, 
2013; Foss & Saebi, 2017). In a similar vein, the BMI literature is currently fuelled by a 
need for companies to deal with worldwide environmental challenges and adjust their 
operations to create value for a closed-loop (circular) economy while at the same time 
capturing value for the firm itself (Bocken et al., 2014; J. Hall & Wagner, 2012; Kortmann 
& Piller, 2016; Rauter, Jonker, & Baumgartner, 2017; Schaltegger, Hansen, & Lüdeke-
Freund, 2015).  
A crucial and well-known constraint of innovation is obtaining external finance (Colombo 
& Grilli, 2007; B. H. Hall, 2010), especially for SME’s and young firms (Angilella & Mazzù, 
2015; Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Brown, Fazzari, & Petersen, 2009; Lee, Sameen, & 
Cowling, 2015). Credit constraints arise primarily from informational opaqueness between 
the firm and its potential financiers, moral hazard issues and high transaction costs 
(Carpenter & Petersen, 2002a; B. H. Hall & Lerner, 2010; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Stiglitz 
& Weiss, 1981). Lack of collateral and financial track record inherent to intangible R&D 
investments aggravate these constraints (Brancati, 2015; Cincera & Santos, 2015; B. H. Hall 
& Lerner, 2010; Lahr & Mina, 2014; Mina, Lahr, & Hughes, 2013). 
Although access to external finance has been recognized in the business model literature as 
a crucial constraint for BMI (Bocken et al., 2014; Linder & Williander, 2015; Schneider & 
Spieth, 2013; Zott & Amit, 2010), it is remarkable that to date there has been little structured 
effort to analyse how to improve firm access to external finance for BMI. As part of the 
emerging literature on undertaking BMI as an approach for solving environmental 
challenges while reaping profits (Foss & Saebi, 2017; J. Hall & Wagner, 2012), 
understanding how to improve access to finance for BMI is crucial.  
In this paper, we study circular (also referred to as closed-loop supply chain) BMI to 
‘jumpstart’ academic understanding of the relationship between BMI and finance. In 
particular, we focus on the role of banks in providing external finance, building on the 
innovation finance literature in this field (Brancati, 2015) and noting the large role of banks 
in providing business funding, in particular to SMEs (Cincera & Santos, 2015; de la Torre, 
Martínez Pería, & Schmukler, 2010; Giudici & Paleari, 2000). Credit constraints for 
innovation are empirically understudied and often with indirect measures, due to the 
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difficulty of observing credit demand and supply (Brancati, 2015). Our qualitative data 
collection approach allows us to collect fine-grained insights about bank lending decisions 
that are otherwise difficult to access. We study the current wave of circular BMI to address 
the following research question: How can firms obtain bank finance for circular business 
model innovation? 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The theoretical framework consists of 
an overview of the BMI literature, with a focus on circular (sustainable) BMI, as well as an 
overview of lending technologies used by banks to evaluate potential clients. Section 3 
describes our case-study methodology. In our findings section, we elaborate on the role of 
business model components in the bank credit decision and discuss these in section 5. We 
find that bank lending for BMI is indeed a constraint, mainly due to lack of track record of 
innovating firms and specificity of assets. We discover two key routes to improved access 
to bank finance for BMI are crucial: firstly through relationship building with both value 
chain partners (suppliers and customers) and banks, and secondly by ‘proving’ capture of 
future cash flows (through customer contracts/orders). Asset-based lending is less successful 
but can be enhanced by secondary markets that indicate residual values as well as by 
standardization, flexibility and/or modularity of assets. 
5.2 Theoretical background 
Business model innovation (BMI): generic, sustainable and circular 
Firms commercialise new ideas and products through their business model but also innovate 
the business model itself to stay competitive in the market place (Chesbrough, 2010). The 
business model concept has evolved over the past few decades, with considerable efforts 
undertaken to merge towards a common definition and understanding (Wirtz et al., 2016; 
Zott, Amit, & Massa, 2011). Within this field, BMI has become a key topic (Amit & Zott, 
2015), with particular attention given to the components of a business model that can be 
affected during the innovation process (Gambardella & McGahan, 2010; Osterwalder, 
Pigneur, & Tucci, 2005; Schneider & Spieth, 2013; Teece, 2010). A review of the business 
model literature by Wirtz et al. (2016, p. 41) resulted in the following definition of a business 
model, which we adhere to in our paper:  
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“A business model is a simplified and aggregated representation of the relevant activities of 
a company. It describes how marketable information, products and/or services are generated 
by means of a company's value-added component. In addition to the architecture of value 
creation, strategic as well as customer and market components are taken into consideration, 
in order to achieve the superordinate goal of generating, or rather, securing the competitive 
advantage.” 
A business model is often defined in terms of its components, which allows us to be more 
specific about where in the firm business model innovation is taking place (and how this 
relates to access to bank finance). We apply the review article of Wirtz et al. (2016) and 
interpretations of others (Bocken et al., 2014; Osterwalder et al., 2005) to define three main 
parts of a business model and their subordinate business model components (see Figure 5-1). 
First, the value proposition describes the market offering of the company. Second, the value 
creation and delivery includes the firms’ strategy, resources, network (partners) and target 
customers. Third, the value capture component includes revenues and costs. 
 
Figure 5-1 Business model components. Based on Bocken et al., 2014; Osterwalder et al., 2005; Wirtz 
et al., 2016 
Within the business model literature, BMI that addresses environmental and/or social 
challenges receives increasing attention both in academia and practice. This type of BMI is 
being addressed from different angles: sustainable business models (Bocken et al., 2014; 
Boons & Lüdeke-Freund, 2013; Rauter et al., 2017; Schaltegger et al., 2015); circular 
business models (Linder & Williander, 2015; Murray, Skene, & Haynes, 2017) and business 
models for closed-loop supply chains (Kortmann & Piller, 2016; Wells & Seitz, 2005). These 
literature streams have in common that different (archetypes of) business models are 
developed and analysed for their ability to create societal value, with a common assumption 
that BMI should allow societal value creation and private value capture to co-exist in a firm’s 
business model (Bocken et al., 2014; Rauter et al., 2017).  
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Many firms are currently strategizing to shift from a ‘linear’ business model to a ‘circular’ 
business model. In a linear business model, value creation is based on an incoming virgin 
material flow, which is manufactured, consumed and deposited as ‘waste’. In a circular 
business model, “value creation is based on utilizing economic value retained in products 
after use in the production of new offerings” (Linder & Williander, 2015). This means that 
firms carrying out circular BMI act or collaborate in one or more parts of the value chain to 
optimize use and recover value from their product. This is very similar to the concept of 
closed-loop supply chains, in which firms take responsibility for the entire lifecycle of the 
products they produce, both to save the environment and to maximally recover their 
investments into a high quality product (Guide, Harrison, & Van Wassenhove, 2003; 
Kortmann & Piller, 2016). Just like closed-loop supply chains, circular BMI can be 
categorized based on their place in the value chain: pre-use (design and manufacturing), use 
(during customer use) and post-use (refurbishment and recycling) product phases 
(Achterberg et al., 2016). Often, circular enterprises strive to retain product ownership since 
this increases their incentives to increase the product longevity and improves their ability to 
organize the return logistics of their products (Linder & Williander, 2015; Tukker, 2015).  
The three types of circular BMI (pre-use, use and post-use) affect business model 
components differently. Table 5-1 describe the different business model components in 
linear and (different types of) circular BMI. In the design and manufacturing phase (pre-
use), products (tangible resources) are designed, developed and manufactured in such a way 
to increase longevity and-/or ease of maintenance, repair, upgrades, refurbishment, 
remanufacturing or recycling (Achterberg et al., 2016). This affects the resources used in 
the business model: materials are developed and-/or sourced according to a set of criteria 
e.g. renewables, bio-based, low resource intensiveness or full recyclability (Achterberg et 
al., 2016; Bocken et al., 2014; Lewandowski, 2016). Additionally, the value proposition can 
change when aiming to address a customer need with lowered resource use, which can also 
affect the target group of customers. Costs arise due to investments into (re-)design of a 
product, mostly related to R&D. Revenues may be affected if the customer base needs to be 
grown from scratch and depending on the pricing strategy.  
When carrying out BMI in the use phase of a product, shifting from sales to retained 
producer ownership and servicing of products is a common strategy of producers (Mont, 
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2002; Tukker, 2015). Services such as repair and maintenance, upgrades, extensions or 
extended support are added to the value proposition to increase the product lifecycle. 
Product-service system (PSS) BMI entails a (full or partly) shift from selling a product to 
servicing a product (Ceschin, 2013; Gaiardelli, Resta, Martinez, Pinto, & Albores, 2014; 
Maxwell & van der Vorst, 2003; Reim, Parida, & Örtqvist, 2015; Tukker, 2015). This 
ownership shift creates a financial incentive for the firm to invest in longevity and re-use of 
products and materials (Baines et al., 2007; Bocken et al., 2014; O. K. Mont, 2002; Tukker, 
2004; Williams, 2007). However, it also entails tying up large amounts of capital, leading to 
a shift of financial risk from the customer to the firm (Linder & Williander, 2015). Increased 
contract length can lower this risk but may lead to a less attractive customer value 
proposition (Besch, 2005). Also, cost and revenue uncertainty are high compared to 
investments required (Linder & Williander, 2015). In the context of baby prams, Mont et al. 
(2006) note that the shift from a sales to a service model leads to higher expected profits but 
delays incoming revenue, creating an external finance need. Furthermore, the pram design 
is adjusted to increase longevity and decrease cost of upgrading between users to make the 
service model more feasible (Mont et al., 2006). Other ‘use’ BMI types are: sell/buyback, 
sharing platforms, lifetime extension and tracing facilities (Achterberg et al., 2016; Bocken 
et al., 2014; Lewandowski, 2016). BMI in the ‘use’ or customer phase affects the value 
proposition and strategy by setting up an integrated product service solution and increasing 
customer engagement/retention. It entails intensive use of specific partner networks to 
deliver an integrated product service offering. Finally, a shift in revenue structure occurs 
when moving from sales to servicing which also affects its costs (high upfront investment 
costs and long payback period). Circular post-use BMI increases the added value of a 
product at the end of its lifecycle. Revenue is generated through recapturing and refurbishing 
products, components or material, recycling or second-hand sales (Achterberg et al., 2016; 
Bocken et al., 2014; Lewandowski, 2016). This process requires an accessible take-back 
program and technological expertise. Some products might not be suitable for this type of 
business model, such as fast-moving consumer goods (Linder & Williander, 2015).   
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Post-use business model innovation may impact the value proposition and the customer base 
if the recovered products, components or materials lead to alternative, non-virgin material 
use. Recovering materials as input for a new value proposition requires building unique 
supplier and logistical networks. Furthermore, the cost structure shifts away from material 
costs (since ‘waste’ is used) towards refurbishing and/or recycling costs, which can require 
high upfront investments into infrastructure (e.g. refurbishing plant). Revenue can be 
affected depending on whether the value proposition and the target customer are altered due 
to marketing recycled material, components or products.  
Bank finance for BMI 
Firms, especially SMEs and start-ups, rely on external sources of finance both to fund day 
to day business activities (i.e. working capital) and for investments into innovation (Cincera 
& Santos, 2015). Bank credit represents the major share of external finance for SMEs in 
Europe and over 80% in the Netherlands (Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Cincera & Santos, 
2015; DNB, 2015; European Commission, 2014).  
Strategies of innovative firms are high risk (Brancati, 2015); the majority of innovations fail 
(Mazzucato, 2013). High expenditures on wages and salaries, uncertainty about the outcome 
of the investment and intangible capital creation in the form of tacit knowledge of employees 
create financing constraints for innovative activities (B. H. Hall, 2010). The high uncertainty 
of return at a project level is argued to be particularly problematic for SMEs since they are 
not able to build an innovation portfolio like large firms (Lee et al., 2015). Innovative firms 
invest in intangible (R&D) and tangible firm-specific assets (resources), whose context-
specificity makes them difficult to use as collateral (Brancati, 2015; Carpenter & Petersen, 
2002a). Even when R&D investments are registered as patents, their salvage value is likely 
to be low if the firm goes bankrupt (B. H. Hall, 2010). Lack of historical cash flow data 
(revenues and costs) is mentioned specifically as an obstacle to financing innovation (B. H. 
Hall et al., 2016). These aspects are summarized in the BMI framework (section 2.1). 
Banks invest in proprietary information gathering (Boot, 2000) and develop different 
methodologies for extending credit, referred to as lending technologies (Berger & Black, 
2011; Berger & Udell, 2006), to reduce credit/default risk (Angilella & Mazzù, 2015; Chaibi 
& Ftiti, 2015). We group these lending technologies into cash flow-based, asset-based and 
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relationship-based. Table 5-2 depicts which elements of the business model components 
would be relevant for banks per lending technology. The mechanisms will be described 
below. In practice, different lending technologies will often be combined, e.g. a relationship 
banker will ask for collateral and will want to see financial statements of a firm. However, 
there are differences in what the primary lending technique is, and these can lead to different 
credit decisions. We therefore take an in-depth perspective on lending technologies and view 
how these can be understood to improve access to finance for (circular) BMI. 
Table 5-2 Theoretical relationship between business model components and lending technologies 
 
Cash flow-based lending 
Banks deploy financial statement analysis (cash flow-based lending technologies) when 
audited financial statements are available as a primary information source upon which 
funding decisions can be based. Collateral and/or personal guarantees might be used to 
secure the loan and monitoring is done on the basis of loan repayments. In general, this 
lending technology can be applied to firms that offer a transparent value proposition and 
value capture. When audited financial statements are not available, banks can still assess 
cash flows through credit scoring. Credit scoring uses automated procedures to screen an 
entrepreneur’s personal financial information together with the available data on the firm 
itself to determine credibility and is often used for (opaque) small businesses (Berger & 
Frame, 2007; Frame, Srinivasan, & Woosley, 2001). The rise of big data is increasing the 
potential of this lending technology (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013). If past cash flows 
Chapter 5 
84 
and/or credit scores are not available or not sufficient for lending, banks can still extend a 
loan based on already secured future cash flows in the form of accounts receivable, in 
particular client contracts, which are a crucial part of circular use business models. Hence, 
the (quality of the) customer component of the business model plays an important role in the 
loan application process as well as the terms of the client contract (the essence of the value 
proposition to the client). Cash flow-based lending (financial statement lending) for 
innovation is challenging for banks due to lack of track record (B. H. Hall & Lerner, 2010). 
Asset-based lending 
In asset-based lending, banks use valuation and pledging of underlying (physical) assets of 
the enterprise (owner) as a basis for the lending decision. Fixed-asset lending uses physical 
assets of an enterprise that are not sold in the course of business as collateral for the loan 
such as real estate, machinery or equipment or vehicles (Berger & Udell, 2006). The asset is 
often uniquely identified and the size of the loan is dependent on its liquidation or market 
value, with repayment tied to the amortization schedule of the asset. Leasing is a lending 
technology based on assets where the asset ownership is transferred to the bank for the 
duration of the loan, often with a buyback construction at the end of the contract 
(Chemmanur & Yan, 2000; Hendel & Lizzeri, 1998). When using asset-based lending, 
working capital loans are provided based on the current value of assets used in the course of 
business such as inventory. All asset-based lending technologies focus on the tangible 
resources used in the business model, creating room for an enterprise to obtain finance even 
when the value capture of the enterprise (revenues) does not (yet) allow for this. Asset-based 
lending for innovative projects might be difficult for banks because the context-specificity 
of assets makes their market value uncertain (Lee et al., 2015; Mina et al., 2013). 
Relationship-based lending 
In relationship-based lending the lending decision is undertaken based primarily on 
proprietary information known only to the bank and the borrower (Boot & Thakor, 2000). 
Boot (2000:10) defines relationship banking as “the provision of financial services by a 
financial intermediary that (i) invests in obtaining customer-specific information, often 
proprietary; and (ii) evaluates the profitability of these investments through multiple 
interactions”. The financier takes a long-term perspective in its lending decision, creating 
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the opportunity to benefit over time from the information gathered, in particular in multiple 
lending decisions (Petersen & Rajan, 1994). Monitoring of the loan is operationalized 
through continued direct contact and observation of the SME’s performance, taking a 
holistic approach that encompasses most business model components. Relationship lending 
allows banks to provide additional services such as market intelligence, access to customers 
and other stakeholder crucial for the firm’s success and sector expertise, similar to a venture 
capitalist or business angel (Boot & Thakor, 2000). Relationship lending is also associated 
with small, opaque and/or innovative firms due to the use of ‘soft’ information which is 
particularly valuable if hard information about track record, assets or cash flows are lacking 
(Brancati, 2015). Strong relationships between banks and firms are shown to increase bank 
willingness to take risks/lend for innovation since potential costs (of default) are spread out 
over a longer period of bank earnings from a client (Brancati, 2015; Jiménez & Saurina, 
2004; Petersen & Rajan, 1994). Also, relationships are shown to lower collateral amounts 
requested by banks (Berger & Udell, 1995). However, it can be difficult for young, 
innovative firms to build up a strong banking relationship if they require major capital 
injections early in their existence (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002a). 
To sum up, although the innovation finance literature, including lending technologies, has a 
rich empirical base, there is no explicit understanding of how firms that carry out business 
model innovation should strategize at a business model component level to increase their 
access to external (bank) finance. By addressing this question in the current paper we add 
unique empirical richness to our understanding of access to external finance, as an important 
requirement for carrying out BMI (Foss & Saebi, 2017).  
5.3 Method 
To understand the effect of business model innovation on a firm’s access to bank credit, we 
employ a case-study based theory-refining approach, building on the BMI and lending 
technologies frameworks and focusing on the actual decision as the unit of analysis 
(Flyvbjerg, 2011; Yin, 2014). This fits well with the process-oriented nature of the 
underlying research question, the aim of building additional theory (Suddaby, 2006) and the 
limited accessibility for researchers of companies and financiers (especially banks) via more 
quantitatively oriented instruments (Bettis, Gambardella, Helfat, & Mitchell, 2015; 
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Eisenhardt, 1989). We outline the steps that we have taken to operationalize our research 
design and its relevance for the research context below. 
Research context 
The research reported here was conducted as part of two research projects running from 
2015-2017. The first project formed part of the Nederland Circulair! consortium, which was 
financed by the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment. Focusing on financing 
barriers experienced by circular businesses, this looked at 13 circular business cases and 
brought them together with financiers to (potentially) solve these barriers. The second 
project, financed by the Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers (VNO-NCW) 
focused on similar issues, analysing 31 company cases (not banks). 
Case selection 
To unravel the mechanisms underlying a credit decision and consequently answering our 
research question, we used purposeful theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989; Siggelkow, 
2007). Hence, we included companies innovating their business models as well as banks. 
The use of multiple cases allows us to ground the research empirically and to generate 
sufficiently complex theory (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
To observe actual financing decisions in the companies, we applied an information-oriented 
selection (Flyvbjerg, 2011; Seawright & Gerring, 2008). We collected evidence from SMEs, 
start-ups and established corporations representing the three types of circular business model 
innovation (pre-use, in-use, post-use) as explained in section 2.1, that had an (external) 
financing need (Achterberg & van Tilburg, 2016; Bocken et al., 2014). 
Regarding financiers, we focused on banks due to their important roles in providing 
corporate finance in general (European Commission, 2014), and for financing a big part of 
the transition to a more sustainable, long-term efficient economy (Campiglio, 2016). The 
banks deploy lending technologies to make their financing decision as described in section 
2.2. In this regard, the Netherlands is a particular interesting case study, as it possesses one 
of the most developed bank-oriented financial sectors in Europe and the world (DNB, 2015). 
In addition, Dutch banks have expressed both individual and joint commitment in their 
willingness to finance the circular economy (ABN AMRO, 2015; ING, 2015; MVO 
Nederland, 2016; Rabobank, 2015). To obtain a representative sample, we contacted 
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representatives from all major banks active in business banking in the Netherlands. The four 
banks that agreed to cooperate are the four largest players in business banking in the country, 
representing at least 61.4% market share (DNB, 2016). Both sustainability-oriented banks 
as well as generic commercial banks were included to account for the fact that circular BMI 
may be financed only by niche-banks that have a mission-driven focus to do so. This 
increases the transferability of our findings.  
Data collection 
Data collection encompassed three distinctive elements to allow for data triangulation 
(Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2014); see Figure 5-2 for an overview. 
First, we used archival documents of all the organizations as well as additional stakeholders 
such as think tanks and NGOs to pinpoint the most relevant characteristics of circular 
business models and their financing challenges. From the banks, we also obtained 
confidential archival documents such as documentation about companies and credit 
assessment process documents. 
Second, 32 interviews were held both with company representatives and bank employees. 
They lasted between 1-2 hours and were recorded and transcribed verbatim. See appendix 
for a full (anonymized) list of interviewees. For each company, an interview took place that 
included questions on whether there had been or is a financing need and whether they applied 
for bank credit. If so, we asked follow-up questions on the amount, the bank that financed 
them, and why they were financed. If they did not receive credit, we asked why the bank 
rejected their application or what prerequisites were asked for in order to obtain credit in the 
future. In this way, we collected evidence about financing decisions for innovative (circular) 
business models based on real loan applications from enterprises developing a circular 
business model.  
For each bank, representatives from the credit committee were interviewed. These included 
experienced bankers with sustainability, commercial and legal backgrounds, such as loan 
officers, (sector) managers, as well as legal department, risk management and front office 
(commercial) staff. Questions revolved around credit decision processes and included 
perspectives on companies innovating their business model to become more ‘circular’. 
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Third, the author team organized four workshops (focus groups) with the four participating 
banks (Geissler & Zinkhan, 1998; Greenbaum, 1998). These lasted between 2-4 hours and 
included a representative sample from each bank’s credit committee discussing the business 
model cases (between 6-20 participants). The workshops were recorded and transcribed 
verbatim. Transcripts were sent to participants to verify accuracy (‘member checking’) 
(Vuori & Huy, 2016). We asked broad questions regarding past credit applications of 
circular enterprises at their bank and their credit decision-making process (lending 
technologies) in general. For each workshop, together with our bank contact person we 
selected two representative companies that had recently been looking for credit as part of 
their developing a circular business model. We asked each bank to explain their credit 
decision-making based on these two representative cases. We elaborated on the challenges, 
opportunities and solutions of financing these enterprises. Finally, we determined the basis 
by which bank participants were most likely to extend credit (assets, contracts, relationship, 
financial statements/going concern). Characteristic shortcomings of focus groups-based 
research – such as participants publicly agreeing to views of the group despite private 
disagreement, and limited data validity due to the formation of a consensus view in group 
interaction – have been mitigated by creating a private space/atmosphere for open exchanges 
and encouraging the discussion of different views (Geissler & Zinkhan, 1998; Greenbaum, 
1998). 
 
Figure 5-2 Overview of data collection 
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Through a combination of insights from archival documents, interviews and workshops with 
representatives from the banks’ credit committees and other employees involved in the credit 
decision, feedback was obtained on their ability and willingness to finance different circular 
enterprises, which we related to the business model of these enterprises (Moran-Ellis et al., 
2006).  
Data analysis 
Corresponding to the theory-refining approach, data analysis followed an abductive 
procedure (Dougherty, 2002; Mantere, 2008). We started with BMI components and bank 
lending techniques as an initial frame of reference (Suddaby, 2006) and made new linkages 
between the main theoretical concepts (theory building), by detecting patterns and matching 
them with the data. These steps involved a constant back and forth between theory and the 
collected data, which ensured internal validity of our study. To ensure reliability of analysis, 
a case study database was developed using Nvivo 11 that allowed for the integration of the 
different data sources (archival documents, interview and workshop transcripts) and 
corresponding perspectives (Gibbert et al., 2008; Jick, 1979; Moran-Ellis et al., 2006). 
Archival documents, interview and workshop transcripts were screened as bottom-up codes 
for central topics, such as factors in the decision-making process, to derive implications of 
how lending technologies are deployed and how differences in generic business models vs. 
innovative circular business models were seen. We developed bottom-up codes from the 
insights in shifting to a circular business model, potential financing challenges and credit 
allocation processes at banks and specific lending technologies or approaches which are 
consolidated under top-down codes (BMI/lending technologies) from our theoretical 
framework. This process of coding and revisiting our initial frame of reference developed in 
several rounds (Dougherty, 2002). The overlap between BMI codes and lending technology 
codes allowed us to establish an empirical link. The coding procedure6 of archival 
documents, interviews and focus groups resulted in 1155 coded segments.  
Three researchers carried out the data analysis, one of them present at each 
interview/workshop. At each workshop/interview one researcher was absent to add an 
                                                          
6 The coding scheme is available from the authors upon request. 
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‘unbiased’ view to data analysis to ensure inter-coder reliability and construct validity 
(Gibbert et al., 2008; Yin, 2014). We also reflected our findings to a group of finance sector 
experts (key informants in the FinanCE working group) to verify and extend them. The 
findings from banks were anonymized during the process (Bank A-D are reported). To 
improve external validity, we also compared sustainability oriented vs. classical commercial 
banks in a cross-case analysis. The authors are fully aware that the findings are context-
dependent (Flyvbjerg, 2011), however the research contributes to a larger understanding of 
a bank’s perspective on BMI in general. 
5.4 Findings 
In the following section, we report our findings on the role of business model components 
and the use of different lending technologies for circular BMI. In general, bank interviewees 
and entrepreneurs recognize the three types of circular BMI (pre-use, use, post-use), which 
confirms part of our theoretical framework. Also, they recognize the financing challenge 
created by circular BMI due to the changing nature of cash flows, increased capital needs 
and legal issues surrounding collateral and its value (bank C, circular economy document). 
Furthermore, the importance of several business model components – strategy, value capture 
- for the loan decision is confirmed by internal credit process documentation (Bank D, credit 
process document).  
We report on the most important BMI components from a bank finance perspective, 
specified per lending technology. The BMI components and their financing challenges are 
illustrated with quotes from firms and banks (Table 5-3 through Table 5-9). The quotes refer 
to the bank interviewees and workshop participants listed (anonymized) in Table 5-11 and 
Table 5-12 (in the appendix). A summary of all findings (BMI components/lending 
technologies) is reported in Table 5-10 (at the end of the findings section). To answer our 
research question, we look at each business model component in turn.  
Value proposition 
The value proposition (or market offering) plays an important role in bank finance for 
circular business models. At the sustainability-oriented bank in our sample lending is 
oriented specifically at circular and sustainable businesses; therefore the value proposition 
is screened to confirm that it is in line with their values. In the face of resource scarcity and 
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climate change, even mainstream banks have an urgency to move to a more 
sustainable/circular way of doing business, based on expectations that this will be profitable 
in the long-term. However, for them it is not central to all their lending decisions; rather it 
is something they want to move towards with part of their lending portfolio. Recognizing 
the circularity of a value proposition is therefore a screening approach that banks want to 
develop further, e.g. by training their relationship bankers to understand and recognize 
circular BMI. 
The value proposition embodied in circular BMI plays a part in the lending decision due to 
expectations of higher levels of value creation and capture. This expectation is based on the 
logic that circular business models should lead to optimal value management because of 
better incentives and resource management. Both banks and enterprises note that the 
increased value and lifetime of the underlying product – due to its circularity – is expected 
to increase the value of the business over the product’s lifetime – especially if this increased 
lifespan is brought to market in a product-service model or within a buyback construction. 
The benefit of this increased value can be shared between the producer and the consumer, 
making both the market offering and the revenue model competitive. Therefore, a value 
proposition that embodies a circular product-as-a-service is generally perceived by banks as 
value enhancing and with some potential to generate profits in the future. However, this 
interest does not automatically translate into a positive lending decision; proof of market 
potential (customers) is needed.  
More specifically, the client contracts that are offered in a service model are a crucial part 
of the value proposition to be assessed by banks. In service models, the conditions of the 
client contract embody the specific value proposition to the client in terms of service versus 
costs and flexibility of opting out of the product after a certain time period. Contract 
conditions, in particular duration and opt-out clauses, affect the perceived riskiness of future 
cash flows (accounts receivables). For clients, it is generally beneficial for conditions to be 
formulated as flexibly as possible; however, from a bank’s perception, stringent conditions 
increase the security of future cash flows. Banks are used to lending on the basis of contracts 
that have the same duration as the economic lifetime of the underlying asset, offering robust 
future cash flows. In circular BMI, assets are expected to last longer and produce cash flows 
in (multiple) consecutive client contracts, which means future cash flows are potentially 
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higher. However, at the time of the lending decision these contracts have not yet been signed. 
The ratio between the signed contract and the asset value becomes important in the lending 
decision. Also, in the case of a buyback construction, the future value of the asset at the end 
of its (first) use cycle needs to be assessed and compared with the future cash outflow 
corresponding to the buyback price. 
Table 5-3 Importance of the value proposition (market offering) for different lending technologies 
Lending 
technology 
Cash flows (future) Assets Relationships 
Value 
proposition 
 (market 
offering) 
Terms of client 
contracts (duration, opt-
out clause) in product-
service BMI affect 
perceived risk level of 
future cash flows. 
Level of 
standardization/modularit
y of market offering and 
underlying product 
affects its marketability 
in multiple rounds of use 
(and therefore lowers risk 
as collateral).  
Value proposition is 
assessed on 
circularity/sustainabili
ty due to values and 
expected profitability.  
Key quotes “From a financial point 
of view this is a hard 
one. For example, a 
wind turbine. At least 
you want an offtake 
time of 5-10 years. Here 
it [the contract duration] 
is only 3 months. Your 
robustness of your cash 
flow is very low. [...] A 
newcomer could take all 
your customers, which 
makes it hard to 
finance.” - Head of 
Commercial Banking, 
Bank B3, workshop 
“You can take the 
building apart in 
components or sell it in 
parts. Every part has a 
different residual value. 
Instead of a residual 
value of 0 or 1 (it is 
rented out or not) there is 
now a whole array of 
value propositions which 
makes the risk for the 
bank smaller.” - Director 
Sustainable Banking, 
Bank D1, interview 
 
“Through 
conversations with 
many stakeholders we 
saw that the 
sustainability of a 
building is becoming 
a more dominant 
factor in its 
rentability. Investing 
in this is a future-
based strategy to 
make sure our 
portfolio is robust.” - 
Director Sustainable 
Banking, Bank D1, 
interview 
 
The (technical) specifications related to the asset in the value proposition/market offering 
can affect the ability to finance the underlying asset, and can be influenced through its level 
of standardization or modularity. Products offered to the market that have a long lifetime 
and are also very standardized, e.g. in terms of size, colour and material, are more 
marketable, including in a second or third round of use. For asset-based lending in particular, 
the value proposition (in terms of the asset offered to the market) can play an important role 
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since it affects the asset value and its (re-)marketability. The relevance of the value 
proposition is deemed particularly relevant in the context of circular real estate, where 
buildings are not only very attractive in the current market but are also designed to be 
multipurpose as a whole and at component level. This flexible value proposition lowers 
perceived risk for banks.  
Value delivery 
The four value delivery components – strategy, resources, customers and networks – impact 
the credit decision through particular lending technologies. We discuss findings for each 
component in turn.  
Strategy 
Banks seem to be more willing to finance circular BMI when existing, established clients 
strategize to shift gradually from linear business to circular business.  
Through this strategy, banks obtain access to more established, secure cash flows from 
existing business to de-risk their loan. Also, bankers note that it is more worthwhile for them 
to invest time and funds in existing, larger clients since they are also obtaining revenue on 
other products. In contrast, bank interviewees also mention that circular initiatives set up by 
start-ups are very unlikely to get financed, and neither are initiatives by established 
businesses that are not expected to become a regular client of the bank. Phased transition 
from a linear to a circular business model is therefore a lending enhancing strategy available 
only to established firms with an existing bank relationship (or those aiming to obtain a bank 
relationship). The strategy becomes relevant in terms of how to organize the manufacturing 
process including which customers to target (notably B2C or B2B) and which materials to 
use. By using or combining existing/proven production processes, perceived technological 
risk can be lowered, which increases the chance of obtaining a bank loan. 
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Table 5-4 Importance of the strategy BM component for different lending technologies 
Lending 
technology 
Cash flows Assets Relationships 
Strategy Through gradual 
transition of firms from 
linear to circular, cash 
flows can be secured by 
existing (linear) cash 
flows from existing 
business units.  
Strategizing to develop 
products that can be 
brought to market for 
many years affects its 
marketability in multiple 
rounds of use (and 
therefore lowers risk as 
collateral). 
Phased transition of 
established firms from 
linear to circular in line 
with their existing strategy 
with an existing bank 
relationship is lending 
enhancing (i.e. same 
industry).  
Key quotes You believe in the 
solution. […] It was a 
strategic decision of the 
client to stay in the 
same industry. […] 
You are not too 
concerned about assets 
or contracts. You look 
at the debtor and what 
is happening.” Sector 
banker public banking, 
Bank D4, workshop 
 
“The most circular 
product is one that you do 
not adjust, which can be 
used for very long in its 
current form. [...] In the 
pay-per-use construction 
the residual value 
increases if you take a 
white desk. We want to 
stimulate that because we 
can circulate it more 
easily. So, you can design 
products in such a way 
that they are timeless.” 
Ahrend, CEO AA1 
 “Who is our client and 
what is their relationship 
with our bank: existing or 
new, and why are they 
shifting banks?” Bank D, 
credit documents 
“Many of our clients are 
both linear and circular. 
They are making a phased 
transition to a circular 
business model. In 
particular the good clients 
who we have known for 
ages, who now realize they 
want to become circular, 
we are right in the in-
between phase at the 
moment.” Senior 
Sustainable Business 
Strategist, Bank A1, 
workshop 
 
Resources 
Tangible resources 
The most important tangible resources for a bank loan are the assets that are brought to 
market as part of circular BMI (e.g. washing machines, carpets, elevators or smartphones). 
This underlying asset is mentioned in product-service BMI in particular, since these assets 
remain on the balance sheet of the firm asking for a loan. In theory, these assets can be used 
as a security for the bank for asset-based lending, as in the traditional lease industry (for cars 
and printers). Sometimes resources can also be relevant for asset-based lending at a 
component or material level. Theoretically, asset-based lending seems a logical approach for 
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circular BMI since the materials, components and/or products are expected to retain their 
value longer. This can lead to lower depreciation costs and a longer period of cash flows 
from a single asset. However, our findings suggest that currently, using tangible assets as a 
basis for a lending decision instead leads to several challenges.  
Firstly, underlying assets in BMI are often innovative, which leads to a lack of 
historical/market data on their long-term value. This makes it difficult for banks to lend 
based on past cash flows over the asset lifetime. The claim, that an asset will produce cash 
flows for a long period of time, is therefore difficult to prove.  
Active second-hand markets in underlying products can increase the belief of banks that 
there is residual value to build on as part of a bank loan. Interestingly, the new and 
distinguishing characteristic of a product (its ability to be long-lasting or be easily reused) 
makes the product less attractive as collateral when it is still in an innovation stage and this 
long-term market value is unproven. Furthermore, banks prefer loan durations from 5-7 
years whereas firms with long-lived assets need a financing term up to 20 years, which led 
to financing constraints as well.  
Second, apart from uncertainty about their long-term value, the underlying assets in BMI 
may suffer from characteristics that further lower their ability to serve as collateral: 
a. Specificity – an elevator tailor-made for a building cannot be re-used at the product 
level 
b. Illiquidity – difficult to move, such as a carpet glued in a building, making re-use 
difficult 
c. Dispersion – washing machines situated at individual consumer homes make collateral 
collection costly. 
Since these characteristics make assets less suitable as collateral, thinking about these 
characteristics already in the product design can help firms obtain a bank loan. One 
electronics firm designed their lighting solutions so that they can be easily removed from a 
building. Removable, standardized carpet tiles have a higher residual value than tailor-made 
fixed carpet. An elevator producer created a materials passport so that at the end of an 
elevator’s lifetime they are able to value it at a material level. Bundles talked about a ‘red 
button’ option so that the service provided to non-paying customers terminates (since a 
washing machine is costly to collect). Fairphone could, for example, collaborate with a 
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network provider, who can switch off connectivity when a customer does not fulfil their 
payment obligations. 
Third, availability of parties who could take over the assets as part of a running business 
was mentioned as a financing challenge related to resources. The underlying assets are worth 
more to a bank if they can be sold to other players in the same field (competitors) that are 
willing to buy them. Selling a client portfolio to a competitor retains more value than selling 
underlying assets separately, terminating client contracts. If the underlying product is 
innovative and there are no other parties offering the same type of services, the asset become 
less valuable for the bank as collateral.  
Finally, one bank in our study has a special leasing division aiming to promote circular 
business models by leasing various types of business assets to customer firms - such as 
vehicles and agricultural or construction equipment – and encouraging clients to increase 
their lifetime through repair and alteration. By leasing crucial business assets from a bank, 
financial constraints of firms engaged in circular BMI can be alleviated.  
Table 5-5 Importance of the resources BM component for different lending technologies 
Lending 
technology 
Assets 
Tangible 
resources 
The higher expected residual value of assets used in circular BMI in contrast to 
linear BMI can lower depreciation costs for firms and increase duration of cash 
flows. (1) Assets underlying in BMI are often novel, leading to a lack of historical 
data on their long-term/residual value. Banks do not easily include the long-term 
value as a security in a bank loan because of the uncertainty that this value will be 
captured (no second-hand contracts and no secondary markets). Long-lived assets 
need longer loan durations, which is a challenge for banks. (2) Assets are often 
costly to collect and therefore not deemed suitable as collateral. (3) The availability 
of other players that can take over the assets as part of a running business affects 
the riskiness of using these assets as collateral (and the value that banks are able to 
place on them). As an alternative route, firms can lease key business assets 
(vehicles, equipment) from banks to alleviate financing constraints.  
Key quotes “When, in closed supply chains, the residual value of products increases, the basis 
for a loan improves” Circular Economy Guide, bank D 
“I expected this to be mentioned as a challenge, the residual value. When you take 
back your product to close the material loop, what will be its value? What do you 
dare to expect, what can you still use from it? That is really a challenge.” Sector 
banker construction, Bank D11, ws 
“[…] banks get stuck on financing these kinds of models. It is about a fixed asset 
with a period of minimum of 20 years. They are allergic for that, because it needs 
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to fit with a period of 5-7 years and it needs to be mobile to serve as collateral. 
These are the tensions.” Sales manager Mitsubishi elevators, AC1 
“[…] what on earth do we do with 10,000 washing machines? [..] We cannot go 
selling them one by one and store them somewhere. So, the residual value for a 
bank is much lower, since we’re not specialized in selling 10,000 washing 
machines. Is there a market for the residual value?” Head of Commercial Banking, 
Bank B3, workshop 
“[…] All that is fixed to a building, loses directly its value. In a lease construction 
you need collateral, thus residual value. ‘Flooring as a service’ obviously has no 
residual value. […] The bank helped us and calculated based on residual value of 
resources.” Director sustainability, Desso, office furniture firm AE1 
“[…] Traditional lease did not fit the financing need of our M-Use, elevators as a 
service, because the elevators are fixed in the building. It is not easy to attract 
funding for our proposition.” Sales manager Mitsubishi elevators, AC1 
“[…] An elevator is much more difficult: a copy machine you can easily remove, 
but an elevator cannot be easily removed. Additionally, copiers have an established 
second-hand market.” Vice president large & key accounts, Bank A19, workshop 
“That is exactly the core risk of the re-marketing, the ability to bring the asset to 
the market again, which is unknown and new. A bank is not going to take that 
risk.” Director Sustainable Finance, Bank C1, workshop 
“Bank C’s subsidiary promotes circular business models by offering its customers 
the opportunity to lease, rather than own, various types of business assets. Bank C’s 
subsidiary also encourages its customers to extend the economic lifetime of these 
assets […]” Document on website bank C. 
 
Intangible resources 
The quality and commitment of the entrepreneur is a key factor for both relationship-based 
and future cash flow-based lending. (Personal) commitment from entrepreneurs is important 
to guarantee the continuation of the business, both through fundraising and personal 
financial support. One bank mentioned they put a lot of effort into judging the quality of the 
entrepreneur by looking at their skills, relevant experience and judging whether the team is 
effective. They also judge whether the entrepreneur ‘fits’ with the business she/he aims to 
carry out. 
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Table 5-5 (continued) 
Lending 
technology 
Cash flow (future) Relationships 
Intangible 
resources 
Commitment of the entrepreneur to 
the business is needed to secure 
future cash flows.  
The expertise, quality, ‘fit’ and track 
record of the entrepreneur and, if relevant, 
the team.  
Key quotes “There is a client, but if the 
contracts are withdrawn, someone 
needs to take care that a new client 
is found for the machine, that 
payments come in every month, 
that someone carries out this whole 
operation. So, people say: what if 
you stop, that risk is too large. 
Then the washing machines are 
standing there and if no-one will 
collect the fees, how will I ever get 
my loan back?” Founder Bundles, 
washing service provider, Z1 
 
“If there is one factor that would be most 
important to lend or not to lend, it is the 
quality of the entrepreneur or the 
combination of people who are running a 
business. […] You could do any analysis 
of financials, but an accountant can help 
with that. If the entrepreneur doesn’t 
understand what he is doing, there is no 
way we are going to finance him.” 
Managing Director, Bank B4, workshop 
“[…] Not everyone has a team in which 
everyone has over 30 years of experience 
and two Harvard MBAs, which played a 
role in succeeding to attract a bank loan.” – 
CEO Black Bear Carbon, K1 
Customers 
The customers targeted as part of a circular business model can serve three functions in the 
bank lending decision, mainly as a signal of revenue expectations and market demand. First, 
having customers willing to sign contracts creates a security for the bank (future cash flows). 
Second, their credit quality affects the quality of accounts receivable in case of client 
contracts. Third, their willingness to pre-finance a product can lower market risk and show 
proof of legitimacy. 
Having signed customer contracts is an important signal for (future) cash flow-based 
lending. Both enterprises and banks mention signed customer contracts as a positive factor 
in obtaining a bank loan. A firm that upcycles used car tires into carbon black had large 
potential clients who carried out tests with their product and then confirmed they wanted to 
become a client. This helped them obtain a bank loan for building a factory. Similarly, Ioniqa 
- a plastics firm that developed (nano)technology to decolor plastic waste fur reuse – 
mentioned the lack of willingness of future clients to commit as one of the reasons why they 
were not able to obtain a bank loan to finance their factory.  
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Table 5-6 Importance of customer BM component for different lending technologies 
Lending 
technology 
Cash flow (future) Assets Relationships 
Customers (1) Having signed contracts 
with customers. (2) The 
creditworthiness of clients 
targeted in a business model 
affects the perceived 
robustness of future cash 
flows.  
Targeting B2B 
customers can lead to 
larger volumes thus 
less dispersion, easing 
collection of collateral 
in case of default. 
Having committed, 
pre-ordering customers 
indicates market 
demand 
Key quotes “The bankability of circular 
business models in many cases 
requires the acceptance of 
‘contractual comfort’ instead 
of the right of legal ownership 
over assets in case things go 
wrong. Secondly, it requires a 
more cash flow based approach 
to finance rather than an 
approach based on collateral 
values.” Bank C, 
documentation  
“At this moment, in the lease, 
we agreed with the bank that 
they would do a credit check 
on every new client.” Ahrend, 
office furniture firm, product 
designer, AA2 
“[…] one of our challenges is 
to get clients to commit for 
future procurement. […] 
Without market demand we 
cannot scale. […] But without 
scale, clients will not commit. 
And without committed clients 
we cannot attract funding for 
building the factory.” CEO 
Ioniqa, H1 
“If an SME wants to market an 
online service for 3-5 years, he 
has to know instantly whether 
a client is creditworthy, as a 
financial sector we might need 
to develop tools for that.” 
Director Sustainable Banking, 
Bank D 
“A carpet producer 
creates value from 
returning materials. 
But this is not value 
for the financier. For 
Fairphones/Iphones: if 
you receive enough 
back from the market 
you get 50-100 Euro 
per phone. As long as 
you get enough 
volume (10.000’s) 
you can send them to 
the refurbisher. With 
those volumes that is 
possible. With carpet 
that is not the case.” 
Vice president large 
& key accounts A19, 
bank A workshop 
 
 “[…] we had many 
test reports from large 
clients that tested our 
product who stated that 
‘if that factory will be 
built, we want to 
become a client’. […] 
this helped to mitigate 
market risk.” 
Blackbear Carbon, 
CEO K1 
“[…] the commitment 
from pre-paying 
customers was 
mentioned as a factor 
in the positive lending 
decision”. Fairphone, 
resource efficiency 
manager G1 
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Banks also aim to screen the credit quality of customers who have committed to 
buying/leasing a product to assess the robustness of this future cash flow. It is always 
possible that this future cash flow will not materialize if customers do not pay, which can 
lead to loan default. However, screening credit quality of clients can be costly, and banks 
note that it either needs to be done automatically or is only viable for large deals/clients. A 
preference for B2B customers by banks stems from the fact that these can agree to longer 
contractual periods; consist of larger volumes and the collection of collateral in case of 
default is easier. However, development of credit scoring intelligence of B2C clients could 
be a potential business development undertaken by banks that improves firm and bank 
screening procedures for contracts and lending respectively. One bank noted that assessing 
creditworthiness of potential customers could even be developed as an automated tool they 
could offer to SMEs that want to sell subscriptions (director sustainable banking D1, bank 
D, workshop).  
A third channel through which customers can affect access to bank loans is when customers 
display willingness to pre-order their product, i.e. through a reward crowdfunding campaign. 
In the case of one bank loan, customer commitment to pay in advance for their electronics 
product was considered by the bank to positively affect the lending decision as it signaled 
market demand.  Similarly, positive test reports from large clients mitigated market risks for 
another firm.  
Networks 
Networks (and partnerships) play a role in obtaining bank credit in several ways. Firstly, we 
find that partnerships/collaboration in the supply chain, in particular with larger firms, can 
lower risks for banks. Shared ownership of underlying resources organized in the whole 
chain, for example through a joint venture, enables the inclusion of a larger balance sheet in 
risk assessment, lowering risk. In addition, it confirms the commitment of necessary partners 
to secure supply and bring to market a successful innovative product. For circular business 
models in particular, dedicated networks can increase the chance of delivering a circular 
value proposition. 
Secondly, through a buyback construction with a supplier the underlying asset value for the 
bank can be increased, facilitating asset-based lending. In the course of this research project 
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a buyback construction between a washing machine service provider and the washing 
machine producer was set up, which led to a series of successful debt crowdfunding 
campaigns for the service provider. 
Third, evidence of embeddedness of a firm within a (local) community or network lowers 
the perceived risk of default. A firm that is well embedded in a community is less likely to 
suffer from withdrawal of funds, customers and (local government) support. This is a crucial 
factor in the credit decision making process of at least one of the banks researched.  
Table 5-7 Importance of the networks BM component for different lending technologies 
Lending 
technology 
Cash flow (past) Assets Relationships 
Network Joint venture (shared 
balance sheet) with 
established supply chain 
partners can lower risk 
for the bank. 
Buyback constructions 
with the supplier of the 
product brought to 
market can increase asset 
values (lower risk) for a 
bank.  
(1) Embeddedness of a 
firm in networks indicate 
business proposition 
relevance to others (2) 
Involve relevant parties 
(in and outside the bank) 
at early stage of loan 
request. 
Key quotes “[…] we set up a joint 
venture with an existing 
party, who had a 
balance sheet” CEO, 
Black Bear Carbon, K1 
“Define the extended 
credit base: all other 
parties whose financial 
health is a prerequisite 
for repayment of our 
loan. These need to be 
included in the 
analysis.” Bank D, 
credit process document 
“I think there is an 
elementary role for Miele 
[washing machine 
producer] in the 
financing, it is key that 
there is a buyback 
obligation from Miele 
against a certain price. 
That would improve the 
financeability [of 
Bundles] substantially.” 
Relationship manager 
corporate banking, Bank 
A18, workshop 
“I think what we did 
especially well – and this 
is quite extraordinary, 
especially at banks – is 
that we involved all 
people internally in the 
bank in a very early 
stage.” CEO, Black Bear 
Carbon K1 
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Value capture 
Revenues 
Proof of ability to generate revenues (through past or confirmed future customers) is deemed 
crucial by all banks and enterprises for a positive credit decision. The absence of robust 
historical revenue data is also seen as a key challenge for financing BMI. Because historical 
revenue data is lacking, loan applications for BMI often do not fit in the standard financing 
models. Also, BMI towards a product-service model leads to cash flows (revenues) coming 
in later, which makes the financing gap that needs to be covered, longer. There are two main 
ways that were reported by our interviewees in which lack of past revenue data for BMI is 
circumvented.  
BMI within a larger firm benefits from an existing track record from other business lines. In 
both cases, a bank loan may benefit from the bank’s incentive to nurture or start a long-term 
relationship with the established firm that carries out/partners in the (circular) business 
model innovation.  
Furthermore, reliability of (future) revenues can be improved by structuring client contracts 
to optimize future cash flows. A longer duration of contracts and a costly opt-out clause can 
lower the risk for banks that cash flows will not materialize. Also, improved data on the 
‘stick rate’ of customers can improve reliability of future cash flows (i.e. knowing what 
percentage of customers end their contract in each time period). Confirmed or expected 
orders from clients can be viewed as proof of future cash flows, in particular if a customer 
is large and creditworthy.  
We found that many banks – and also large firms that fund BMI internally – are more willing 
to fund a certain type of BMI when they believe in the ‘logic’ of the business case and its 
potential to create revenue. This increases their willingness to take risks. We see this in 
particular in the shift from a for sales- to a product-service business model: there is a general 
understanding that a product-service model allows firms to capture more value from a 
product that is durable and/or modular than a sales model is able to capture for a linear (short-
lasting) product. Our finding is that the general belief that circular BMI is an attractive and 
logical business case that will create revenues, increases the willingness of both firms and 
banks to invest ‘learning money’ into understanding how to finance this type of BMI.  
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Table 5-8 Importance of the revenues BM component for different lending technologies 
Lending 
technology 
Cash-flow (past) Cash-flow 
(future) 
Assets Relationships 
Revenue Banks prefer to 
have historical 
cash flow data but 
this is often not 
available for BMI. 
Joint ventures 
with supply chain 
partners and BMI 
with(in) existing 
firms alleviate this 
challenge.  
(1) Optimizing 
contract terms 
and customer 
portfolio signal 
robust and 
predictable cash 
flows. 2) Belief 
in the revenue-
generating 
capacity of a 
particular type of 
BMI.  
Lack of 
secondary 
markets makes 
BMI residual 
values insecure. 
It is important 
what part of the 
asset value is 
recovered within 
an existing 
contract, and 
expected ‘stick 
rate’ of the assets 
after the contract 
ends.  
Banks are more 
willing to invest in 
BMI for an 
existing client or a 
large potential 
client than non-
clients and/or small 
firms because it is 
more likely to 
create additional 
business/revenues.   
Key quote “The process of 
the bank is filling 
in the model by 
historical facts. 
For new business 
models there is no 
historical data. For 
those data you 
have to look into 
the future (or into 
the 
entrepreneur).” 
Sustainable 
Business 
Manager, Bank 
A2, interview 
“In the first 
conversation 
with the bank 
they told me, you 
don’t exist for 
two years, 
period. I came 
back after two 
years, but then I 
didn’t have a 
track record in 
cash flows. After 
two years of 
track record of 
cash flows, I 
again returned, 
and then was 
told: ‘Sure you 
now have this 
track record, but 
you have no 
secured cash 
flows for the 
future.’” 
Bundles, 
founder/CEO Z1 
“Residual value 
is fictive, after 
five years there 
is no market. 
[…]. Two things 
are important: 
(1) strong clients 
and (2) do I get 
the assets back in 
the first place? 
We say: ‘they 
bet on the stick 
rate’ -  after five 
years these 
assets are still in 
there.” Philips 
Capital, Head of 
financial 
sourcing, in 
workshop Bank 
D 
“We will never 
finance an 
individual firm that 
arranges all its 
banking business 
elsewhere. […] 
And the smaller the 
firm the stronger is 
that rule. If it is, for 
example, Apple, 
we might see what 
we can do.” 
Director 
Sustainable 
Banking, Bank D1, 
interview 
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The expected revenue captured from the first client is important; this is ‘secure’ revenue that 
has already been contracted. Assets in BMI often have no secondary markets, which makes 
residual values insecure. The revenue-generating capacity of assets therefore depends more 
on what part of the asset value will be recovered within an existing contract, and what the 
‘stick rate’ of the client is expected to be after the contract ends. 
Costs 
Finally, costs enter into the credit decision when high upfront investment costs for BMI lead 
to large loan sizes in relation to (expected) incoming revenue. This generally increases the 
duration and perceived riskiness of the loan, which makes it less attractive for the bank. This 
problem was mentioned for both infrastructural investments (for factories) and for shifting 
to a product-service model. The high upfront investment cost of shifting from a for sales- to 
a product-service business proposition is seen as an important funding constraint, even 
though banks agree that this model can be attractive in the long-term since it can lead to 
steady cash flows from lasting customer relationships and durable products. Also, BMI in 
the post-use phase (processing of products, components and materials for re-use) requires 
large infrastructural investments for scaling up, in particular for setting up factories for 
carrying out large-scale processing. Here, banks concentrate on market, technological and 
operational risks: they want proof of market demand and scalability.  
We find that firms perceive the longer lifetime of assets as financially attractive due to lower 
yearly depreciation costs of assets. However, for banks, the willingness to spread out 
depreciation over a longer time period depends on the residual value financiers are willing 
to account for – and this often depends on the duration and flexibility of contracts. Firms 
who use internal finance indicate higher willingness to depreciate assets over a longer period 
than banks. Firms such as Mitsubishi and Fairphone also mention that lower repair costs 
due to smart, modular and/or durable design and proactive repair and maintenance make the 
business case for a product-service model more attractive.  
Just-in-time asset holding lowers financing costs. Shifting to a service model can mean that 
firms are holding many assets on their balance sheet. Bank employees suggest that a 
preferred strategy from a financing perspective is to only hold those assets on the balance 
sheet which are contracted out to clients. This creates a more specific and smaller financing 
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need instead of pre-financing a larger amount of assets, which are not yet bringing in any 
revenues. 
Table 5-9 Importance of the costs BM component for different lending technologies 
Lending 
technology 
Cash flow (future) Assets 
Costs (1) BMI takes time to prove itself, which 
makes it costly and difficult to finance 
upfront. (2) In a product-service business 
model, growth will entail high upfront 
investment costs. Long-term costs are 
expected to be more stable due to efficient 
maintenance. (3) Lower financing costs 
can be reached by pre-financing only 
assets that are actually set out to 
customers. 
Lower depreciation and repair costs 
in a product-service model make 
financing of this type of BMI more 
attractive.  
Key quote  “Why would Bundles buy in 200 washing 
machines? Why not buy in stock-based, 
directly from Miele.[…] It creates a more 
focused and smaller financing need. Now 
you would finance 200 machines and 
already pay interest to the bank while you 
do not yet have 200 contracts signed.” 
Assistent Accountmanager A15, bank A, 
workshop 
 
 “We think there is a much healthier 
model with the leasing construction 
especially with a device which is so 
easy to repair. […] When you would 
take 100 phones back from Unilever 
because they had the leasing contract, 
and 50 of those have a scratched 
screen, we need to change those, and 
for Fairphone 1 that would take 30 
minutes. For Fairphone 2 only 10 
seconds, so that decreases the repair 
costs.” Fairphone, Resource 
Efficiency Manager G1 
Chapter 5 
106 
 
Ta
bl
e 
5-
10
 E
m
pi
ri
ca
l m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s i
n 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
BM
I a
nd
 le
nd
in
g 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
 
Chapter 5 
107 
5.5 Discussion, conclusions and implications 
The research question guiding our inquiry was: How can firms obtain bank finance for 
(circular) BMI? We find that all components of the business model (value proposition, value 
delivery and value capture) can positively affect the bank lending decision, which makes it 
relevant for business model innovators at firms to understand how to optimize their business 
model to obtain (bank) finance. 
Access to bank credit for (circular) BMI 
The way banks make financing decisions based on how they perceive a firm’s BMI is of 
strategic importance for companies (Chesbrough, 2010; Teece, 2010). Our findings confirm 
finance to be a major challenge in (circular) BMI, in particular in the shift from a sales to a 
service model (Linder & Williander, 2015). Innovative (circular) business models differ 
from traditional business models in ways that are highly relevant for financiers. A lack of 
financial track record (value capture) is a crucial challenge experienced by most innovative 
businesses in their search for bank credit. The higher expected lifetime of underlying assets 
in the case of circular BMI in general does not yet alleviate financing constraints. A shift to 
a product service business model – a common objective of circular enterprises – leads to 
additional financial challenges such as long-term asset holdings on the balance sheet, higher 
retained value of assets and cash flows from contracts versus sales (Bocken et al., 2014; 
Rauter et al., 2017). Long-term asset holdings are seen by banks as a technological and 
financial risk rather than as valuable collateral, due to a lack of secondary markets for these 
assets and high collection costs (low value per product distributed across consumers and/or 
buildings). Furthermore, the duration of credit need is too long for banks that expect a 5-7 
year payback period, whereas most of the innovative (circular) business models need time 
to scale up and expect a long life and therefore payback period for their products.  
The shift to a circular product-service business model leads banks to rely on confirmed future 
cash flows: the quality, duration and size of contracts with clients. Even for circular 
enterprises that carry out a sales model, confirmed orders/clients create more trust than 
collateral value. This focus on cash flow-based lending can be seen as a major impediment 
for innovative circular business models as their aim is to ‘close the material loop’: to increase 
the (market and use) value of underlying resources. Banks do not adhere to this value yet, as 
Chapter 5 
108 
it may need time to develop and for secondary markets to grow. Our evidence shows that 
enterprises starting as or shifting towards circular business models have difficulty finding 
the necessary financial resources due to the longer payback period and lack of experience in 
evaluating financial risks (Linder & Williander, 2015) a finding which is in line with the 
literature on innovation finance (Brancati, 2015; B. H. Hall, 2010).  
The relationship between lending technologies and BM components 
Our study highlights that successful financing of BMI is improved by awareness of 
entrepreneurs and managers about how banks screen based on different business model 
components. Our research bridges the strategic management and innovation finance 
literature by integrating business model components and bank lending technologies in one 
theoretical framework (Bocken et al., 2014; Linder & Williander, 2015; Wirtz et al., 2016). 
It also adds empirical rigour to the emerging debate through in-depth, qualitative empirical 
insights on access to bank finance for BMI (Gambardella & McGahan, 2010; Osterwalder 
et al., 2005; Schneider & Spieth, 2013).  
The value proposition (market offering) can influence a lending decision if: a bank is 
(un)favourable towards the type of innovation carried out; the value proposition is stable 
over time; the asset is standardized or modular, leading to higher expected asset values; or 
it embodies contractual terms that indicate stable future cash flows. The relevance of signed 
client contracts for financing a service model confirms earlier findings in the PSS literature 
(Linder & Williander, 2015). Banks offer concrete suggestions such as adjusting contractual 
terms to make them more secure for financiers – although this may be unattractive for clients 
(Besch, 2005) – and gathering data on ‘stick rates’ of customers that give more robustness 
to future cash flow information. Also, we find delaying of incoming revenues in the shift 
from a sales to a service model is seen by banks as problematic in the short term (O. Mont 
et al., 2006) but attractive in the long term due to higher stability of cash flows and client 
retention. Banks report they are particularly willing to engage with firms and develop sector 
expertise if they believe this ‘type’ of BMI (i.e. service models) (Bocken et al., 2014; 
Lewandowski, 2016; Wirtz et al., 2016) is promising from a cash flow perspective. 
In the value delivery part of the business model, two strategies were found to help firms 
obtain bank finance for BMI (Bocken et al., 2014; Lewandowski, 2016; Wirtz et al., 2016): 
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existing firms and clients that strategize to gradually shift towards BMI, and strategizing to 
position standardized/modular products increases collateral values of underlying assets. 
Tangible resources developed/used in the process of BMI can theoretically serve as 
collateral but BMI-related assets are often found to suffer from context- and firm-specificity 
as well as from lack of secondary markets and players that would be able to take over assets 
as part of a running business in case of default. Their ability to serve as collateral depends 
largely on characteristics such as specificity, movability, dispersion and (il-)liquidity. 
Intangible resources play a role in bank lending – largely in terms of the commitment and 
quality of the entrepreneur to make sure that BMI is executed as planned. Our findings 
confirm the problem of firm-specific resources (assets) employed in BMI, making assets less 
suitable as collateral for a bank loan (Brancati, 2015; Carpenter & Petersen, 2002a). Which 
customers are targeted as part of BMI is also important for a bank lending decision: their 
creditworthiness and willingness to sign client contracts/pre-order are important signals for 
a bank to judge future cash flows. Location and size of customers matter for service models, 
since dispersed collateral makes collection in case of default costlier. Successful engagement 
of networks (partners) can be a crucial factor for obtaining a bank loan since joint ventures 
or buyback constructions with supply chain partners (Kortmann & Piller, 2016) can deliver 
a more robust balance sheet and increase underlying asset values. Furthermore, 
embeddedness in (social) networks can signal the relevance and potential success (future 
cash flows) of the BMI. Our study underlines the important role of relationships/networks 
(Bocken et al., 2014; Osterwalder et al., 2005) for bank finance for (BM) innovation, in 
particular for obtaining borrower-specific ‘soft’ information about the innovating firm 
(Berger & Udell, 2006; Boot, 2000; Brancati, 2015). Specific types of information banks 
look for are quality and commitment of the entrepreneur, a hitherto neglected aspect in the 
BMI literature (Amit & Zott, 2015). Banks use formal and informal commitments from the 
firm’s network to determine their credit decision. Networks and embeddedness have been 
suggested in the literature to enhance access to finance (Berger & Udell, 2002; Uzzi, 1999). 
The value capture part of the business model is highly relevant for obtaining bank finance 
for BMI which has been indicated by earlier work (Schneider & Spieth, 2013; Zott & Amit, 
2010). Banks prefer historical cash flow data, which can be available when established firms 
gradually innovate their business model or in the case of joint ventures with established 
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firms. Signed contracts and orders from clients are useful signals of future cash flows: the 
size, expected growth and ‘stick rate’ of the portfolio of contracts in relation to the 
underlying asset that needs financing is an important factor for obtaining bank finance. We 
confirm the lack of historical cash flow data as an obstacle to bank finance (B. H. Hall et al., 
2016). This problem can sometimes be overcome by setting up joint ventures with 
established supply chain partners or by carrying out BMI within an established firm 
(Kortmann & Piller, 2016). Finally, BMI-related costs are highly relevant since they 
determine the size of the financing need. Timing of costs (upfront or periodical) also affects 
the size and duration of the financing need and lower operational costs can shorten payback 
periods, which lowers risk for the bank. However, we find a larger willingness to engage in 
‘risky’ lending with existing and relatively large clients due to the ability to spread out costs 
over time and across products, which confirms relationship banking theory (Boot, 2000). 
The larger, hierarchical banks in our sample confirm the need to automate the lending 
process to this type of BMI in the middle- to longer term in order to make it cost-effective, 
which is in line with the literature on bank organizational structure (Brancati, 2015). 
Limitations and future research 
Our study has several limitations and offers avenues for future research. One limitation of 
our study is the degree to which our insights – coming from empirical data on circular BMI 
– are transferable to BMI, in general (Bocken et al., 2014; Linder & Williander, 2015). Since 
we find that many of the financing constraints faced by the firms in our sample are similar 
to those pinpointed in the innovation finance literature in general, we think this problem is 
manageable. Nevertheless, a similar study using data from firms who carry out different 
types of BMI (e.g. based on digitalisation, artificial intelligence, blockchain) would further 
our understanding of BMI finance and how this is affected by firm / BMI characteristics. 
Just like previous BMI literature evolved out of the development of internet technology in 
the 90’s, empirical data collection in this field is limited to BMI that is occurring. 
A second limitation is that our data collection is partly self-reported by banks (workshops 
and publications about circular economy). It could be possible that in the workshops, banks 
report to be more positive about their willingness to finance circular BMI than their ‘real’ 
loan decision show. However, bank willingness to finance circular BMI is not higher than 
the outcomes of the real credit decisions as reported by the entrepreneurs/firms. We do find 
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that the public publications of banks about circular economy seem somewhat more 
optimistic than their real decisions and the workshops, but these are also less concrete.   
Future research could delve further into alleviation of financing constraints for BMI using 
all three types of lending technologies: cash flow, asset and relationship-based. From a cash 
flow perspective, we recommend setting up and testing quantitative models for cash flow 
prediction of service models (see e.g. Fischer & Achterberg, 2017). From an asset 
perspective, improved understanding is needed about how asset characteristics influence 
their ability to serve as collateral for access to finance. Our study shows that there are large 
differences between types of assets and their ability to serve as collateral in bank loans. Since 
increased asset lifetimes can serve sustainability purposes, firm profits and collateral value, 
further research should delve into specific asset characteristics that optimize all three. 
Finally, further research should aim to improve our understanding of how relationships 
facilitate bank financing decisions for BMI. Our study does not provide enough data to 
clarify what are the parameters that decide which firms are able to get finance based on 
relationships with banks, suppliers and customers, and how these relationships interact 
(Kortmann & Piller, 2016). Finally, the current study limits itself to bank loans, whereas 
other sources of finance for BMI – such as venture capital and crowdfunding – should be 
studied as well, including combinations and pecking orders between them.  
Managerial implications 
For entrepreneurs and managers 
Entrepreneurs wanting to attract credit for BMI can undertake several concrete actions to 
make their business model more financeable. Firstly, engagement of customers and networks 
will help obtain a bank loan. Engaging a bank at an early stage can create buy-in and 
willingness to develop insight into the particular type of BMI. Commitment from value chain 
players such as (potential) customers and suppliers – as a signal of future cash flows – will 
help lower risks from a bank perspective. This can be organized by building customer 
communities, running (pre-order) crowdfunding campaigns and setting up joint ventures or 
buyback constructions with suppliers. Identifying similar market players that could 
potentially take over running the business in case of default may also help obtain a bank 
loan. Secondly, entrepreneurs wanting to finance their BMI should consider how their value 
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proposition and strategy could be designed to optimize the value of underlying assets and 
increase robustness of future cash flows. By marketing assets that are durable, flexible, 
moveable, modular and/or at some level standardized means these assets can embody 
multiple ‘value propositions’ in the future, which may increase their collateral value for the 
bank. A materials passport can also improve residual value of assets. At the same time, the 
value proposition still needs to be distinguishing enough to merit financing without fear of 
competitors capturing their market share – a challenge that entrepreneurs need to navigate.  
However, the most important signal found to improve access for BMI bank finance is 
robustness of future cash flows. This means that – in service models – contracts need to be 
designed in such a way that they guarantee long-term revenues, while also keeping the terms 
attractive for clients. It can also mean that if entrepreneurs obtain commitment from 
launching customers that are large and/or creditworthy, this can have a positive influence on 
access to bank finance, as well as data collection on the ‘stick rate’ of clients – all signals of 
robust future cash flows. One strategic option for innovative firms offering product-service 
business value proposition is to first obtain long-term B2B contracts (i.e. service all 
smartphones for a large firm or all washing machines for a housing corporation), which gives 
a bank the security of future revenue and allows for free cash flow to grow the B2C market. 
Joint ventures and buyback constructions with suppliers also increase future cash flow 
robustness.  
For banks 
To overcome financing challenges residing within innovative (circular) business models, 
banks that wish to lend to a certain type of BMI should develop product/sector expertise and 
innovate their use of lending technologies to best overcome information asymmetries. In 
practice, this can mean learning to determine quality of future cash flows (accounts 
receivable), assessing creditworthiness of clients and evaluating collateral values of new 
products for asset-based lending.  
Our research indicates that building relationships with innovative firms can help banks 
understand this type of BMI and also increases the chance of them being able to extend credit 
based on multiple components of the business models, since cash flow or assets will often 
be insufficiently available. Banks therefore need to invest in expertise to be able to screen 
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technological innovations to gauge their potential for creating future cash flows enabling 
them to service a loan. With time, the increased investments into relationships with 
innovating firms can pay off in the form of expertise on this specific type of innovation 
leading to a larger and growing market (share) in the future and can be used to develop 
automated lending models once this type of business model has mainstreamed. In addition, 
a bank could develop additional services for firms, such as client acceptation procedures 
based on credit scoring models, which can improve the competitive position of the firm.  
Another way to lend to BMI is by sharing risks with other financial and market players. 
Buyback constructions and joint ventures with suppliers, (pre-)orders from customers, 
syndication between banks and other financial players as well as re-selling to long-term 
financiers such as state investment banks or pensions, are ways to share BMI financial risk.   
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5.6 Appendix 
Table 5-11 List of interviewees/workshop participants (face-to-face) (49) 
Code Role Date Interviewers Type 
A1 Senior Sustainable Business Strategist 
Dec 2015 
Sep 2016 
3 
2 
Interview  
Workshop 
A2 Sustainable Business Manager Dec 2015 3 Interview 
A3 Account manager Sep 2016 2 Workshop 
A4 Account manager Sep 2016 2 Workshop 
A5 Innovation manager Sep 2016 2 Workshop 
A6 Innovation manager Sep 2016 2 Workshop 
A7 Asset manager Sep 2016 2 Workshop 
A8 Account manager Sep 2016 2 Workshop 
A9 Financial specialist Sep 2016 2 Workshop 
A10 Marketing manager Sep 2016 2 Workshop 
A11 Account manager Sep 2016 2 Workshop 
A12 Account manager Sep 2016 2 Workshop 
A13 Sustainability Program Manager Sep 2016 2 Workshop 
A14 Credit analyst Sep 2016 2 Workshop 
A15 Assistant Account manager Sep 2016 2 Workshop 
A16 Young Professional Trainee  Sep 2016 2 Workshop 
A17 Economist Sep 2016 2 Workshop 
A18 Relationship manager corporate banking Sep 2016 2 Workshop 
A19 Vice president large & key accounts Sep 2016 2 Workshop 
B1 Manager Innovation Lab 
Jan 2016 
Feb 2016 
2 
2 
Interview  
Workshop 
B2 Intern Innovation Lab 
Jan 2016 
Feb 2016 
2 
2 
Interview  
Workshop 
B3 Head of Commercial Banking Feb 2016 2 Workshop 
B4 Managing Director Feb 2016 2 Workshop 
B5 Sector manager business banking Feb 2016 4 Workshop 
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B6 Senior relationship manager SME banking Feb 2016 4 Workshop 
B7 Senior relationship manager SME banking Feb 2016 4 Workshop 
B8 Relationship manager SME banking Feb 2016 4 Workshop 
B9 Director operations, investment management Feb 2016 4 Workshop 
B10 Corporate Communication & Strategy Intern Feb 2016 4 Workshop 
B11 Controller investment management Feb 2016 4 Workshop 
C1 Director Sustainable Finance 
Jan 2016 
Aug 2017 
2 
2 
Interview 
Workshop 
C2 Director Sustainable Lending Jan 2016 2 Interview 
C3 Manager Sustainable Finance Aug 2017 2 Workshop 
C4 Senior Risk Manager Aug 2017 2 Workshop 
C5 Sector Banker Aug 2017 2 Workshop 
D1 Director Sustainable Banking 
Jan 2016 
Jun 2016 
2 
3 
Interview  
Workshop 
D2 Head of Sustainability Corporate Banking 
Jan 2016 
Jun 2016 
2 
3 
Interview  
Workshop 
D3 Sector banker industry Jun 2016 3 Workshop 
D4 Sector banker public banking Jun 2016 3 Workshop 
D5 Senior Procurement Consultant Jun 2016 3 Workshop 
D6 Director Corporate Lending Jun 2016 3 Workshop 
D7 Director Strategy & Business Development Jun 2016 3 Workshop 
D8 Procurement consultant Jun 2016 3 Workshop 
D9 Sector banker industry Jun 2016 3 Workshop 
D10 Head Real Estate Risk & Portfolio Management Jun 2016 3 Workshop 
D11 Sector banker construction Jun 2016 3 Workshop 
D12 Product manager maintenance corporate buildings Jun 2016 3 Workshop 
D13 Innovation manager Jun 2016 3 Workshop 
D14 Risk management Jun 2016 3 Workshop 
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Table 5-12 List of interviewees at firms (face-to-face) (37) 
Code Firm name  Role Sector Date # Inter-
viewers 
E1 Auping Product Development Bed producer Nov 2016 2 
E2 Auping Procurement Bed producer Nov 2016 2 
F1 DSM Manager Circular 
Economy 
Chemicals Oct 2016 2 
G1 Fairphone Resource efficiency 
manager 
Consumer 
electronics 
Nov 2016 2 
H1 Ioniqa CEO Plastics Dec 2017 2 
I1 Gyproc Sustainability Manager  Building 
materials 
Dec 2017 2 
J1 Rockwool Public affairs Building 
materials 
Oct 2016 2 
K1 Black Bear 
Carbon 
CEO Car tire 
upcycler 
Nov 2016 2 
L1 Interface  Sustainable 
Development 
Carpets Nov 2016 2 
M1 Coolrec  Directeur Waste 
recovery 
Jan 2017 2 
N1 Closing The 
Loop 
Founder Electronics 
recovery 
Aug 2016 2 
O1 HVC  CEO Waste  Oct 2016 2 
P1 Canon Sustainability Manager Electronics  Dec 2016 2 
P2 Canon Sustainability Manager Electronics Dec 2016 2 
P3 Canon Lease Business Controller 
Solutions Financing 
Electronics Jan 2017 2 
Q1 Gerrard 
Street 
Founder Consumer 
electronics 
Sep 2016 2 
Q2 Gerrard 
Street 
Founder Consumer 
electronics 
Sep 2016 2 
R Desko General Directeur Office 
furniture 
Nov 2016 2 
S1 Philips CEO  Electronics Nov 2016 3 
S2 Philips Global Head 
Sustainability 
Electronics Nov 2016 3 
S3 Philips Director Sustainability Electronics Nov 2016 3 
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S4 Philips 
(Lighting) 
Director Sustainability  Electronics Feb 2017 2 
S5 Philips 
(Lighting) 
Head of Global Public & 
Government Affairs  
Electronics Feb 2017 2 
T1 van de Sant Founder  Furniture Jan 2017 2 
U1 Greenwheels Business development 
manager 
Car sharing Mar 2017 2 
V1 Peerby Founder / CEO  Sharing 
platform 
Dec 2016 2 
W1 United 
Wardrobe 
Founder / CEO Clothing 
resale 
platform 
Oct 2016 2 
X1 Blabla car Country Manager  Car sharing Dec 2016 2 
Y1 NS: OV fiets Sustainable business 
manager 
Bicycle 
renting 
Dec 2016 2 
Z1 Bundles Founder / CEO Washing 
service 
provider 
Dec 2016 2 
AA1 Ahrend  CEO Office 
furniture 
Feb 2017 2 
AA2 Ahrend  Product Design  Office 
furniture 
Feb 2017 2 
AA3 Ahrend  MVO Office 
furniture 
Feb 2017 2 
AB1 Gispen Manager Circularity Office 
furniture 
Nov 2016 2 
AC1 Mitsubishi 
electronics  
Sales Manager Elevator firm Mar 2017 2 
AE1 Desso Director sustainability Office 
furniture 
Jan 2017 2 
AF1 Philips 
Capital 
Head of Financial 
Sourcing 
Office 
Lighting 
Jun 2016 3 
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6 The wisdom of the crowd in funding: information heterogeneity 
and social networks of crowdfunders7 
 
Abstract 
Crowdfunding has enabled large crowds to fund innovative projects. This type of funding 
might tap into the wisdom of crowds who were previously disconnected from the funding 
process. We distinguish between in-crowd and out-crowd funders (with and without ties to 
project creators) in order to test for heterogeneity in their information use. Based on the 
analysis of a large-scale survey amongst project funders, this paper shows that in-crowd 
investors rely more on information about the project creator than out-crowd investors. Out-
crowd investors do not seem to attach more importance to information about the project 
itself than in-crowd investors, except in the case of donation-based crowdfunding. For 
financial-return crowdfunding, financial information becomes less important once a strong 
relationship with the project creator is established. Our study allows project creators to target 
information to specific audiences based on their relationship strength across different types 
of crowdfunding projects. 
6.1 Introduction 
The funding of innovative start-ups has always been challenging due to a lack of track 
record, collateral and technological uncertainty (Engel & Stiebale 2014; Hall 2002; Giudici 
& Paleari 2000). More generally, small and medium sized firms face greater capital 
constraints than large firms, lacking access to market-based funding due to the high fixed 
costs associated with issuing equity and the unwillingness of institutional investors to take 
small holdings. This leaves start-ups highly dependent on bank credit, venture capital funds, 
angel investors and bootstrapping for their liquidity needs (Chittenden, Hall, & Hutchinson, 
1996; Ebben & Johnson, 2006; G. Giudici & Paleari, 2000; Keasey & McGuinness, 1990). 
Access to bank credit has become more transactional in recent decades with increased 
                                                          
7 Joint work with Friedemann Polzin and Erik Stam. Published as Polzin, F., Toxopeus, H., & Stam, E. (2017). The 
wisdom of the crowd in funding: information heterogeneity and social networks of crowdfunders. Small Business 
Economics, 1–23.  
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centralization and computerized assessment of creditworthiness (Bhidé, 2010), and is often 
restricted due to a lack of profit and collateral. This shift severely affects innovative small 
firms due to their disproportionate reliance on soft information in the lending process 
(Brancati, 2015; Cosci, Meliciani, & Sabato, 2016). Furthermore, the willingness of venture 
capitalists to fund start-ups is often limited to certain sectors (Huyghebaert, Gucht, & Hulle, 
2007) and there is evidence that the financial crisis has dampened their willingness to invest, 
particularly in follow-up rounds (J. Block & Sandner, 2009; Cowling, Liu, Minniti, & 
Zhang, 2016; Migendt, Schock, Täube, von Flotow, & Polzin, 2014). Structural financing 
constraints for small firms impede economic growth when firms downplay their growth 
strategy to match available funds (Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Binks & Ennew, 1996; 
Chittenden et al., 1996; Rostamkalaei & Freel, 2015). 
The rise of crowdfunding over the past decade in part addresses this funding gap by offering 
entrepreneurs an alternative to traditional finance channels. Crowdfunding caters well to 
innovative, opaque, small firms and makes use of social networks in the funding process 
(Colombo et al., 2015; Vismara, 2016). It builds on and expands beyond the traditional ‘in-
crowd’ of family and friends by allowing both in- and out-crowd investors to provide finance 
through digital platforms (Bruton et al., 2015; Salomon, 2016). Furthermore, it has lowered 
the transaction costs for entrepreneurs to collect small investment amounts from a dispersed 
set of investors and is becoming an increasingly sizable source of funding for start-ups and 
other bottom-up initiatives in the economy (Massolution, 2015; Wardrop, Zhang, Rau, & 
Gray, 2015). However, it is unclear whether crowdfunding provides access to the wisdom 
of the crowd, or whether it opens up a wider audience of fools alongside the usual family 
and friends in-crowd.  
In line with the growth of crowdfunding, academic research directed at understanding this 
phenomenon has emerged in recent years (Moritz & Block, 2016). Much of this literature 
focuses on success factors driving crowdfunding campaigns, such as the role of early 
contributions (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2015; Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015; Colombo 
et al., 2015). There is also considerable attention on the role of social networks in 
crowdfunding (Agrawal et al., 2015; Horvát, Uparna, & Uzzi, 2015; Hui, Gerber, & Gergle, 
2014) and on overcoming informational asymmetries (Ahlers, Cumming, Günther, & 
Schweizer, 2015; Lin, Prabhala, & Viswanathan, 2012; Vismara, 2015). Lacking attention 
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until now is the bridge between these two topics, namely how social networks affect the type 
of information used by investors in crowdfunding decision-making. Although there are 
suggestions regarding crowdfunding information mechanisms and the role of social 
networks (Ter Wal, Alexy, Block, & Sandner, 2016), there is little empirical evidence about 
the type of information that funders use to make investment decisions. Are crowdfunders 
well informed about the project they invest in, or are they jumping on a band-wagon set in 
motion by other investors in a campaign? 
This study offers the first detailed empirical analysis on heterogeneity in information use by 
crowdfunders and how this is affected by their social networks. The ability to distinguish 
between investors based on their interpersonal ties to the entrepreneur offers insights into 
the application of theories about information asymmetries and social networks in funding 
decisions, and serves as input for public policy for entrepreneurship and finance. Our main 
research question is: How does the type of information used by crowdfunders vary with the 
strength of their ties to project creators? 
This article is structured as follows: first, we review the relevant literature and introduce the 
theoretical framework. Next, we present the research design including our quantitative 
research approach and data. We then display the results which form the basis for the 
conclusions in the final section. 
6.2 Literature review and theoretical framework 
Signaling in early stage finance and information cascades 
The way entrepreneurs obtain capital when forming a new firm has important implications 
for future performance (Bosma, Praag, Thurik, & Wit, 2004; Cassar, 2004). Their search for 
external finance is characterised by agency problems between the entrepreneur and funder 
due to information asymmetries that lead to adverse selection and moral hazard (Denis, 
2004; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Parker, 2009). This is especially the case for new firms that 
face high financing costs (Rostamkalaei & Freel, 2015) driven by cumbersome information 
gathering, a lack of track record and, often, collateral (Blumberg & Letterie, 2007; Cassar, 
2004). 
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Scholars suggest signaling can overcome these agency problems (Akerlof, 1970; Amit, 
Glosten, & Muller, 1990; Gompers, 1995; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). 
Signaling can take place using different kinds of information, for example the availability of 
patents and prototypes, or the track record of entrepreneurial team (Audretsch, Bönte, & 
Mahagaonkar, 2012; Becker-Blease & Sohl, 2015; Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 2005; Gompers 
& Lerner, 2001; Spence, 1973). Many studies in the signaling literature establish a positive 
relationship between early-stage investments and firm success (Bernstein et al. 2015a; 
Bosma et al. 2004; Kerr et al. 2014; Kortum and Lerner 2000; Samila and Sorenson 2010) 
and link an entrepreneur’s characteristics, such as human capital, to venture performance 
(Becker-Blease & Sohl, 2015; Ouimet & Zarutskie, 2014; Pukthuanthong, 2006). Bernstein 
et al. (2015b) examine venture attributes used to signal quality to investors, i.e. the team, 
track-record of the venture and identity of current investors. They suggest that information 
about the person(s) behind the venture is crucially important for obtaining external finance, 
which is in line with the practice of VC and business angels (Alexy, Block, Sandner, & Ter 
Wal, 2012; Becker-Blease & Sohl, 2015; Vismara, 2016). 
Crowdfunding8 as a new form of seed finance,  acts as a platform (agent) between investors 
and entrepreneurs (Bruton et al., 2015; Cumming, Pandes, & Robinson, 2015; Harrison, 
2013; Salomon, 2016). A growing interest and body of research is emerging into this new 
form of entrepreneurial finance (for a review see Kuppuswamy & Bayus, 2015; Moritz & 
Block, 2016). Crowdfunding combines features of a two-sided market platform with 
underlying networking technologies. The real-time, open and online insight into the 
commitment of previous funders, as well as extensive targeted descriptions of the 
fundraising campaign, are specific signals of crowdfunding (Bruton et al., 2015). The quality 
of these signals as input into investment decisions is questionable since the crowd might not 
have expertise in production, marketing and competition, nor are they likely to invest in due 
diligence given high fixed costs (Belleflamme, Lambert, & Schwienbacher, 2013; Vismara, 
                                                          
8 Following previous work we distinguish four types of crowdfunding (Ahlers, Cumming, Günther, & Schweizer, 
2015; Belleflamme, Lambert, & Schwienbacher, 2014; E. Mollick, 2014; Nesta, 2014): Purely donation-based 
crowdfunding exists that involves only intangible returns. Reward-based crowdfunding (or pre-ordering) consists 
of pledging an amount of money in exchange for future products. Lending-based crowdfunding can be compared 
to micro-loans, where the backer lends a certain amount of money to the project creator. Equity-based crowdfunding 
issues shares in the company behind the call, which are distributed among the funders according to the value of 
their contributions. The latter two are combined throughout this paper and referred to as ‘financial crowdfunding’. 
Chapter 6 
123 
2016). As such, the wisdom of the crowd is not self-evident. On the one hand, the crowd 
could represent new customers, delivering knowledge about the market potential of an 
offering by signing up as funders. On the other, they could be free-riding on the – potentially 
unwise – investment decisions of others, and ‘herd’ without adding any new information to 
a decision process (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992). 
Hornuf & Schwienbacher (2015) find that specific kinds of information, such as updates to 
investors, significantly drive investment as funders update their preferences in the light of 
project assessment. Moritz et al. (2015) examined investor communication in equity 
crowdfunding, highlighting that perceived sympathy, openness and trustworthiness in the 
relationship between venture and investor reduced perceived information asymmetries. They 
also found that third-party communication influences the decision making process of 
crowdfunders. Furthermore, allowing crowdfunders to adjust privacy settings regarding 
information about their contribution deters some investors but increases average 
contribution size (Burtch, Ghose, & Wattal, 2015). 
This suggests that some form of quality signaling between project creator and crowdfunder 
occurs which relates to the general notion of the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ in funding decisions 
(E. R. Mollick & Nanda, 2015; Surowiecki, 2005). But how does the crowd gather its 
‘wisdom’? Literature on investment processes suggest that this is facilitated by the social 
networks of both entrepreneur and investor (Alexy et al., 2012; Colombo et al., 2015; Ter 
Wal et al., 2016; Uzzi, 1999).  
Ties that bind, ties that blind: Social networks and information 
Social networks strongly influence an entrepreneur’s funding success as these provide access 
to resources such as finance, knowledge and partners (Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Dubini & 
Aldrich, 1991; Huang & Knight, 2015; Kwon & Arenius, 2010; Shane & Cable, 2002). 
Social network theory provides a possible lens to study the role of information in the 
relationship between funder and venture (M. S. Granovetter, 1973; Hoang & Antoncic, 
2003; Jack & Anderson, 2002; Kwon & Arenius, 2010; Uzzi, 1999). Granovetter 
(1973:1361) defines the notion of ‘strength’ of interpersonal ties based on ‘a combination of 
the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy and the reciprocal services which 
characterize the tie’.  
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Social networks, comprising both strong and weak ties, may affect the type of information 
used in a financing decision through three mechanisms. First, the funder’s motivation for 
investing, for example for financial return or to strengthen an existing relationship, will 
affect the information required (Belleflamme et al., 2014; Shane & Cable, 2002). Second, 
the extent to which interpersonal ties develop and enforce common norms of behaviour will 
affect the perceived moral hazard of an investment (Bernstein, Giroud, et al., 2015; M. 
Granovetter, 2005; Uzzi, 1999). This may make obtaining information about the 
entrepreneur more attractive than information about the project, its objectives, risk and 
finance. Third, the way in which quality signals are disseminated and received may vary 
based on the strength of the relationship, affecting informational asymmetries (Ter Wal et 
al., 2016). For example, funders with weak ties to the project creator consume novel 
information more readily than those with stronger ties (Alexy et al. 2012; Granovetter 1973; 
Ter Wal et al. 2016). However, in situations of risk and uncertainty, reliance on multiple, 
more trustworthy information sources may favour funders with stronger ties to the project 
creator  (Centola & Macy, 2007; Ter Wal et al., 2016).  
Crowdfunding could be classified as a new form of relationship-based financial 
intermediation, exploiting the local knowledge and trust embedded in social networks to 
provide quality signals about the project creator and their project. The mechanisms at play 
could be similar to those seen in venture capital and angel investment. , Relationships are 
built between financier and venture as well as between syndicates of financiers to mitigate 
information asymmetries (Alexy et al. 2012; Gompers 1995; Gompers and Lerner 2001; 
Yao-Wen 2010). Social ties between investors are formed every time they are attracted to 
the same target company (Sorenson & Stuart, 2008; Ter Wal et al., 2016).  
Several scholars (Agrawal et al., 2015; Belleflamme et al., 2014; Lin et al., 2012; E. Mollick, 
2014; Ordanini et al., 2011; Vismara, 2016) show that the size of a founder’s social network 
is positively associated with the capital raised for a project and the subsequent success of the 
project in both reward-based and equity crowdfunding; this effect does not hold in a 
donation-based setting (Burtch, Ghose, & Wattal, 2013; Kuppuswamy & Bayus, 2015).  
Furthermore, the relationship between funders and project creators affects investment 
sequencing through information cascades. Individual funders possess different levels of 
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information, hence some investors have an advantage over others (Cumming et al. 2015a; 
Hildebrand et al. 2016). When professional investors with industry experience and track-
record enter relatively early in a crowdfunding campaign, their public visibility attracts other 
investors (Vismara, 2015), in a similar way as in other online market places (Dellarocas, 
2003; Lin et al., 2012). This suggests that the quality indication process with crowdfunding 
is staged, with an in-crowd to out-crowd sequence, using different types of information and 
levels of expertise to make a funding decision.  
In-crowd information needs 
We define the in-crowd as those project funders who have strong or weak interpersonal ties 
with the project creator. On crowdfunding platforms, investors base their decisions on 
information provided by the project creator in the form of updates during the campaign and 
on the investment behavior and comments of other crowd investors (Hornuf & 
Schwienbacher, 2015). In-crowd information requirements could be affected by the three 
mechanisms outlined above: funder motivation, project creator intentions and information 
flow. 
Firstly, the in-crowd may have different motivations than wanting to contribute to a 
successful project, such as reinforcing their relationship with the project creator, social 
obligation or altruism (Belleflamme et al., 2014; Gartner, Frid, & Alexander, 2011; Klyver, 
Lindsay, Kassicieh, & Hancock, 2016; Shane & Cable, 2002). This could make them less 
inclined to search for quality signals about the project itself, and focus more on information 
about the person behind the project. Secondly, we expect that funding decisions embedded 
within a social network will decrease fears of negative behaviour by the project creator 
(Bernstein, Giroud, et al., 2015; M. Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1999). This motivates the 
funder to seek information about the person behind the venture, increasing trust along with 
relationship strength. Third, and central to our argument, social networks support the flow 
of information which signal quality of projects and entrepreneurs (Alexy et al., 2012; Ter 
Wal et al., 2016). Instead of relying on formal sources of information (such as project 
websites and media), in-crowd funders may place higher weight on information coming 
through their personal relationship with the project creator, which they expect to be more 
accurate and proprietary, giving them an edge over publicly available information. In line 
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with Ahlers et al. (2015), Cholakova & Clarysse (2015a) and Cumming et al. (2015) we 
expect the in-crowd to gather (soft) information about the characteristics of a project’s 
management (track record, size or level of education) as this affects probability of success 
of the venture. Due to existing ties, obtaining and processing this person-to-person 
information about management or initiators is less costly than for out-crowd funders. 
Additionally, relationships may imply a longer term commitment to the entrepreneur and 
therefore a longer term perspective on the costs and benefits of investing in information 
gathering about the entrepreneur (Boot, 2000; Brancati, 2015; Scholtens, 1999).  
H1 In-crowd funders are more likely to rely on information about the person(s) behind the 
project than out-crowd funders. 
Out-crowd information needs 
We define the out-crowd as those project funders who have no personal ties to the project 
owner. We expect this to lead to different information needs through the same three 
mechanisms. First, without the funding decision embedded in a social relationship, the 
motivation is more likely to be based on expected results, such as financial return 
(Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015), a finished product or societal impact rather than social capital 
(Apinunmahakul & Devlin, 2008) or community benefits (Belleflamme et al., 2014). 
Information about the project, its objectives, finance and risk will be more relevant as it 
gives insight into the expected return of the project (Ahlers et al., 2015; Belleflamme et al., 
2013, 2014). Secondly, information gathering about the project team is unlikely to reduce 
moral hazard as there is no relationship to enforce social reward or punishment (Belleflamme 
et al., 2014; Vismara, 2016). Third, as the out-crowd lacks direct insights from the project 
creator, they depend on information that reaches them through formal direct (project 
websites, newsletters) or indirect (media) channels (Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2015). 
Information about the project creator obtained through formal channels is often perceived as 
less trustworthy and more difficult to interpret as a quality signal than when obtained through 
interpersonal ties. As such, it loses its advantage over more general information about the 
project and its objectives (Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2015; Vismara, 2016). We expect out-
crowd funders to be less motivated than in-crowd funders to gather information about the 
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project team and to instead focus more on ‘traditional’ quality signals such as the nature of 
the project or venture and its strategy (Ahlers et al., 2015; Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2015).  
H2 Out-crowd funders are more likely to rely on information about the project and its 
objectives than in-crowd funders.  
Furthermore, we expect out-crowd funders to rely more on information about financial 
planning and risk than in-crowd funders due to stronger instrumental (results-based) 
motivation and a lack of personal access to the project owner. A recent study on equity 
crowdfunding shows that the decision to invest is positively associated with the funders’ 
interest in rewards  (Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015). Ahlers et al. (2015) study the 
effectiveness of quality attributes and the level of uncertainty in offer documents used to 
encourage (small) investors to invest in an equity crowdfunding context. They highlight the 
importance of financial projections for crowdfunding success. The absence of ties to the 
project owner creates an incentive to look for alternative, objective quality signals and leads 
funders to investigate information about financial planning and risk more thoroughly than 
in-crowd funders (Ahlers et al., 2015; Busenitz et al., 2005; Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 
2015).  
Besides proving a quality signal, information about financials and risk can also reduce the 
perceived risk of moral hazard by revealing the commitment level of the project creator, 
such as whether or not they provide personal collateral and/or invest their own resources 
(Blumberg & Letterie, 2007). We therefore expect that out-crowd funders rely more on 
information about financial planning and risks than in-crowd funders, looking both for 
quality signals and to reduce perceived moral hazard risk.  
H3 Out-crowd funders are more likely to rely on information about financial planning and 
risks than in-crowd funders.  
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6.3 Methodology 
Research design 
In this paper, we seek to understand the effect of the strength of interpersonal ties on the 
information used by crowdfunders. In order to test the hypotheses formulated above, we 
constructed the analytical model presented in Figure 1. Most of the literature to date uses 
project-level investment data that includes varying degrees of information about the project 
and its creator, however, this type of data does not convey much information about the 
project funders themselves. To analyse the hypothesized relations, we used a large-scale 
survey of crowdfunders (Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015; E. Mollick, 2015). We note that this 
methodological approach is potentially vulnerable to common method bias (i.e. gathering 
all information for this analysis via one survey) which has been shown to affect survey data 
(Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Whilst we could not conceptually identify 
any underlying factors that the predictor and criterion variables had in common, we adopted 
several measures to reduce potential bias. We started by minimizing item ambiguity which 
included avoiding vague concepts, complicated syntax and unfamiliar terms. We 
deliberately used simple, specific and concise questions to measure the constructs. The 
respondents were also guaranteed anonymity. 
Data 
We use data from a large-scale survey called the ‘National Crowdfunding Research’ 
conducted in 2013 in The Netherlands with 1278 individual respondents.9 Respondents were 
surveyed regarding their participation in crowdfunding, on topics such as their investments, 
motivation and use of information in investment decisions. It targeted both crowdfunders as 
well as non-crowdfunders. A snowball sampling method was used which drew on the 
personal and organisational networks of participating organisations. About 300 responses 
included our variables of interest (see Figure 1). Of these, the respondents had participated 
in either donation, reward-based or financial return (debt and equity) crowdfunding through 
                                                          
9 The questionnaire is published at: http://www.crowdfundingonderzoek.nl/  
Chapter 6 
129 
all types of platforms (mainly, but not only, Dutch platforms). The sample is representative 
of other active crowdfunders in terms of age and education (Mollick, 2015). 
Dependent variable 
We created several dependent variables as proxies for use of information, with a distinct 
question in the survey where respondents rated the importance of six different types of 
information in their decision to crowdfund. These types of information were: (1) information 
about the project or the company, (2) information about the objectives of the project or the 
company (Ahlers et al., 2015; Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2015), (3) information about the 
person or organization behind the project or the company, (4) information about previous 
projects of the person or organization behind it (Bernstein, Korteweg, et al., 2015; 
Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015), (5) information about the financial planning of the project or 
the company, and (6) information about the risks associated with the project or the company 
(Ahlers et al., 2015). Using factor analysis we created the following additional ‘information 
use’ dependent variables from these responses: (1) information about project and objectives 
‘infoprojobj’, (2) information about person and their track record ‘infopersprev’, and (3) 
information about financial planning and risks ‘infofinrisk’. 
Independent variables 
To determine the influence of interpersonal ties on the information use of funders, we 
included the relationship to project creator as an independent variable (‘What was your 
relationship with the project owner or business owner before making your financial 
contribution through crowdfunding?’). We combine the individual answer categories to 
create new variables measuring relationship strength, aggregating different types of 
relationship to strong ties, weak ties or no ties (a smiliar approach has been taken by Klyver 
et al., 2016). ‘Strong ties’ included family, friends, initiator of the project or employee 
(Kuppuswamy & Bayus, 2015). ‘Weak ties’ consists of people who indicate that they know 
the person behind the project or are a friend of friend, a business relationship, customer, fan 
or visitor (Bruton et al., 2015). If there was no relationship we coded it as ‘no ties’. We 
created one extra answer category based on manual answers entered in the category ‘other’, 
namely ‘initiator/employee’. In the case that there were multiple relationships indicated, we 
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always selected the strongest (i.e. if someone responded both ‘friend’ and ‘fan’, we used 
‘friend’).  
Control variables 
To account for the effect of other characteristics of the funders, we include a number of 
control variables from the survey such as age, gender (Klyver et al., 2016), education level, 
(E. Mollick, 2014), type of project invested in, amount funded, type of return (donation, in-
kind, financial) (Vismara, 2015, 2016), motivation, investment of others and risk awareness.  
Following earlier work (Calic & Mosakowski, 2016; Hörisch, 2015), we distinguish between 
for-profit, social, cultural and ecological projects and coded all projects into these categories 
as follows: (1) For-profit, (2) Social, (3) Cultural, (4) Ecological. Multiple answers were not 
coded. We asked an external researcher to validate our coding and used this feedback to 
improve our coding process (Patton, 2002). If there was only a description of the specific 
project (without a name) we searched for a crowdfunding project which matched that 
description and the time period, and if we found a plausible match, we coded this project. 
By including instrumental (vs. value-based) motivation as a control variable, we control for 
one of the mechanisms through which we expect relationship strength to influence the type 
of informational need. We do this in order to focus on the behavioural intention of the project 
funder and quality signals as key mechanisms to overcome informational asymmetries in 
our model (Vismara, 2016). We use ‘importance of security of getting a promised return’ 
(securityreturn) as a proxy for instrumental motivation. Consistent with cognitive evaluation 
theory, the intrinsic motivation of lenders to provide capital is undermined when 
entrepreneurs focus on future extrinsic rewards associated with lending (Allison, Davis, 
Short, & Webb, 2015). We also control for the influence of others investing in the project 
(herding effect) (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Vismara, 2015) by including the variable 
‘knowing the financial contributions made by others’ (knowingfincontriboth) in our 
analysis. 
Finally, we control for risk awareness (professionalism) of crowdfunders, since we expect 
experienced investors to use more information than amateur investors. We use the statement 
‘I keep in mind the consideration that to invest through crowdfunding in a company can be 
a high risk investment’ as a proxy for risk awareness.  
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Data analysis 
Most variables were assessed on a 5-point Likert scale (Dillman, 2000). The level of ties 
(strong, weak and no ties) and type of crowdfunding (donation, reward and financial return) 
were entered as dummy variables, with reward-based crowdfunding being the reference 
case. Amount invested, gender, education and social media types have different scales. The 
data analysis was conducted in several steps (Hair, 2010). First, we thoroughly screened the 
dataset: cases with missing values have been excluded. Second, we recorded central 
variables based on our theoretical framework. Third, we used a factor analysis to determine 
influential variables and to eliminate redundancy among variables in the survey, in particular 
to define factor loadings for the various dependent variables describing ‘informational use’. 
Fourth, we conducted exploratory data analysis, highlighting how crowdfunders with 
different relationship strengths to the project owner (in-crowd, out-crowd; differently 
defined) differ with respect to: motivation, objectives, amount invested, personal  
characteristics, etc., followed by a more structured correlation analysis (see Table 6-4 in the 
appendix). Finally, as our dependent variable is of ordinal nature, we conducted ordered 
logistic regressions to determine the explanatory power of our independent variables 
(Agresti, 2010; Hair, 2010). Ordered logistic regression does not require normally 
distributed variables and can deal with metric and non-metric independent variables as well 
as non-linear effects. It also has relaxed assumptions regarding heteroskedastic variables 
(Hair, 2010). 
6.4 Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 6-3 (appendix) provides descriptive statistics of our dependent, independent and 
control variables. The first three rows are our dependent variables measuring the information 
use of funders. The next three rows describe our independent variables (strong, weak and no 
ties). The remainder of the rows describe our control variables. In our full model 283 
observations report on all variables, of which 72 funders engaged in donation-based 
crowdfunding, 163 contributed to reward-based projects and 48 contributed to campaigns 
that are expected to yield a financial return. The importance of information about the project 
and its objective is generally very high (mean of 4.3) followed by information about the 
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entrepreneur (3.7) and information about the financial aspects and risks of the campaign 
(3.3). Whilst very few investors have low information needs on all dimensions, only 40% of 
funders score highly (4 to 5) on the importance of all information for their decision-making. 
About 18% of the respondents have strong ties to the project creator, about one half have 
weak ties, and approximately one third of all respondents have no ties. The average amount 
invested lies in the range of € 101 - € 250. There is a slight bias towards male respondents 
(63%). The average age of respondents lies in the range of 35 – 44 years old. Respondents 
are on average highly educated, holding a University Bachelor degree. The correlation table 
including all dependent, independent and control variables is presented in Table 6-3 
(appendix). Several statistically significant correlations between our dependent variables 
and relationship strength are reported. Some control variables are also statistically 
significantly correlated with at least one of the information variables.  
Determinants of information use of crowdfunders 
Our models (1-6, see Table 6-1) allow analysis of the importance of several types of 
information used by crowdfunders according to relationship strength between funder and 
project owner. We enter both strong and weak ties into the regression as dummy variables, 
using no ties as a reference case. Our results show that relationship strength has significant 
effects on the importance of different types of information.  
First, our regression model shows that funders with strong or weak ties attach significantly 
higher importance to information about the project creator and their previous projects than 
funders with no ties. This supports our hypothesis 1 (H1). We differentiate this result across 
crowdfunding types in two steps. As a first step, in our regression model we add dummy 
variables for both financial return and donation crowdfunding, using reward-based 
crowdfunding as a base case (this is the largest sample). We find significantly higher 
information is required about the person and their previous projects for both financial return 
and donation crowdfunding compared to the reference reward crowdfunding case 
(independent of ties). As a second step, to analyse the effect of ties on information needs 
within each type of crowdfunding, we computed the full model again specifically for the 
subsets of donation-based, reward-based and financial-return crowdfunding respectively 
(Table 6-5 to Table 6-7 in the appendix). For donation-based crowdfunding we find no 
statistically significant effect of relationship strength on information about the person behind 
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the project and their track record. Within reward-based crowdfunding, both funders with 
strong and weak ties attach more importance to the information about the project creator 
than those with no ties. In financial-return crowdfunding campaigns, funders with strong ties 
attach more importance to information about the person than those with no ties, whereas 
funders with weak ties show no significant difference in information needs about the project 
creator compared to those without ties. We therefore conclude that relationship strength 
drives an increased need for information about the project team, in particular for reward and 
financial (debt and equity) crowdfunding.  
Second, only for donation crowdfunding do we find evidence that out-crowd funders rely 
more on information about the project and its objectives compared to in-crowd funders (an 
effect in line with hypothesis 2). This is driven by the significantly lower need for 
information about the project and its objectives in donation crowdfunding by funders with 
weak ties, who rely less on this information than those with strong ties or no ties (a U-shaped 
relationship between project information need and the strength of ties).  
Overall, and for reward and financial return crowdfunding individually, we find no evidence 
that out-crowd funders rely more on information about the project than in-crowd funders. 
We therefore reject our second hypothesis (H2) both for our aggregated model and for 
reward and financial return crowdfunding; a higher information need about the project and 
its objectives only holds for those funders with no ties participating in donation 
crowdfunding, in relation to funders with weak ties in donation crowdfunding.  
Third, we find evidence that in financial return crowdfunding, out-crowd funders rely more 
on information about financial planning and risk than in-crowd funders. This result is driven 
mostly by funders with strong ties, who indicate a significantly lower information need for 
financial planning and risk than funders with no ties. This decreased information need is not 
observed for funders with weak ties. For donation and reward crowdfunding, and in our 
model that includes all types of crowdfunding, we find no significant differences in 
information needs about financial planning and risks for any strength of ties. Hence our 
hypothesis 3 (H3) is supported for financial return (debt and equity) crowdfunding and 
rejected for reward and donation crowdfunding.   
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Table 6-1 Results for all types of crowdfunding 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES infoprojobj infopersprev infofinrisk infoprojobj infopersprev infofinrisk 
strongties 0.134 1.185*** 0.101    
 (0.347) (0.331) (0.330)    
weakties -0.377 0.903*** 0.196    
 (0.258) (0.247) (0.244)    
noties    0.308 -0.940*** -0.176 
    (0.247) (0.235) (0.233) 
keepinmindrisk 0.110 0.120 -0.0404 0.118 0.127 -0.0418 
 (0.101) (0.0994) (0.100) (0.101) (0.0993) (0.0999) 
knowingfincontriboth 0.108 0.0287 0.384*** 0.117 0.0365 0.383*** 
 (0.111) (0.109) (0.108) (0.111) (0.109) (0.108) 
profit -0.654* -0.143 -0.430 -0.659* -0.179 -0.439 
 (0.346) (0.330) (0.333) (0.346) (0.331) (0.332) 
social 0.452 0.0647 -0.396 0.505 0.0634 -0.409 
 (0.307) (0.290) (0.295) (0.308) (0.291) (0.295) 
cultural 0.124 -0.241 -0.570 0.227 -0.209 -0.593 
 (0.381) (0.365) (0.369) (0.378) (0.362) (0.367) 
ecological 0.825*** -0.386 0.141 0.838*** -0.357 0.144 
 (0.318) (0.299) (0.303) (0.317) (0.299) (0.302) 
amount -0.0261 0.0160 0.132*** -0.0184 0.0129 0.131*** 
 (0.0496) (0.0475) (0.0489) (0.0494) (0.0476) (0.0490) 
gender 0.300 0.303 0.139 0.310 0.301 0.139 
 (0.241) (0.229) (0.233) (0.241) (0.229) (0.233) 
age 0.269** 0.174* 0.177* 0.270** 0.184* 0.175 
 (0.113) (0.105) (0.107) (0.113) (0.105) (0.107) 
education 0.0244 -0.103 -0.0202 0.0169 -0.0977 -0.0193 
 (0.0709) (0.0685) (0.0663) (0.0704) (0.0684) (0.0664) 
securityreturn 0.533*** 0.506*** 0.456*** 0.510*** 0.499*** 0.458*** 
 (0.117) (0.110) (0.109) (0.117) (0.109) (0.110) 
donation 0.149 0.809*** 0.451 0.123 0.776*** 0.447 
 (0.295) (0.286) (0.294) (0.293) (0.285) (0.293) 
financialreturn 0.260 0.584* 0.878*** 0.225 0.557* 0.884*** 
 (0.344) (0.313) (0.317) (0.343) (0.313) (0.316) 
Observations 287 287 283 287 287 283 
Pseudo R2 0.0633 0.0536 0.0599 0.0607 0.0519 0.0598 
LR Chi2 53.59 57.29 67.01 51.38 55.47 66.93 
Prob < Chi2 3.07e-06 7.33e-07 1.51e-08 3.58e-06 7.19e-07 6.90e-09 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Types of crowdfunding projects  
We also investigated the influence of different types of projects on the use of information 
about the project, entrepreneur and financial planning and risks by funders with different 
strength of ties. We carried out this analysis by adding project type dummies to the full 
model (profit, social, ecological and cultural). First, we find no influence of project type on 
the information need about the project owner. Second, we find that the importance of 
information about the project and its objectives varies with the project type. In for-profit 
campaigns funders attach less importance to information about the project and its objectives. 
In campaigns with an ecological purpose, this effect is reversed. These effects are consistent 
across all relationship types. In donation-based and reward-based crowdfunding, the 
coefficients for both for-profit and ecological projects are higher. The importance of 
information about the project and its objectives is high in donation-based crowdfunding for 
ecological projects. Also, in the presence of strong ties, the negative coefficient for for-profit 
projects disappears. Third, the importance of information about finance and risks does not 
vary with the type of project in our full model that includes all crowdfunding types. 
Interestingly, within reward-based crowdfunding (our largest subset), funders of cultural and 
for-profit projects attach less importance to information about finance and risks than those 
funding social and ecological projects. This could indicate that these projects display higher 
informational asymmetries related to their social and ecological goals versus cultural and for 
profit projects. Financial-return crowdfunding exhibits no significantly different information 
use based on the type of project, except for a decreased information use about the owner and 
her track record. 
Control variables 
As for our control variables, age and security of a promised return (which we interpret as 
instrumental motivation) show a statistically significant positive relationship to nearly all 
information variables in our full model. Age is only insignificant for information needs about 
finance and risk. When we split up the data into different types of crowdfunding, age loses 
most of its significance. The positive significant relationship between instrumental 
motivation and information needs remains consistent in all types of crowdfunding, except 
for information about finance and risks in financial-return crowdfunding. This is probably 
due to lack of variation within this category (financial return funders are likely to be 
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instrumentally motivated). We find a strong positive moderating relationship for donation- 
and financial return crowdfunding regarding information about the entrepreneur and track-
record as well as information about financials and risk in financial-return crowdfunding. As 
expected, the size of the investment (amount) drives the importance of information about 
financial planning and risks. Risk awareness is not significantly correlated with the 
importance of information in general. Knowing the financial contribution of others increases 
the importance of information about financial planning and risks, indicating some 
additionality between knowing the contribution of others and information gathering for 
particularly out-crowd, instrumentally motivated funders – the contribution of others 
increases the chance that the project will be fully funded, and therefore increases the 
expected payoff of time taken to gather financial and risk information.  
Robustness checks 
In order to check the robustness of our findings, we checked for multi-collinearity i.e. the 
correlation among explanatory variables. Investigating the variance inflation factors (VIFs) 
reveals no multicollinearity, given the mean VIF of 1.5 in models including all types of 
crowdfunding and 1.6, 1.5, 1.7 in models using donation-based, reward based and financial-
return crowdfunding respectively (see Kutner et al. 2005). We also divided relationship 
dependent variables into in-crowd and out-crowd and calculated the models again. The 
results remained consistent. As a robustness check for the dependent variables (importance 
of information) we included measures that incorporate these types of information (quality of 
the project, reasons for the existence of the project, information about the project/objectives, 
knowledge and skills of the project creator and their passion, information about the 
person/track record). Strong and weak ties positively influence the importance of the 
knowledge and skills of the entrepreneur and thus confirm our main results. In the case of 
no ties to the project, this coefficient becomes negative, which is also consistent with our 
results. As an alternative measure of our relationship strength variable, we included the self-
reported importance of the relationship for the funding decision. A higher value drives the 
information about the entrepreneur and previous projects, consistent with our main results. 
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6.5 Discussion 
The guiding research question was: how does the type of information used by crowdfunders 
vary with the strength of their ties to project creators? Overcoming information asymmetries, 
prevalent in the relationship between financier and entrepreneur, especially for young and 
innovative firms, has traditionally been a role of venture capitalists that screen, select and 
monitor potential targets and syndicate with other investors through social networks to pool 
resources, exchange information and spread the risks (Alexy et al., 2012; Gompers & Lerner, 
2001; Manigart & Wright, 2011; Shane & Cable, 2002; Ter Wal et al., 2016). Our research 
adds to the informal investor and crowdfunding literature on overcoming information 
asymmetries in social networks by disentangling quality signals used by crowdfunders to 
judge project quality (Audretsch et al., 2012; Becker-Blease & Sohl, 2015). 
Information heterogeneity and social networks of crowdfunders 
First, researchers stressed the role of internal social capital (early backers) as signals for 
funding success (Ahlers et al., 2015; Colombo et al., 2015; Cumming, Leboeuf, et al., 2015; 
Vismara, 2015, 2016). We add to this line of research by differentiating types of information 
required by potential investors, based on their relationship with the project creator. Whereas 
in-crowd funders rely on information about the person behind the campaign and previous 
projects, there is no increased use of information about financials and associated risks. These 
results are in line with previous research on crowdfunding motivation (Cholakova & 
Clarysse, 2015). Our results show that in-crowd funders are not just involved out of 
sympathy or relationship building (we control for instrumental motivation) but also search 
for information that signals project quality or behavioural intentions thereby complementing 
earlier work that found a positive relationship between strength of ties and altruistic 
investment behaviour (Klyver et al., 2016). The inclusion of the entrepreneur’s social 
network informs the funding decision in a similar way to the VC-entrepreneur relationship 
(Huang & Knight, 2015; Manigart & Wright, 2011; Shane & Cable, 2002).  
We extend previous work on the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ in collective funding decisions 
(Mollick & Nanda, 2015; Surowiecki, 2005) with regards to the use of information about 
the project and the project creator. Our research confirms the notion that relationships 
between investors and project creators facilitate the exchange of information about the 
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entrepreneur and their track record, a mechanism prevalent in VC/angel investor-
relationships (Bernstein, Korteweg, et al., 2015; Vismara, 2016). Our findings suggest that 
the in-crowd gathers (soft) information about the management of the venture (Ahlers et al., 
2015; Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015; Cumming, Leboeuf, et al., 2015). 
Second, we find no consistent evidence for our hypothesis that out-crowd funders rely more 
on information about the project and its objectives in decision-making than in-crowd 
funders. This in contrast to predictions from previous studies (Ahlers et al., 2015; Hornuf & 
Schwienbacher, 2015). Even though they do rely significantly less on information about the 
person than in-crowd investors, this is not being compensated by a greater reliance on 
information about the project. It raises concerns with regard to the quality of decision-
making of out-crowd funders contrary to findings in previous studies (Mollick & Nanda, 
2015).  
Third, we hypothesized that out-crowd funders investigate information about financial 
planning and risk more thoroughly to search for quality signals and commitment (Ahlers et 
al., 2015; Blumberg & Letterie, 2007; Busenitz et al., 2005; Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 
2015). We find that this hypothesis holds for financial crowdfunding. In our full model, we 
find no support for this notion and also find that funders in general – with or without ties – 
attach a lower importance to this type of information.  
Crowdfunding decision making can thus be characterised as relationship-driven (Bernstein, 
Korteweg, et al., 2015; Colombo et al., 2015). In this regard crowdfunders, when aggregated 
across all types, apparently behave differently to professional (VC) investors who rely also 
on financial due diligence and an alignment of goals between venture and investor 
(Audretsch et al., 2012; Bernstein, Korteweg, et al., 2015; Busenitz et al., 2005). This study 
also reveals interesting differences regarding the use of information of distinct types of 
campaigns, which adds to the understanding of funding dynamics (Belleflamme et al., 2014; 
Calic & Mosakowski, 2016; Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2015; E. Mollick, 2014). For-profit 
project funders are significantly less interested in information about the projects and its 
objectives than others, particularly compared to ecological project funders who attach a 
significantly higher importance to the objective of a project. This could be explained by 
either warm-glow or impact motivations (Andreoni, 1990; Maas & Liket, 2010). These 
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effects are strongest in donation-based crowdfunding. Our findings corroborate recent 
studies on crowdfunding social and environmental enterprises and projects reporting mixed 
evidence of funding success to sustainability orientation and goals (Calic & Mosakowski, 
2016; Hörisch, 2015). 
Information heterogeneity across types of crowdfunding 
We find more support for our hypotheses when we separate distinct types of crowdfunding. 
The mechanisms through which we expect social networks to affect informational needs 
(motivation, intention of the project owner and quality of the project) seem to lead to 
different information needs for donation, reward, and financial (debt and equity) 
crowdfunding decisions. Donation-based crowdfunding is often associated with non-
financial motivations and non-profit organisations, whereas reward-based and financial 
crowdfunding are more commonly associated with for-profit or social entrepreneurs and 
financial motivation (Ahlers et al., 2015; Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015; E. R. Mollick & 
Nanda, 2015). In financial - debt or equity - crowdfunding, return for funders depends on 
the ability of the venture to generate enough profit to pay back a loan (debt) or create an exit 
scenario (equity). These crowdfunders rank the support to family, friends or local business 
very low as a motivation to invest (Nesta, 2014; Vismara, 2015). Others distinguish between 
equity and reward-based crowdfunding and find that both are driven by extrinsic motives, 
whether in-kind or financial (Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015).  
Before accounting for relationship strength, we find significant differences in information 
needs between crowdfunding types. In general, financial return (debt and equity) funders 
have higher information needs about the entrepreneur than reward funders. This is in line 
with VC literature predictions (Alexy et al. 2012; Bernstein et al. 2015; Busenitz et al. 2005; 
Shane and Cable 2002) as well as Ahlers et al. (2015) who indicate that financial return 
crowdfunding leads to higher concerns of moral hazard and a greater need for quality signals 
compared to reward and donation crowdfunding due to the long-term commitment to the 
enterprise, higher risk and expected returns. Low fears of moral hazard and a focus on 
product information render all types of reward crowdfunders less interested in information 
about the project owner.  
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Our granular models, in which we account for the effect of relationship strength per type of 
crowdfunding, show that in both reward and financial return crowdfunding, in-crowd 
funders have a significantly higher information need about the person behind the project 
than out-crowd funders. This suggests that even at the lower level of informational need 
within reward-based crowdfunding, relationship strength plays a role, thus adding a novel 
insight to the literature on the role of social networks in crowdfunding.  
Interestingly, donation-based funders show significantly higher levels of information need 
about the person behind the project than reward-based funders, at similar levels as financial 
return crowdfunding. This is counter to expectations of (Belleflamme et al., 2014) and 
Ahlers (2015), who argue that in donation-based crowdfunding the degree of asymmetric 
information is of little importance because other intangible factors increase the funders’ 
utility. We explain this from a motivation perspective. Donation crowdfunding can be 
likened to philanthropy, where ‘returns’ can be in the form of ‘warm glow’ (Andreoni, 
1990), societal impact (Maas & Liket, 2010) or community benefits (Belleflamme et al., 
2014). Donation funders interested in the (social, cultural or ecological) impact of their 
donation are more likely to be motivated to look for quality signals, indicating that their 
money will be well spent, before pledging their funds. 
When we look at the effect of strength of ties on information needs in donation-based 
crowdfunding, we find no increased demand for information on either the project creator or 
financial planning and risks. However, for out-crowd donation-based crowdfunding we find 
a significantly higher information need about the project and its objectives than for in-crowd 
funders. This is driven by a negative effect of weak ties in particular. This lower interest of 
weak tie funders in information about the project may point to a (weak) relationship 
motivation to donate instead of interest in the project and its impact. This is in contrast to, 
on the one hand, strong tie funders who may display interest in the project due to their strong 
relationship and, on the other hand, due to out-crowd funders who donate primarily out of 
interest in the project, without a social relationship.   
We also find that, compared to reward-based and donation crowdfunding, financial return 
funders, with and without ties, are significantly more interested in information about 
financial planning and risks. The risk profile of reward-based crowdfunding is lower than 
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debt or equity crowdfunding since they can be seen as early adopting consumers (Hornuf & 
Schwienbacher, 2015; Vismara, 2016) and their return does not depend on the long-term 
profitability of the enterprise, only on the ability to deliver the promised product. Non-
delivery rates on the largest reward-based platform Kickstarter are approximately 9% 
(Mollick, 2015), which points to a much lower risk than average venture failure rates 
(Aldrich & Ruef, 2006). Within the subset of financial return crowdfunding, we find that 
out-crowd funders have a higher need for information about finance and risk than in-crowd 
funders. Our results indicate that a strong relationship appears to substitute financial due 
diligence and complements the importance of teams quality signals as financial return 
funders with strong ties are less interested in information about finance and risk (Ahlers et 
al., 2015; Bernstein, Korteweg, et al., 2015; Uzzi, 1999). 
6.6 Conclusions and implications 
Conclusions 
Our study offers the first detailed analysis of the heterogeneity in information use by 
crowdfunders, and more particular how information use is affected by social networks within 
different types of crowdfunding.   
This paper highlights the heterogeneity in information use by crowdfunders that are 
differently connected to the project creator. Funders from the in-crowd attach more 
importance to information about the project creator, as expected, but funders from the out-
crowd do not rely more on information about the project, except for donation-based 
crowdfunding. Our findings suggest a trade-off between strong ties and the importance of 
information about financial planning and risks in the context of financial return (equity and 
debt) crowdfunding. In general, this information is perceived as less important and is not 
influenced by social network ties between crowdfunder and project for donation and reward 
crowdfunding. Donation and financial return crowdfunders attach more importance to the 
information about the person behind the project which reflects a relationship-based funding 
approach, whereas reward-based crowdfunders care significantly less about the project 
creator as they focus on the product as specific output with lower information asymmetry 
issues. Additionally, the information use of crowdfunders is influenced by the type of project 
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they invest in. For-profit project funders need less information about a project and its 
objectives whereas ecological projects exhibit a higher need for this type of information.  
Implications 
Our research has important implications for project developers, platform managers and 
policy makers. Based on the results of our research, platform managers and project owners 
can customize their campaign directly to the group of funders they would like to attract, 
based on their relationship strength and also on insights from our control variables (age, 
gender, education, instrumental motivation or financial means). More importantly, it is 
possible to deploy a tailored and staged in-crowd/out-crowd process of crowdfunding (see 
Figure 2). We indicate ‘average’ information use when coefficients are small or not 
significant. 
Table 6-2 Information use heterogeneity of crowdfunders with different strength of ties to project 
creator 
 
Project creators can focus on providing detailed information about themselves and their 
previous projects to potential in-crowd funders (strong and weak ties) and display more 
summarized information about the project, its objectives, financial planning and risks. For 
potential out-crowd funders, the campaign should instead focus on information about the 
project and its objectives (especially for donation-based campaigns) and financial 
planning/risks (for financial return crowdfunding), and summarise personal information 
about the project creator.  
6.7 Limitations and future research 
Although this research provides new empirical evidence on decision-making by 
crowdfunders, there are some limitations to our study and interesting pathways for further 
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research. Limitations arise firstly from the use of the survey instrument, where we cannot 
control for non-response or social-desirability bias. Secondly, as the sampling followed a 
snowball method, the composition of groups (age, gender, education, experience with 
crowdfunding) do not necessarily represent the general population of crowdfunders. Our 
sub-samples within crowdfunding types are relatively small (50-160 respondents) which 
limits the statistical power of our analyses. Third, our dataset was collected in 2013, a time 
at which crowdfunding was emergent. More recent datasets will probably provide different 
insights as the phenomenon of crowdfunding has become more widespread, in particular 
equity crowdfunding. Broader samples could give more insights into the motivations and 
behaviour of crowdfunders, including barriers to crowdfunding. A weakness of the survey 
itself is that we cannot compare the use of information by funders with the use of information 
of those that decided not to fund, since this question was only asked to the funders. Finally, 
we cannot distinguish between early and late-stage funders, as information about investment 
timing is missing. 
To further this research, a combination of field experiment and real-time data from platforms 
where we could observe the relationship between use of information, strength of ties and 
commitment of others during the funding decision in real life, would provide more insight 
into the causality of the relations found in this study. Combining project-level investment 
data with survey data about the funders would elicit a clearer and more robust picture of 
funding decisions (Jick, 1979) and eliminate potential common method bias (Podsakoff et 
al., 2003). Finally, it would be valuable to explore other institutional contexts outside of the 
Netherlands, with differently developed financial markets (including angel investing and 
venture capital), levels of entrepreneurship, and regulation of financial markets and 
crowdfunding in particular. 
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6.8 Appendix  
Descriptive statistics 
Table 6-3 Number of cases, means, standard deviations 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Variable description 
infoprojobj 283 4.30 0.79 1 5 
Likert scale (1-5) average of importance of 
information about (1) the  project or company 
and (2) objectives of project or company 
infopersprev 281 3.71 0.90 1 5 
Likert scale (1-5) average of importance of 
information about (1) the person or organization 
behind the project or the company and (2) 
previous projects of the person or organization 
behind it 
infofinrisk 283 3.31 1.02 1 5 
Likert scale (1-5) average of importance of 
information about (1) financial planning of the 
project or company and (2) risks associated with 
the project or the company 
strongties 283 0.18 0.39 0 1 Dummy: 1 is strong ties (family, friend, initiator/employee) 
weakties 283 0.48 0.50 0 1 Dummy: 1 is weak ties (I know the person, friend of friend, business relationship) 
noties 283 0.34 0.48 0 1 Dummy: 1 is no ties (There is no relationship) 
knowingfincontriboth 283 2.50 1.06 1 5 Likert scale 1-5: How important is knowing the financial contribution by others 
keepinmindrisk 283 3.67 1.23 1 5 
Likert scale (1-5): I keep in mind the 
consideration that investing through 
crowdfunding in an company can be a high risk 
investment 
profit 283 0.37 0.48 0 1 Dummy. Type of project invested in. 1 = for-profit, 0 other. 
social 283 0.44 0.50 0 1 Dummy. Type of project invested in. 1 = social, 0 other. 
cultural 283 0.33 0.47 0 1 Dummy. Type of project invested in. 1 = cultural, 0 other. 
ecological 283 0.24 0.43 0 1 Dummy. Type of project invested in. 1 = ecological, 0 other. 
amount 283 5.19 2.52 1 11 
Scale (1-7): less than €10 / €11 - €25 / € 26 - € 
50 / € 51 - € 100 / € 101 - € 250 /  € 251 - € 500 
/ More than € 500 
gender 283 1.39 0.49 1 2 Dummy Male = 1; Female = 2 
age 283 4.04 1.06 1 7 
Scale (1-7): Under 18 years / 18-24 year / 25-34 
years / 35-44 years / 45-54 years / 55-64 years / 
Over 65 years 
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education 283 8.01 1.58 1 10 
Scale (1-10): Lower education or primary edn / 
Lower Vocational Edn / High school or VMBO 
/ HAVO / VWO / MBO / HBO / Univ. Bachelor 
/ Univ.master's or doctoral / Post-doc 
securityreturn 283 3.60 1.09 1 5 Importance of the security that there is a promised return 
donation 283 0.25 0.44 0 1 
Dummy: What type of financial return have you 
received or will you receive in exchange for 
your financial contribution? Answer: No 
reward 
reward 283 0.58 0.50 0 1 
Dummy: What type of financial return have you 
received or will you receive in exchange for 
your financial contribution? Answer: Reward 
(e. g. a product, service or mention your name) 
financialreturn 283 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Dummy: What type of financial return have you 
received or will you receive in exchange for 
your financial contribution? Answer: A 
financial return (e. g. in the case of a loan or 
investment) 
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Table 6-4 Correlations for all crowdfunding types 
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Differentiated analyses 
Table 6-5 Results for donation-based crowdfunding 
VARIABLES infoprojobj infopersprev infofinrisk infoprojobj infopersprev infofinrisk 
Strongties -0.719 1.063 0.315    
 (0.760) (0.709) (0.673)    
weakties -1.048* 0.155 0.350    
 (0.556) (0.495) (0.525)    
noties    0.976* -0.374 -0.340 
    (0.534) (0.468) (0.489) 
keepinmindrisk -0.0788 0.207 -0.235 -0.0824 0.196 -0.234 
 (0.201) (0.182) (0.189) (0.200) (0.181) (0.189) 
knowingfincontriboth -0.422* 0.00908 0.0197 -0.412* 0.0294 0.0198 
 (0.237) (0.240) (0.227) (0.236) (0.242) (0.227) 
profit -1.602* -1.057 0.205 -1.619* -1.129 0.208 
 (0.950) (0.913) (1.040) (0.948) (0.911) (1.038) 
social 1.179 -0.415 -0.926 1.197 -0.391 -0.929 
 (0.837) (0.793) (0.862) (0.838) (0.802) (0.860) 
cultural 1.159 -0.903 -0.940 1.252 -0.695 -0.947 
 (0.928) (0.867) (0.917) (0.910) (0.863) (0.909) 
ecological 1.866** 0.526 -0.801 1.895** 0.562 -0.800 
 (0.853) (0.831) (0.899) (0.848) (0.827) (0.899) 
amount 0.0637 0.0947 0.125 0.0635 0.0951 0.126 
 (0.103) (0.101) (0.0999) (0.103) (0.102) (0.0987) 
gender 0.298 0.766 0.636 0.292 0.742 0.635 
 (0.498) (0.486) (0.468) (0.497) (0.484) (0.467) 
age 0.185 -0.132 0.327 0.207 -0.0993 0.324 
 (0.235) (0.216) (0.226) (0.230) (0.214) (0.220) 
education -0.0767 -0.211 0.0676 -0.0893 -0.250 0.0692 
 (0.163) (0.157) (0.143) (0.161) (0.156) (0.139) 
securityreturn 0.621*** 0.691*** 0.759*** 0.617*** 0.675*** 0.758*** 
 (0.224) (0.206) (0.220) (0.224) (0.204) (0.220) 
       
Observations 74 74 72 74 74 72 
Pseudo R2 0.101 0.0925 0.0863 0.100 0.0858 0.0863 
LR Chi2 21.12 24.64 24.38 20.90 22.86 24.38 
Prob < Chi2 0.0705 0.0257 0.0278 0.0519 0.0289 0.0180 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Chapter 6 
150 
Table 6-6 Results for reward-based crowdfunding 
VARIABLES infoprojobj infopersprev infofinrisk infoprojobj infopersprev infofinrisk 
strongties 0.316 1.013** -0.0798    
 (0.457) (0.427) (0.439)    
weakties -0.354 1.194*** 0.0959    
 (0.352) (0.337) (0.330)    
noties    0.198 -1.145*** -0.0562 
    (0.339) (0.320) (0.318) 
keepinmindrisk 0.262* 0.187 -0.0310 0.282** 0.181 -0.0361 
 (0.136) (0.133) (0.130) (0.135) (0.132) (0.129) 
knowingfincontriboth 0.225 -0.0781 0.501*** 0.230 -0.0760 0.503*** 
 (0.157) (0.150) (0.148) (0.157) (0.150) (0.148) 
profit -0.769* -0.314 -0.764* -0.807* -0.311 -0.758* 
 (0.463) (0.436) (0.457) (0.461) (0.435) (0.456) 
social 0.329 0.193 -0.362 0.403 0.173 -0.386 
 (0.402) (0.377) (0.383) (0.401) (0.373) (0.378) 
cultural 0.0381 -0.241 -0.831* 0.0889 -0.261 -0.854* 
 (0.495) (0.466) (0.481) (0.491) (0.464) (0.478) 
ecological 1.022** -0.408 0.252 0.947** -0.391 0.272 
 (0.432) (0.403) (0.406) (0.429) (0.400) (0.403) 
amount 0.00523 0.0277 0.116* 0.0182 0.0264 0.112 
 (0.0688) (0.0666) (0.0695) (0.0684) (0.0664) (0.0689) 
gender 0.329 0.135 0.106 0.346 0.135 0.107 
 (0.322) (0.307) (0.316) (0.321) (0.308) (0.317) 
age 0.217 0.178 0.194 0.209 0.177 0.191 
 (0.155) (0.145) (0.149) (0.155) (0.145) (0.148) 
education 0.0653 -0.0850 -0.00993 0.0677 -0.0889 -0.0146 
 (0.0897) (0.0895) (0.0876) (0.0887) (0.0894) (0.0871) 
securityreturn 0.595*** 0.359** 0.354** 0.572*** 0.362** 0.355** 
 (0.167) (0.156) (0.155) (0.166) (0.156) (0.155) 
       
Observations 165 164 163 165 164 163 
Pseudo R2 0.0798 0.0386 0.0461 0.0742 0.0382 0.0457 
LR Chi2 40.94 23.92 30.28 38.08 23.71 30.07 
Prob < Chi2 9.74e-05 0.0318 0.00430 0.000149 0.0223 0.00272 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6-7 Results for financial-return (debt and equity) crowdfunding 
VARIABLES infoprojobj infopersprev infofinrisk infoprojobj infopersprev infofinrisk 
              
strongties 1.363 2.714** -2.158*    
 (1.343) (1.114) (1.236)    
weakties 0.989 0.899 -0.669    
 (0.797) (0.745) (0.720)    
noties    -1.030 -1.187* 0.746 
    (0.787) (0.720) (0.718) 
keepinmindrisk 0.542 -0.368 0.190 0.546 -0.266 0.119 
 (0.497) (0.458) (0.457) (0.496) (0.448) (0.449) 
knowingfincontriboth 0.285 0.158 0.743** 0.292 0.193 0.667** 
 (0.290) (0.265) (0.294) (0.290) (0.266) (0.281) 
profit 0.832 0.534 0.199 0.852 0.600 0.121 
 (1.107) (0.952) (0.933) (1.111) (0.938) (0.931) 
social 0.446 0.100 -0.112 0.483 0.167 -0.136 
 (0.943) (0.827) (0.825) (0.937) (0.811) (0.831) 
cultural -0.0182 -0.964 1.277 0.0300 -0.844 1.030 
 (1.509) (1.350) (1.348) (1.499) (1.317) (1.322) 
ecological -0.975 -1.529** 1.214 -0.894 -1.184 0.793 
 (0.889) (0.779) (0.801) (0.849) (0.742) (0.730) 
amount -0.255 0.00886 0.316** -0.245 0.0515 0.264* 
 (0.167) (0.149) (0.152) (0.164) (0.144) (0.145) 
gender 1.624* 0.294 -1.085 1.592* 0.245 -0.913 
 (0.838) (0.718) (0.730) (0.828) (0.701) (0.711) 
age 1.037*** 0.360 -0.235 1.051*** 0.454 -0.281 
 (0.380) (0.308) (0.313) (0.379) (0.305) (0.309) 
education -0.121 -0.0629 -0.463** -0.124 -0.0640 -0.410* 
 (0.248) (0.200) (0.230) (0.248) (0.197) (0.224) 
securityreturn 0.866** 1.057*** 0.288 0.846* 0.938*** 0.400 
 (0.435) (0.355) (0.373) (0.433) (0.350) (0.363) 
       
Observations 48 49 48 48 49 48 
Pseudo R2 0.211 0.150 0.157 0.210 0.125 0.144 
LR Chi2 22.62 22.78 23.13 22.52 18.98 21.21 
Prob < Chi2 0.0465 0.0444 0.0402 0.0321 0.0890 0.0474 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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7 What motivates crowdfunders of sustainable enterprises: societal 
impact or financial return?10 
 
Abstract 
We use survey data to show that crowdfunders of sustainable enterprises report to be more 
motivated by creating societal impact than by obtaining financial returns. At the same time, 
crowdfunders of sustainable enterprises also indicate that they are not less motivated by 
financial return as crowdfunders of regular enterprises. We document no trade-off between 
financial motivation and impact motivation for sustainable enterprise crowdfunders, a 
finding which runs counter to motivational theory that extrinsic motivation crowds out 
intrinsic motivation. This suggests that the motivations of crowdfunders of sustainable 
enterprises instead follow the sustainable enterprise narrative that societal impact and 
financial return (should) go hand in hand. 
7.1 Introduction 
The urgency for sustainable entrepreneurship and sustainable innovation has strongly 
increased with the ascent of climate agreements (COP21) and momentum surrounding 
sustainability-based innovation such as that around renewable energy (Mazzucato & 
Semieniuk, 2017; Polzin, 2017) and circular economy (Ellen MacArthur Foundation & 
McKinsey & Company, 2014; Geissdoerfer, Savaget, Bocken, & Hultink, 2017). Finance 
for sustainable entrepreneurship and innovation, however, faces challenges due to high risk 
levels, lack of track record, collateral and R&D investment constraints (Arena, Bengo, 
Calderini, & Chiodo, 2017; Brancati, 2015; Hall, 2010). These financing challenges are 
further enhanced by externality problems such as the inability to privately capture the 
societal value created by sustainable enterprises (Pacheco et al., 2010; Polzin, 2017). In the 
case of innovative sustainable enterprises, the creation of knowledge externalities is yet 
another hurdle (Faber & Frenken, 2009; Rennings, 2000).  
                                                          
10 Joint work with Karen Maas. This chapter has benefited from peer-review at the Journal of Business Venturing.  
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In the light of these financing constraints, some researchers indicate crowdfunders to be 
particularly willing to fund sustainable entrepreneurial activity (Calic & Mosakowski, 2016; 
Hörisch, 2015; Lehner, 2013). Since sustainable entrepreneurs are usually innovating in their 
sector, this willingness can be partly attributed the fact that crowdfunding is seen as a 
particularly suitable financing tool for early ventures (J. H. Block et al., 2017; Bruton et al., 
2015) and early stage innovations, in general (Davis, Hmieleski, Webb, & Coombs, 2017). 
On top of that, however, some authors suggest there is a particularly good match between 
crowdfunding and sustainable enterprises, mainly based on legitimacy theory (Calic & 
Mosakowski, 2016; Lehner, 2013). Legitimacy theory perspectives argue that the focus of 
crowdfunders on the mission and core values of an enterprise, as well as the ‘democracy’ of 
having many small funders, fits well with sustainable projects and enterprises (Calic & 
Mosakowski, 2016; Lehner, 2013). In the case of renewable energy crowdfunding, a 
combination of normative, gain and hedonic motivations is found (Dóci et al., 2015; 
Vasileiadou et al., 2016). The limited monetary motivations of sustainable entrepreneurs can 
be a strong signal that they are more outcome-focused, reducing the risks of moral hazard 
and increasing legitimacy of the investment as perceived by the crowdfunder (Hörisch, 2015; 
Lehner, 2013).  
Several mechanisms for successful crowdfunding of sustainable enterprises and projects 
have been pointed out. From a project perspective, the already mentioned legitimacy of 
crowdfunding sustainable enterprises and projects is proposed as a channel through which 
funders are being attracted (Calic & Mosakowski, 2016; Lehner & Nicholls, 2014). From a 
platform perspective, the micro-institutional setting of crowdfunding can stimulate 
collective action for sustainable enterprise finance through transparency about participating 
investors and threshold settings such as funding deadlines and target amounts (Carr, 2013; 
Cheng & Bernstein, 2014; Toxopeus & Maas, 2017). From a crowdfunder perspective, the 
literature has established the importance of social networks in funding success (Giancarlo 
Giudici, Guerini, & Rossi-Lamastra, 2017; Lin et al., 2012; Polzin, Toxopeus, et al., 2017; 
Vismara, 2016) and has analysed pro-social and financial motivations of crowdfunders 
(Allison et al., 2015; Belleflamme et al., 2013; Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015; Gerber & Hui, 
2013). However, there is little research documenting funders’ motivation in the context of 
crowdfunding for sustainable enterprises (Calic & Mosakowski, 2016; Hörisch, 2015).  
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In this paper, we therefore focus on the research question: what motivates crowdfunders to 
invest in sustainable enterprises: societal impact and/or financial return? We also investigate 
whether there exists a trade-off between the two motivations. This study adds theoretical and 
empirical understanding of motivations of crowdfunders of sustainable enterprises, bridging 
motivational theory (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003), crowdfunding (Cholakova & Clarysse, 
2015) and sustainable entrepreneurship (Shepherd and Patzelt, 2011). 
7.2 Theory 
Despite the divergent perspectives on the exact definition of sustainable entrepreneurship 
(Dean & McMullen, 2007; Pacheco et al., 2010) and similar concepts such as green 
entrepreneurship (Allen & Malin, 2008), environmental entrepreneurship (Keogh and 
Polonsky, 1998; Meek et al., 2010), ecopreneurship (Dixon & Clifford, 2007; Schaltegger, 
2002; Schaper, 2002), shared value (Porter & Kramer, 2011) and social entrepreneurship 
(Austin, Stevenson, & Wei-Skillern, 2006; Peredo & McLean, 2006), there are several 
commonalities across definitions. All concepts refer to (1) carrying out entrepreneurial 
activity (Hall et al., 2010; Keogh & Polonsky, 1998; Shepherd & Patzelt, 2011), and (2) 
innovativeness (Alvord, Brown, & Letts, 2004; Austin et al., 2006; Chell, Nicolopoulou, & 
Karataş-Özkan, 2010; Keskin, Diehl, & Molenaar, 2013), in order to simultaneously deliver 
(3) social or environmental value for individuals, communities or society (Hall et al., 2010; 
Shepherd & Patzelt, 2011). Within these different concepts, social entrepreneurship 
definitions generally – but not always – focus more on delivering social rather than 
environmental value (Alvord et al., 2004; Maas & Grieco, 2017; Peredo & McLean, 2006; 
Zahra, Gedajlovic, Neubaum, & Shulman, 2009), whereas ecopreneurship, green 
entrepreneurship and environmental entrepreneurship primarily target environmental 
problems (Allen & Malin, 2008; Keogh & Polonsky, 1998; Schaltegger, 2002).  
Sustainable enterprises are thus understood as being innovative organizations that produce 
societal – social or environmental – value by using a business model as a vehicle to address 
a market failure and achieving financial sustainability to scale their societal impact (Cohen 
& Winn, 2007; Dean & McMullen, 2007). Sustainable enterprises are presumed to have 
more societal impact on the economic, environmental or social dimension than regular 
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enterprises or established firms (J. K. Hall et al., 2010; Kuckertz & Wagner, 2010; Maas & 
Grieco, 2017).  
In this paper, we explore the role of financial motivation and impact motivation of 
crowdfunders (Allison et al., 2015; Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015; Gerber & Hui, 2013), 
specifically in sustainable enterprises (Calic & Mosakowski, 2016; Hörisch, 2015) as 
opposed to regular enterprises. Secondly, we investigate the trade-off between financial 
motivation and impact motivation for both subgroups (Allison et al., 2015; Bénabou & 
Tirole, 2003; York & Venkataraman, 2010).  
Impact motivation as a driver of sustainable enterprise crowdfunding 
Individuals can be encouraged to provide funding to a particular campaign through the use 
of narratives (Frydrych, Bock, Kinder, & Koeck, 2014), linguistic style (Parhankangas & 
Hellström, 2007), pitches (Davis et al., 2017) and other persuasion techniques (Allison, 
Davis, Webb, & Short, 2017). More specifically, researchers use different theoretical 
concepts to understand non-financial motivations for providing sustainable crowdfunding. 
Some key concepts used are: intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation, based on social 
determination theory (Allison et al., 2015; Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015); legitimacy (Calic 
& Mosakowski, 2016; Lehner & Nicholls, 2014); localized altruism and social capital 
(Giudici et al., 2017), and community benefits (Belleflamme et al., 2014).  
Although a large portion of previous research does not focus specifically on crowdfunding 
of sustainable enterprises, but instead uses a broader lens such as equity crowdfunding 
(Vulkan, Åstebro, & Sierra, 2016) or slightly different ones like pro-social lending (Allison 
et al., 2015; Kuppuswamy & Bayus, 2017), motivations for crowdfunding sustainable 
enterprise are likely to build on these previous efforts. At the same time, we propose that the 
distinguishing factor of sustainable enterprises – their objective to create a positive social or 
environmental impact alongside creating financial return – is likely to make investments in 
such enterprises attractive for impact-motivated crowdfunders.  
In more established financial markets, socially responsible investments (SRI) and impact 
investments have increased substantially in the past decade (Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015; 
Mudaliar, Pineiro, & Bass, 2016). Impact investing, as a subset of SRI, has especially gained 
traction (Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015; Hummels, 2016). Three different types of motivation 
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of SRI investors have been outlined (Kinder, 2005; Oh, Park, & Ghauri, 2013). Investors 
with a value-based or impact motivation invest based on personal, moral or ethical standards, 
leading to the inclusion of non-financial parameters in the investment decision (Oh et al., 
2013; Toxopeus, Liket and Maas, 2017). Value-seeking investors use social or 
environmental screens to improve their financial returns, based on the assumption – and 
mixed evidence – that companies with high ESG scores outperform the market (Ameer & 
Othman, 2012; Fulton, Kahn, & Sharples, 2012; Renneboog, Ter Horst, & Zhang, 2008a, 
2008b, 2011). Value-enhancing investors undertake strategies to improve the social and 
environmental performance of the firms they invest in, i.e. by engaging in dialogue and filing 
shareholder resolutions (Scholtens, 2006). On top of these three motivation types, warm-
glow theory suggest that people mainly invest in sustainability in order to feel good about 
themselves (Allison, McKenny, & Short, 2013; Andreoni, 1990).  
At least some of these motivations are likely to play a role for crowdfunders of sustainable 
enterprises. Some evidence suggests that the emergence of crowdfunding benefits pro-
social, sustainability-oriented or impactful projects in particular (Allison et al., 2015; Calic 
& Mosakowski, 2016; Gerber & Hui, 2013). Research across several academic domains 
indicates that people engage in prosocial behaviour when they believe their actions make a 
positive impact (Kuppuswamy & Bayus, 2017). Others expect a relationship between 
sustainability orientation and crowdfunding success from theory, but do not find it 
empirically (Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015; Hörisch, 2015). One of the main mechanisms 
through which scholars expect crowdfunding to be exceptionally successful for sustainable 
projects and ventures is through building legitimacy, which is arguably easier for sustainable 
than for regular enterprises (Dart, 2004; Lehner & Nicholls, 2014). This mechanism requires 
funders to be motivated to support enterprises that undertake activities that are perceived as 
legitimate, as part of ‘a socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions’ 
(Suchman, 1995).  
Crowdfunders are expected to respond positively to the legitimacy claims of sustainable 
enterprises if they themselves are motivated to create societal impact. We therefore propose 
impact motivation to be a key motivation driving crowdfunding of sustainable enterprises, 
leading to our first hypothesis: 
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H1: Crowdfunders of sustainable enterprises are significantly more impact motivated than 
crowdfunders of regular enterprises. 
Financial motivation as a driver of sustainable enterprise crowdfunding 
‘Supporting a good cause’ (Gerber & Hui, 2013) may not suffice as the sole motivation for 
funders or investors to fund sustainable enterprises (Toxopeus et al., 2015). Financial 
motivations often play a role for investors in sustainable or ethical firms (Nilsson, 2008); 
otherwise money could have been donated through philanthropy or charity (Maas & Grieco, 
2017). However, research on this topic is still in its infancy and the question remains how 
important financial returns are as a motivation for crowdfunders of sustainable enterprises. 
This runs parallel to the discussion in traditional financial markets whether SRI and impact 
investors expect financial returns (Renneboog et al., 2008a, 2008b, 2011; G. Williams, 
2007). Many studies analysed the performance of SRI mutual funds and non-SRI mutual 
funds. Most of those studies, with a small number of exceptions (e.g. Renneboog et al., 
2008b) find no significant differences in risk-adjusted returns between SRI funds and 
conventional funds. Similar results have been found in the US (Statman, 2000), UK (Mallin, 
Saadouni, & Briston, 1995), Continental Europe (Bauer et al, 2005) and Canada (Bauer, 
Derwall, & Otten, 2007). At firm level, some evidence suggests a positive relationship 
between sustainability practices and firm performance (Ameer & Othman, 2012). 
Although we expect positive utility of societal impact for crowdfunders, existing theory and 
evidence does not paint a clear picture whether this implies that the financial motivation to 
crowdfund sustainable enterprises (as opposed to regular enterprises) is similar to that in 
regular enterprises. Most empirical evidence documents the existence of financial 
motivations for sustainable investments, but do not compare its importance to motivations 
for regular investments (Allison et al., 2015; Dóci & Vasileiadou, 2015).  
We argue that investors are not willing to forgo expected financial return when they invest 
in sustainable enterprises and may instead ‘double up’ their benefits, in line with the value-
seeking investor perspective (Oh et al., 2013; Maas, Perego and Kim, 2017). This means 
their investment is also financially motivated and crowdfunders expect a sustainable 
enterprise to deliver the same financial returns as regular firms (Nilsson, 2008). One reason 
to expect that crowdfunders do not want to forgo financial return in exchange for societal 
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impact is that it could serve as an explanation as to why crowdfunding campaigns of 
sustainable enterprises may be more successful than crowdfunding campaigns of regular 
enterprises: total utility will be higher if expected financial returns remain similar. Another 
reason to expect upholding of financial return requirements is that this the motivations of 
crowdfunders of sustainable enterprises would in essence follow the sustainable enterprise 
narrative of their ability to create ‘shared value’, both financial and societal (Dart, 2004; 
Porter & Kramer, 2011). 
This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H2: Crowdfunders of sustainable enterprises are just as financially motivated as 
crowdfunders of regular enterprises.  
Does financial motivation crowd out impact motivation? 
The fact that sustainable enterprises offer both financial and societal return expectations to 
their investors begs the question whether financial (extrinsic) rewards will crowd out impact 
(intrinsic) motivations to invest (Bénabou & Tirole, 2003). There has been ample research 
on the question of whether responsible investments pays off financially (Renneboog et al., 
2008b, 2008a, 2011). Research has provided evidence of the ethical, normative, social, 
warm-glow or intrinsic motivations of investors (Allison et al., 2015, 2013; Borgers & 
Pownall, 2014; Dóci & Vasileiadou, 2015; Nilsson, 2008). However, it is unclear from the 
literature whether financial motivation crowds out impact motivation for crowdfunders of 
sustainable enterprises.  
There exist theoretical predictions on the crowding out of intrinsic motivation by extrinsic 
motivations in general (Bénabou & Tirole, 2003); empirical studies apply this prediction to 
prosocial crowdfunding (Allison et al., 2015) and reward versus equity crowdfunding 
(Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015). The context of prosocial lending provides evidence of a 
crowding out of intrinsic motivation due to extrinsic cues, but in a different empirical setting 
than sustainable enterpreneurship since lenders obtain no financial returns (Allison et al., 
2015). Others find a trade-off between financial and psychic (i.e. happiness) returns in SRI 
(Beal, Michelle Goyen, & Philips, 2009). In general, extrinsic rewards or cues do seem to 
crowd out intrinsic motivation.   
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It is unclear how this ‘crowding out effect’ translates to sustainable enterprise crowdfunding, 
a setting where both financial return and societal impact are defining characteristics of the 
investment object (Shepherd & Patzelt, 2011). Understanding whether financial motivation 
crowds out impact motivation for the crowdfunding of sustainable enterprises is highly 
relevant for at least two reasons. Firstly, if this crowding out effect exists in the sustainable 
enterprise crowdfunding context, the narrative used to attract crowdfunders should take this 
into account, since we expect impact motivation to be highly relevant for such investors. By 
directing the attention in the campaign to the expected financial return, crowdfunders 
motivated intrinsically to create societal impact may not invest. Second, understanding of 
this trade-off affects which investors should be targeted in the first place. If crowdfunders 
of sustainable enterprises are willing to accept lower financial returns due to utility derived 
from expected societal impact (Geobey et al., 2012), this means a different – less financially 
demanding – investor segment can be targeted.   
A general intuition seems to be that for sustainable investments, the crowding out effect may 
actually work in the opposite directions. When moving from regular to sustainable enterprise 
crowdfunding, the additional benefit of creating societal value may lead to lower financial 
return motivations (Gerber & Hui, 2013). In the realm of SRI, researchers find that some 
pension beneficiaries report willingness to give up a percentage of their pension in return for 
sustainable investments (Borgers & Pownall, 2014). Other researchers document SRI 
investors to be less concerned with negative returns for SRI investors than conventional 
investors (Renneboog et al., 2011).  
However, the main distinguishing promise of sustainable enterprises (as opposed to regular 
enterprises) is that societal impact, both social and environmental, can go hand in hand with 
profitable financial returns (Bocken et al., 2014; Choi & Gray, 2008; B. Cohen & Winn, 
2007; Dean & McMullen, 2007; Porter & Kramer, 2011). This ‘win-win’ approach positions 
sustainable enterprises between regular for-profit enterprises and non-profit organizations as 
an increasingly popular strategy for delivering societal value (Brugmann & Prahalad, 2007; 
J. K. Hall et al., 2010; Porter & Kramer, 2011). If the sustainable enterprise narrative claims 
delivery of shared value as a key objective, we expect investors who value both financial 
and societal return to step in. This is most in line with findings in the context of renewable 
energy investments, where both financial and environmental motivations were documented 
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as driving investments (Dóci & Vasileiadou, 2015). Although we expect financial 
motivation to crowd out impact motivation for regular enterprises, we hypothesize that this 
does not hold for sustainable enterprises due to the sustainable enterprise narrative. This 
leads to our third and fourth hypotheses:  
H3: There exists a significant negative trade-off between impact motivation and financial 
motivation for enterprise crowdfunders. 
H4: The trade-off between impact motivation and financial motivation is moderated by 
whether the crowdfunding object is a sustainable or a regular enterprise. Where the object is 
a sustainable enterprise, we expect the trade-off to disappear.  
7.3 Methodology 
Research design 
To test our hypotheses, we carried out a large-scale survey on decision-making by 
crowdfunders. While a lot of crowdfunding research uses project-level data obtained from 
crowdfunding websites, sometimes linked to social media content (Lin, Prabhala, & 
Viswanathan, 2009), detailed information about the crowdfunders themselves is generally 
lacking, with some exceptions (Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015; Mollick, 2015; Polzin, 
Toxopeus, et al., 2017). A survey approach allows for broad and detailed insight into how 
an individual investment decision is made, which is very difficult to obtain using methods 
other than self-reporting. However, this approach also has some drawbacks, in particular 
regarding social desirability response bias (Arnold & Feldman, 1981; Steenkamp, de Jong, 
& Baumgartner, 2010; van de Mortel, 2008) and common method bias (Conway & Lance, 
2010; Podsakoff et al., 2003). Whereas social desirability bias is particularly salient in 
research where respondents report on sensitive issues (such as ethics, racial attitudes or 
weight), variables such as investment motivations, use of information and relationships are 
less prone to dominant social norms. It may, however, appear socially desirable for 
crowdfunders to report being impact motivated (rather than financially motivated). To 
minimize these issues, we select variables that do not overlap in their operationalization and 
we use simple, direct questions to assure internal validity by preventing item ambiguity. To 
reduce social desirability bias, we provide respondents with full anonymity (Conway & 
Lance, 2010). Furthermore, to reduce common method and self-reporting bias we code all 
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the projects / enterprises reported by respondents ourselves as sustainable or regular (we also 
asked respondents to classify their projects). 
Data 
We collected survey data in 2016 in The Netherlands about crowdfunding motivations and 
decision-making. We approached respondents by email through the networks of the four 
research institutions involved, and asked them to fill in a survey online. Of the people we 
approached, 686 filled in the survey and 276 respondents indicated they had crowdfunded. 
265 respondents gave us the name of the specific initiative (enterprise or project) that they 
had invested in. Of this group, 143 indicated they had crowdfunded in a for-profit 
project/enterprise (and therefore were able to answer the questions of interest for this study). 
We then asked questions about this specific investment, such as the amount, their motives 
to invest and the information that was important in making their investment decision. We 
also asked them to describe the project they invested in according to pre-set options. 
Additionally, we asked them some personal information such as age, gender and income. In 
the questionnaire, it was emphasized that answers would be treated strictly confidential with 
anonymity being assured. Using the names of the projects/enterprises given by respondents, 
we looked up each initiative and coded all projects as ‘sustainable’ or ‘regular’ using a 
coding protocol (instead of using the self-reported descriptions).  
Variables 
As explained below, we used specific questions from our questionnaire to operationalize the 
variables in our hypotheses.  
To select our sample of interest from the broader survey data we took several steps. First, in 
order to make sure we are analysing entrepreneurial activity (versus non-profit activities), 
we included only respondents who classified the project or enterprise they invested in as ‘for 
profit’ (versus ‘not for profit’). Next, we coded each project as either regular or sustainable 
using the question: “How would you describe the project or enterprise (multiple answers 
possible: commercial/sustainable/social/circular/innovative/cultural)?” If respondents 
answered at least one of the categories sustainable, circular, social, commercial and 
innovative, we included the observation in our analysis.  
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Next, we took all the project names and coded them ourselves as sustainable or regular based 
on a predefined coding protocol based on Calic and Mosakowski (2016). This protocol can 
be found in the appendix. The coding was carried out by one of the authors and a student 
assistant specializing in sustainable entrepreneurship, based on existing definitions of 
sustainable entrepreneurship (Kates and Parris, 2003; Shepherd and Patzelt, 2011). We self-
coded this variable to prevent common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003), although we 
also asked respondents to classify the project they invested in.  
The coding took place as follows. We look up the crowdfunding campaign website of each 
project (or, if no longer available, the project itself) in our sample and code these as 
‘sustainable’ (1) or ‘regular’ (0) based on the following questions: 
Environmental: Does the project in some way benefit the environment – nature and the 
Earth’s life support systems (For example: saves trees, plants, bees, whales, the ecosystem, 
reduces pollution, makes recycling easier, etc.)? (1=Yes; 0=No) 
Social: Does the project in some way benefit people (For example: improves education, 
fights discrimination, donates to the needy)? (1=Yes; 0=No) 
If respondents reported more than one project, we code it if all of them are either sustainable 
or regular. If respondents reported only the crowdfunding platform (i.e. ‘a Kiva project’), 
we code this as sustainable or regular only if all projects on this website fall within one of 
these categories (i.e. on Kiva, all projects are meant to support the livelihood of people in 
developing countries, which leads to coding as ‘sustainable’).  
Only if we could not find any information on the reported project/enterprise, we reverted to 
the self-reported coding of the respondents (in 7 cases). This back-up variable was created 
as follows: if the respondent categorized the project in at least one of the categories 
sustainable, circular, social, we classified the project as ‘sustainable’. If respondents 
answered ‘commercial’ and/or ‘innovative’ but did not answer sustainable/circular/social at 
the same time, we classified the project as ‘regular’. This means that projects that were both 
commercial/innovative and sustainable, circular or social are classified as sustainable 
projects. 
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Next, we measure the degree by which a crowdfunder is motivated by societal impact or 
financial return by asking the question (in Dutch): how important were the following 
motivations for your decision to invest in this crowdfunding project? We then provided 
several potential motivations, including ‘societal impact’ and ‘financial return’, and asked 
respondents to rate the importance of each motivation on a Likert scale from 1 to 5 (1 – not 
at all important; 5 – very important).  
Our control variables were determined based on variables that were shown in earlier 
crowdfunding and/or investment research to have a significant relationship with contribution 
patterns in crowdfunding or which we expect to affect motivations. These include amount 
invested (Polzin, Toxopeus, et al., 2017), type of crowdfunding (Cholakova & Clarysse, 
2015; van der Lijn et al., 2016), gender (Barber & Odean, 2001; Mohammadi & Shafi, 2017), 
age (Korniotis & Kumar, 2011), investment experience (Hodge & Pronk, 2006) and 
crowdfunding experience.  
Amount invested was operationalized using the question: how much did you invest in this 
specific project/enterprise? (In Euros: 0-50/51-100/101-500/501-1,000/1,001-5,000/5,000-
10,000/10,000<). ‘Type of crowdfunding’ dummies were based on the question: what type 
of return did you or will you receive for your contribution? (No return/mention of 
name/symbolic or small return/product or service/interest/interest with option to convert to 
equity (convertible loan)/equity in the enterprise). We categorized ‘no return/mention of 
name/symbolic or small return’ as donation crowdfunding; ‘product/service’ as reward 
crowdfunding; ‘interest’ as loan crowdfunding and ‘convertible loan/equity’ as equity 
crowdfunding. In the case that respondents reported to receive multiple types of return (i.e. 
symbolic and product), they were coded within both types (25 cases). If respondents 
specified an ‘other’ type of return, they were not included in any specific crowdfunding type 
(2 cases).  
Gender was reported as female (0) or male (1). Age was reported in categories (0-18/18-
24/25-34/35-44/45-54/55-64/65<). Investment experience was measured by combining two 
questions: whether they had any stock market experience (yes/no) and whether they had any 
informal investment experience (yes/no). We added these responses together to create an 
ordinal variable as a proxy for investment experience (between 0-2). Crowdfunding 
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experience was measured using the question: how often have you invested in crowdfunding? 
(1/2-5/6-10/10-50/more than 50 times).  
Data analysis 
Since our first dependent variable (sustainable enterprise) is a dummy variable, we use a 
logit model to test hypotheses 1 and 2. For hypotheses 3 and 4 our dependent variables 
(impact motivation and financial motivation) are ordinal (Likert scales from 1-5), which is 
why we use an ordered logit regression model (Hill, Griffiths, & Judge, 2001). First, we 
defined our variables (see above). Second, we excluded any missing variables from the 
dataset based on our variables of interest. Next, we conducted exploratory data analysis to 
better understand variations in the data, such as summary statistics and correlations. After 
that we set up our (ordered) logit regression models to determine the explanatory power of 
our independent variables: impact motivation and financial motivation of crowdfunders, in 
relation to our dependent variable (sustainable enterprise versus regular enterprise 
crowdfunding). To be able to account for different crowdfunding types in our results, we use 
equity crowdfunding as a base case and enter donation, reward and loan crowdfunding into 
the model as dummies. 
7.4 Results 
Descriptive results 
In Table 7-1 we outline the descriptive characteristics of our variables of interest for our full 
sample. In Table 7-2, we describe the variables in the two subsets of interest: sustainable 
(sustainable/circular/social) and regular enterprises (only commercial/innovative).  
We find the dataset splits right through the middle in terms of sustainable versus regular 
enterprises funded by respondents. While quite convenient for our analysis, it is somewhat 
surprising that sustainable enterprises are so highly represented. Although our dataset is not 
a representative panel, and perhaps displays a bias towards sustainability networks in our 
data collection, it provides some affirmation of the importance of crowdfunding for 
sustainable entrepreneurial activity.   
On average in the full dataset, respondents rate impact motivation as more important than 
financial motivation. When we look further into the subsets (sustainable/regular enterprises) 
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we find that crowdfunders in the regular enterprise subset rate impact motivation slightly 
higher than financial motivation. Within the sustainable enterprise subset, impact motivation 
increases by more than 1 point (on a 5-point Likert scale). Financial motivation is marginally 
higher for sustainable enterprise crowdfunders than for regular enterprise crowdfunders 
(0.09 points on a 5-point Likert scale).  
Table 7-1 Descriptive statistics of variables of interest (sustainable and regular enterprises) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
sustainable enterprise 135 0,50 0,50 0 1 
impact motivation 129 3,43 1,28 1 5 
financial motivation 129 2,86 1,49 1 5 
gender 116 0,69 0,46 0 1 
       
age 135 4,03 1,17 1 7 
amount 131 2,98 1,40 1 7 
donation dummy 135 0,20 0,40 0 1 
reward dummy 135 0,39 0,49 0 1 
       
loan dummy 135 0,15 0,36 0 1 
equity dummy 135 0,24 0,43 0 1 
investment experience 116 0,82 0,75 0 2 
crowdfunding experience 135 2,29 1,01 1 5 
 
We find a slight over-representation of males in the full dataset, in line with general 
characteristics of crowdfunders. This imbalance decreases in the subset of sustainable 
enterprise crowdfunding (79% male crowdfunders in the regular subset as opposed to 59% 
in the sustainable subset). 
Pairwise correlations 
Next, we carry out pairwise correlations for our variables of interest (see Table 7-5 in 
appendix). We find a significant positive correlation between sustainable enterprise 
crowdfunding and impact motivation, and not between sustainable enterprise crowdfunding 
and financial motivation (a coefficient near zero). We find no significant pairwise correlation 
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between impact motivation and financial motivation for the whole group of enterprise 
crowdfunders (sustainable and regular). However, when we split up the dataset and correlate 
the two motivations in each subset separately, we find that within crowdfunding for regular 
enterprises there is a significant negative correlation, but within crowdfunding for 
sustainable enterprises this significant correlation disappears and the coefficient goes to near 
zero.  
Furthermore, we find that all our control variables are significantly correlated with at least 
one of our main dependent and independent variables (impact motivation, financial 
motivation and sustainable enterprise crowdfunding). This confirms our set of control 
variables.  
Table 7-2 Descriptive statistics of variables of interest (sustainable versus regular enterprises) 
 
Empirical results 
We run a full logistic regression model for hypotheses 1 and 2, first separately and then 
together (Table 7-3.). As expected, we find that impact motivation is significantly higher for 
crowdfunders of sustainable enterprises than those in regular enterprises, confirming our 
first hypothesis (H1). In the model where we only include financial motivation (and not 
impact motivation), we find no significant difference in financial motivation (importance of 
financial return) between crowdfunders of sustainable and regular enterprises, which is in 
line with H2. However, when we include both impact motivation and financial motivation 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
impact motivation 64 3,88 1,20 1 5 65 3,00 1,21 1 5
financial motivation 64 2,90 1,40 1 5 65 2,81 1,59 1 5
gender 69 0,59 0,49 0 1 66 0,79 0,41 0 1
age 69 4,19 1,07 1 7 66 3,86 1,25 2 7
amount 67 2,99 1,41 1 7 64 2,98 1,41 1 7
donation dummy 69 0,25 0,43 0 1 66 0,15 0,36 0 1
reward dummy 69 0,38 0,49 0 1 66 0,39 0,49 0 1
loan dummy 69 0,33 0,47 0 1 66 0,36 0,48 0 1
equity dummy 69 0,32 0,47 0 1 66 0,17 0,38 0 1
investment experience 59 0,76 0,82 0 2 57 0,88 0,68 0 2
crowdfunding experience 69 2,36 0,98 1 5 66 2,21 1,03 1 5
sustainable enterprise crowdfunding regular enterprise crowdfunding
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(thus controlling for impact motivation while testing for financial motivation), we find that 
sustainable enterprise crowdfunders not only report to be more impact motivated and also 
more financial motivation than regular enterprise crowdfunders, albeit with a smaller 
coefficient. This result runs counter to our hypothesis (H2) that financial motivation is the 
same between the two subgroups, but it does not rule out the underlying reasoning that 
crowdfunders in sustainable enterprises are actually value-seeking (looking for financial 
return through their sustainable investment).  
Table 7-3 Main models based on hypotheses 1-2 
 
As an additional result, we find that female crowdfunders invest significantly more often in 
sustainable enterprises than male crowdfunders since this gender effect shows up when we 
VARIABLES H1 H2 H1&2
Impact motivation 0.658*** 0.760***
(0.209) (0.224)
Financial motivation 0.190 0.382*
(0.182) (0.207)
Age 0.0972 0.187 0.181
(0.204) (0.198) (0.214)
Gender -0.656 -1.064** -0.741
(0.502) (0.477) (0.514)
Amount 0.0832 0.116 -0.00878
(0.201) (0.190) (0.208)
Donation crowdfunding 0.617 0.974 0.735
(0.631) (0.617) (0.653)
Reward crowdfunding -0.251 -0.0168 0.336
(0.585) (0.613) (0.678)
Loan crowdfunding -0.318 -0.727 -0.367
(0.526) (0.503) (0.537)
Investment experience -0.364 -0.245 -0.383
(0.336) (0.312) (0.340)
Crowdfunding experience 0.121 0.150 0.0735
(0.229) (0.217) (0.230)
Constant -2.402* -0.938 -3.981**
(1.292) (1.195) (1.626)
R-squared 0.1488 0.0828 0.1715
Observations 113 113 113
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sustainable enterprise (vs regular enterprise) crowdfunding
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test only for financial motivation (second column in Table 7 -3) This suggests that impact 
motivation is overrepresented in female crowdfunders, which is why the gender effect 
disappears when we add impact motivation to our model (first and third column in Table 7-
3).  
Table 7-4 Trade-off between financial motivation and impact motivation (H3&4) 
 
We find a strong significant negative relationship between financial and impact motivation 
for the full dataset, which confirms our H3 that in general there is a trade-off between these 
two motivations for enterprise crowdfunders. However, when we test for moderation by 
H3 H4 H4
Variables all enterprises sustainable subset regular subset
financial motivation -0.545*** -0.340 -0.706***
(0.171) (0.242) (0.253)
sustainable enterprise 1.529***
(0.408)
age 0.0379 0.0296 0.105
(0.181) (0.293) (0.234)
gender -0.847* -1.063* -0.862
(0.450) (0.639) (0.675)
amount 0.349* 0.756*** -0.0140
(0.178) (0.281) (0.242)
donationcf 0.523 0.965 0.512
(0.550) (0.758) (0.907)
rewardcf -1.007* -0.466 -0.993
(0.556) (0.742) (0.901)
loancf -0.832* -0.948 -0.298
(0.451) (0.641) (0.774)
investment experience 0.361 0.324 0.485
(0.285) (0.389) (0.455)
crowdfunding experience 0.250 0.473 0.130
(0.195) (0.315) (0.260)
R-squared 0.1379 0.1398 0.0956
Observations 113 58 55
Impact motivation (dependent variable)
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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splitting the sample into regular and sustainable enterprises, we find that this significant 
negative relationship between impact motivation and financial motivation is driven entirely 
by a significant negative relationship within the subset of regular enterprise crowdfunding. 
Within the subset of sustainable enterprise crowdfunding – our main object of study – there 
is no trade-off between financial and impact motivation, which was to be expected after our 
H2 result. It confirms our hypothesis (H4) that for sustainable enterprise crowdfunding, 
financial and impact motivation do not crowd each other out and instead coincide (‘double 
up’), while for regular enterprises, we do witness a trade-off between impact and financial 
motivation (H3).   
7.5 Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper we shed light on two motivations of crowdfunders to invest in sustainable 
(versus regular) enterprises: motivation to create societal impact (impact motivation) and 
motivation to obtain financial return (financial motivation). Our study offers the first 
empirical analysis of financial motivation versus impact motivation of crowdfunders of 
sustainable enterprises. Furthermore, we compare crowdfunder motivations for funding 
sustainable enterprises to crowdfunder motivations for funding regular enterprises. We find 
that impact motivation is reported by the average crowdfunder as their main motivation to 
invest and that this motivation is significantly higher for crowdfunders of sustainable 
enterprises than for crowdfunders of regular enterprises. At the same time - and unexpectedly 
- crowdfunders of sustainable enterprises also report a higher financial motivation than 
crowdfunders of regular enterprises. We find a trade-off between impact motivation and 
financial motivation for regular enterprise crowdfunders but not for crowdfunders of 
sustainable enterprises. Our results suggest that crowdfunders of sustainable enterprises do 
not expect to forgo financial return for societal impact and are instead motivated to obtain 
both types of return, both more so than crowdfunders of regular (non-sustainable) 
enterprises. We discuss this result in light of previous literature on crowdfunding 
motivations and sustainable enterprises to pinpoint our academic and practical contribution.  
Our findings suggest that intrinsic / extrinsic crowdfunder motivations are far from 
homogeneous: the type of crowdfunding platform, and whether the crowdfunded activity is 
non-profit or for-profit leads to different motivations of the crowdfunders involved. The 
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higher impact and financial motivation of sustainable enterprise crowdfunders contradicts 
previous evidence in the context of a pro-social lending platform that a focus on extrinsic 
motivation (through project language) crowds out the intrinsic motivation of crowdfunders 
(Allison et al., 2015). This study was carried out on a platform where investors provide zero-
interest loans (Kiva.org), where crowdfunder contributions are not for-profit. Our finding 
suggests that this evidence of crowding out of intrinsic motivation in the context of prosocial 
lending is not transferable to for-profit crowdfunding (reward / loan / equity). This lack of 
transferability between platform types is confirmed by another empirical study in an equity 
/ reward crowdfunding context, where financial motives were found to be the main driver 
behind crowdfunder decision-making, with non-financial motives only playing a secondary 
role (Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015). Here, authors note that their setting – a general 
crowdfunding platform that is not specifically social or environmental – might explain the 
absence of non-financial motivations of funders. Our setting combines the pro-social 
(Allison et al., 2015) and for-profit (Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015) characteristics of these 
earlier studies and finds that impact and financial motivations can co-exist. Our results are 
mostly in line with evidence from renewable energy investment at a community level, where 
both financial and societal motivations of funders are reported (Dóci & Vasileiadou, 2015). 
More generally, our findings confirm that crowdfunding motivations, and trade-offs between 
them, are heterogeneous across crowdfunding and project types.  
We interpret our result as follows. Of the existing categorizations of SRI investors, 
crowdfunders in sustainable enterprises somewhat fit the definition of value-seeking 
investors (Oh et al., 2013), but perhaps a better term to coin based on our result is as value-
stacking investors. Sustainable enterprise crowdfunders are trying to obtain financial value 
by choosing sustainable investments (value-seeking) but at the same time indicate they want 
to generate societal impact (value-based). We describe sustainable enterprise crowdfunders 
as value-stacking investors because they essentially take over the narrative of sustainable 
entrepreneurs, with the objective to create sustainable business in both a societal and 
financial sense  (Bocken et al., 2014; Cohen & Winn, 2007; J. K. Hall et al., 2010). We 
expect this win-win narrative, embedded into the field of sustainable entrepreneurship both 
at a macro level and based on individual firm stories, to attract and perhaps help grow an 
investor community that is motivated by both entrepreneurial objectives without crowding 
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the other objective out (Fletcher, 2007; Martens, Jennings, & Jennings, 2007; Steyaert, 
2007). This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that we find an increased financial and 
impact motivation in the subset of sustainable enterprise crowdfunding only: within regular 
enterprises, a negative trade-off between impact and financial motivation holds. Our results 
could serve as an explanation for the relative success of crowdfunding campaigns of 
sustainable enterprises: funders are investing to obtain double benefits. Since there is very 
little track record on realized financial return for sustainable enterprises, let alone societal 
impact, time will tell whether these expectations will actually materialize. Increased 
transparency and track record on actual value creation by sustainable enterprises – both 
financial and societal – is likely to affect which type of crowdfunder will decide to 
contribute. 
Implications 
Our study is relevant for crowdfunding platforms that facilitate crowdfunding for sustainable 
enterprises and sustainable enterprises wishing to run a successful crowdfunding campaign. 
Based on our results, sustainable enterprises should communicate both their expected 
societal impact on their crowdfunding page and their financial return objectives. Financial 
motivations of sustainable enterprise crowdfunders are also relevant for financial regulators, 
who need insight into expectations and the decision-making processes of investors in order 
to know whether certain investors should be protected from potentially uninformed 
investment decisions. Our study indicates that understanding the decisions of sustainable 
enterprise crowdfunders is relevant, especially since many sustainable enterprises are 
innovative and therefore high risk, and may not deliver on their financial promises. For the 
sustainable enterprise subset, crowdfunders need to have enough financial and risk literacy 
to increase the chance that their sustainable crowdfunding delivers on their financial return 
expectations. Similarly, societal value creation as narrated by the entrepreneur may be overly 
optimistic (J. K. Hall et al., 2010). Impact evaluations and experience with sustainable 
enterprise value creation can improve the decision-making of crowdfunders aiming for 
impact.  
Limitations and further research 
Our study has several limitations. Firstly, our study is carried out only in the Netherlands. 
Although the respondents in our dataset also crowdfunded abroad, a next step would be to 
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compare our results to similar studies in other countries or to carry out an international study 
ourselves. Secondly, although anonymous survey research is a standard way of identifying 
motivations of individuals, self-reporting bias could be influencing our results: 
crowdfunders may be tempted to report a higher impact motivation and a lower financial 
motivation than they have in reality. To solve self-reporting bias, a future research approach 
would be to obtain data from crowdfunding platforms that carry out campaigns for both 
sustainable and regular enterprises. This way, we could monitor how success rates are related 
to the financial and societal return promises of regular and sustainable enterprises while 
keeping platform characteristics and investor characteristics constant. It can also add value 
to run controlled and randomized experiments to isolate enterprise characteristics, such as 
different levels and narratives of financial return and societal impact.  
The third limitation is our focus on just two types of motivation. Although this focus is 
chosen deliberately at this stage of the crowdfunding research realm, future research can 
lead to a better understanding of the variety of mechanisms and motivations driving 
sustainable enterprise crowdfunding and how they interact. A relevant long-term goal would 
be to strive for a full evidence-based motivational model for sustainable enterprise 
crowdfunding in a similar way to that which has been carried out for philanthropy (Bekkers 
& Wiepking, 2011).   
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7.6 Appendix 
Coding Protocol Sustainable versus regular enterprises (dummy) 
Look up each project campaign page (if no longer available, the project website) and answer 
the following questions: 
Environmental: Does the project in some way benefit the environment – nature and the 
Earth’s life support systems (For example: saves trees, plants, bees, whales, the ecosystem, 
reduces pollution, makes recycling easier, etc.)? (1=Yes; 0=No) 
Social: Does the project in some way benefit people (For example: improves education, 
fights discrimination, donates to the needy)? (1=Yes; 0=No) 
Code a project as sustainable (1) if the answer is YES to either environmental or social (or 
both). Code the project as regular (0) if the answer to both questions is NO. 
Before coding, browse through the following articles (Kates & Parris, 2003; Shepherd & 
Patzelt, 2011) for an understanding of ‘sustainable’ and for relevant examples.   
What if the description of the project as found online is unclear? 
- If the crowdfunding website is mentioned, and this is a website for only sustainable projects 
(KIVA, lendahand, oneplanetcrowd) code the project as sustainable. 
- If a vague description has been given without the name (i.e. “biological supermarket”), use 
the description to decide whether it is sustainable or not (i.e. biological benefits ecosystems, 
so yes, sustainable) 
- If a vague description has been given but is not sufficient to code it as sustainable or not, 
follow the coding that the respondent gave.  
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8 User crowdfunders: insiders or idealists?11 
 
Abstract 
Crowdfunding has attracted new types of investors into the innovation and entrepreneurial 
finance space, notably users/customers of ventures and investors with societal impact 
motivations. These new investors represent a promising additional source of finance for 
innovation, but their contribution to this investment space depends on the quality of their 
investment decision-making. We know little about how (differently motivated) users may 
overcome the high levels of informational asymmetry that characterizes innovation finance. 
By combining investment, user and survey data on a large, successful crowdfunding 
campaign of a sharing platform, we are able to differentiate between user and non-user 
crowdfunders and their investment motivation. We find evidence of lower information 
search effort for users, which we explain based on their access to local ‘sticky’ information 
about the venture as evidenced in the user innovation literature. Although both users and 
impact-motivated funders have less investment experience – and therefore are ‘new’ 
investors – we find no significantly lower financial literacy than non-user crowdfunders. 
This confirms evidence from the financial literacy literature that investors self-select based 
on their financial literacy. Financially motivated users show higher financially literate than 
both non-users and impact-motivated users, signaling that this group may represent a high 
quality additional source of innovation finance. Our results inform policy development for 
innovation finance and crowdfunding regulation.  
8.1 Introduction 
In the past decades, there has been a paradigm shift from a producer-focused innovation 
process to innovation carried out by users (Baldwin & von Hippel, 2011). The role of users 
in the innovation process has been documented to be large, containing billions of dollars of 
investment by users each year for enhancement of their products (von Hippel, de Jong, & 
Flowers, 2012). Communities of users report to voluntary assist each other in this innovation 
                                                          
11 Joint work with Friedemann Polzin.  
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process due to social norms and enjoyment in this process, rather than for monetary profits 
(Franke & Shah, 2003). The rise of low cost internet technologies has also enabled the rise 
of crowdsourcing (Poetz & Schreier, 2012), open source software (S. S. Levine & Prietula, 
2014) and multi-sided platform ventures (Frenken & Schor, 2017; Hagiu, 2014). Platforms 
enable peer-to-peer sharing, renting and buying of goods and services; within the 
connotation of the ‘sharing economy’ this is expected to deliver not only economic, but also 
environmental and social value (Frenken & Schor, 2017). The influence of users and 
consumers in the innovation process has also expanded to its financing (Brem, Bilgram, & 
Marchuk, 2017; Ordanini et al., 2011). Starting in the reward-based crowdfunding industry 
with pre-ordering, user financiers now engage in debt and equity crowdfunding. 
Surprisingly, the emerging crowdfunding literature and the user innovation literatures have 
only just begun to explore how users fund innovation (Brem et al., 2017).  
We put three perspectives at the forefront of our study. First, we want to understand whether 
user crowdfunders overcome asymmetric information problems in a different way than non-
users. In the crowdfunding literature, the role of social networks in overcoming 
informational asymmetries has been highlighted (Lin et al., 2012; Polzin, Toxopeus, et al., 
2017). Also, research has been conducted on whether crowds are able to select high quality 
projects as compared to experts (Ethan Mollick & Nanda, 2015). Users – in particular of 
online platforms - have first-hand experience with the value proposition and delivery of a 
firm, which allows them to privately assess the quality of the product or service. The user 
innovation literature highlights the development of local “sticky” information of users, 
which can bring them in a good position to innovate (Lüthje, Herstatt, & von Hippel, 2005; 
von Hippel, 1994, 1998).  
Second, we explore different characteristics of users with regard to their absorptive capacity 
-– ability to process new information based on prior experience and expertise (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). The ability to process obtained information is a crucial aspect of ability to 
judge venture quality. Whereas for reward crowdfunders need to be able to judge whether 
producing a product (value delivery) is feasible, for debt/equity crowdfunders, it is necessary 
to judge as well whether the venture will be able to generate profits and survive (value 
capture). It is unclear whether certain users self-select as funders based on their ability to 
judge this venture quality, or that user crowdfunders are simply a less experienced and less 
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financially literate ‘crowd’. We therefore explore differences in financial literacy (van Rooij, 
Lusardi, & Alessie, 2011) and investment experience (Hodge & Pronk, 2006) of user and 
non-user crowdfunders.  
Third, we expect the primary investment motivation of funders to alter efforts and ability to 
overcome informational asymmetries. While financial theory assumes monetary profit to be 
the key driver of investments, the crowdfunding literature has unveiled diverse non-financial 
motivations of funders (Dóci & Vasileiadou, 2015; Gerber & Hui, 2013; Jian & Shin, 2015). 
Some evidence suggests that sustainable/social ventures are particularly successful at 
crowdfunding (Calic & Mosakowski, 2016), suggesting crowdfunder willingness to 
contribute to provision of collective goods through entrepreneurial activity (Olson, 2009; 
Ostrom, 2010a). Also, the institutional setting of crowdfunding – using a threshold and 
providing transparency about behaviour of other funders – may stimulate collective action 
(Cheng & Bernstein, 2014; Toxopeus & Maas, 2018).  
By combining three datasets (investment, user and survey data) on one large, successful 
crowdfunding campaign of a sharing platform venture, we quantitatively answer the 
following research question: Are information search efforts and absorptive capacity of user 
crowdfunders different than for non-user crowdfunders? Using logistic regression analysis, 
we document lower information search effort both for users and impact-motivated funders. 
Also, we find that financially motivated user funders are more financially literate than non-
users, whereas impact motivated user funders have approximately the same financial 
literacy. Both users and impact motivated funders have less investment experience than 
financially motivated non-user crowdfunders. Furthermore, we find a female 
overrepresentation in the impact-motivated user group, with significantly lower financial 
literacy and investment experience.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, we review the relevant literature 
and introduce our theoretical framework (section two). In section three, the research design 
and the data are described. Finally we present the results (section four) which we discuss in 
the light of prior research and we draw conclusions (section five).  
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8.2 Literature review and theoretical framework 
Overcoming informational asymmetries for innovative ventures 
Obtaining access to external finance is often a constraint for start-up enterprises due to lack 
of profitable track record, collateral and their innovative, high risk nature in rapidly changing 
markets (Brancati, 2015; Carpenter & Petersen, 2002b; Engel & Stiebale, 2014; Giudici & 
Paleari, 2000; Gompers & Lerner, 2001). Early stage ventures and their potential financiers 
attempt to overcome informational asymmetries, adverse selection and moral hazard by 
using signaling (Ahlers et al., 2015; Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973, 2002). Ventures lacking 
track record and collateral may use different types of signals to attract investors such as 
patents, prototypes, track record of entrepreneurial team and commitment from other 
investors or clients (Audretsch et al., 2012; Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011).  
In the past decade, crowdfunding has grown to become a significant source of finance for 
early-stage ventures, offering online capital markets that match many - small and large - 
funders to a venture at relatively low cost (Bruton et al., 2015). The research on 
crowdfunding is emerging (for reviews see J. H. Block et al., 2017; McKenny, Allison, 
Ketchen, Short, & Ireland, 2017; Moritz & Block, 2016; Short, Ketchen, McKenny, Allison, 
& Ireland, 2017) and one of the key questions surrounding this new type of capital is if – 
and how – informational asymmetries and moral hazard problems are overcome between 
entrepreneur and investors. This is relevant in particular since the incentive for the individual 
investor to do extensive screening and monitoring on a small investment is low (Agrawal et 
al., 2015; Vismara, 2016). The ability of inexperienced funders to gauge the quality of the 
venture is questionable, and motivations of funders to invest appear more diverse than in 
‘traditional’ finance.  
Crowdfunding platforms offer a wide set of signals to potential investors on the basis of 
which they can judge quality of the venture, such as a video, an investment sheet, a project 
description and insight into amount, identity and comments of other funders (Butticè, 
Colombo, & Wright, 2017; Colombo et al., 2015; Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2015). 
Furthermore, funders may search for other information sources to undertake due diligence 
or use information and advice from their personal social network to make an investment 
decision (Vismara, 2016, 2015). 
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Overcoming informational asymmetries by user funders 
Crowdfunding has led to the entrance of a new type of financier: funders who are familiar 
with a venture as a user or customer (Belleflamme et al., 2014; Ordanini et al., 2011). 
However, it is unclear whether users are able to judge the investment quality of a venture, 
and if so, how. The question of how users are able to overcome informational asymmetries 
has its parallels in the user innovation literature. A key explanation for decentralized user-
driven innovation – as opposed to innovation by experts - is that users possess ‘sticky’ local 
information which lowers innovation cost for users (von Hippel, 1994, 1998). This 
information is ‘local’ because it is obtained in the course of using the product or service, and 
it is ‘sticky’ because of the high costs involved to transfer this information (Lüthje et al., 
2005). Information can be divided into two types: ‘need’ information, often localized with 
users and ‘solution’ information, traditionally assumed to be located with producers but 
found to be located with users as well (Lüthje et al., 2005). This local, sticky information is 
argued to be a key reason why decentralized innovation processes exist. 
The user innovation literature begs the question whether user crowdfunders are also able to 
employ ‘local, sticky’ information to inform investment decisions in innovative enterprises 
which they are familiar with as users. A decision whether to finance a venture can be seen 
as a type of problem-solving, like innovating. The ‘problem’ of selecting high quality 
innovative ventures is large: obtaining access to external finance is often a constraint for 
start-up enterprises due to lack of profitable track record, collateral and their innovative, 
high risk nature in rapidly changing markets (Brancati, 2015; Carpenter & Petersen, 2002b; 
G. Giudici & Paleari, 2000; Gompers & Lerner, 2001). Technological change provides high 
uncertainty for all the economic actors involved in a venture, including investors 
(Mazzucato, 2013).  
In the case of finance for innovation – characterized by high informational asymmetries - 
users could add valuable insight to a financing decision. If we see the financing decision as 
‘problem solving’ this may explain why the locus of the financing decision in some cases 
shifts towards users of innovative ventures (von Hippel, 1994). A tacit understanding of 
venture quality can allow users to invest in ventures which are deemed too uncertain by 
experienced investors who are less familiar with the venture. This is particularly the case for 
platform ventures, since users are creating value themselves and therefore very familiar with 
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the value proposition and its delivery. Furthermore, user crowdfunders all have their own, 
unique experience and therefore understanding of the quality of the venture, which makes 
‘task partitioning’ between user funders reasonable (von Hippel, 1994). Each user is willing 
to contribute to the required funding, but the crowdfunding project will only take place if 
enough users (and non-users) decide that the quality of the venture is high enough to invest, 
which in the aggregate solves the ‘problem’ of whether a venture merits financing, or not.  
H1. User crowdfunders undertake a lower informational search effort than non-users due to 
access to local ‘sticky’ information. 
Absorptive capacity of user crowdfunders 
The quality of the investment decision of users (versus non-users) not only depends on their 
access to information, but also on their capacity to judge the investment quality of a venture. 
Although engagement of users in debt/equity crowdfunding might seem promising due to 
user familiarity with the enterprise and its additionality as a funding source, policymakers 
fear users will underestimate enterprise risks (AFM, 2014). Indeed, users – activated as 
funders – may well be non-professional investors and/or lack the financial literacy to judge 
the quality of their investment (Lusardi & Mitchelli, 2007; van Rooij et al., 2011). Also, user 
familiarity with an enterprise could create a home bias effect in their investment decision 
(Coval & Moskowitz, 1999; Lin & Viswanathan, 2015). However, Mollick and Nanda 
(2015) document that in the context of reward crowdfunding, the quality of projects selected 
by a crowd is similar to the expert selection. Even more interesting, the crowd is willing to 
invest in a larger amount of projects, and additional projects are not of lower quality (Ethan 
Mollick & Nanda, 2015). This suggests additionality of funds without investment quality 
loss, albeit in a theatre context.   
The ability of crowdfunders – both users and non-users - to judge the quality of a venture as 
an investor depends on their absorptive capacity: their ability to ‘recognize the value of new, 
external information, assimilate it and apply it for commercial purposes’ (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990, p128). Importantly, not all users of a venture choose to crowdfund. The 
best positioned user crowdfunders are those who not only possess local ‘sticky’ information 
about the venture but also are able to apply this information as part of an investment decision 
because they are sufficiently financially literate  (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011). In spite of fears 
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that user crowdfunders may invest without enough expertise to judge the quality of their 
investment, we expect that only users who are financially literate enough to judge the 
investment proposal, will invest. This expectation is partly founded on evidence on stock 
market participation which shows that illiterate households self-select out of investing in 
stocks (van Rooij et al., 2011). Based on the absorptive capacity argument, financial literacy 
lowers the costs for user crowdfunders to take a well-informed investment decision.  
Building on this evidence, we expect user crowdfunders to self-select into debt/equity 
crowdfunding based on their financial literacy, and therefore have a similar financial literacy 
than other (non-user) crowdfunders.   
H2. User crowdfunders are just as financially literate as non-user crowdfunders.  
Impact motivation as a moderator of information search effort and financial literacy  
When it comes to debt and equity crowdfunding, financial motivation is assumed to be the 
most important driver for debt/equity crowdfunders to join a campaign (Cholakova & 
Clarysse, 2015). However, both theoretical and empirical work suggests that crowdfunding 
is a successful funding strategy for ventures with a social/sustainable orientation, in 
particular (Allison et al., 2015; Calic & Mosakowski, 2016; Lehner, 2013). This success 
could be partly driven by non-financial motivation of funders. Research shows that 
crowdfunders can be motivated to contribute to the socio-economic goals of entrepreneurial 
activity (Calic & Mosakowski, 2016; Dóci & Vasileiadou, 2015). Crowdfunders obtain 
additional (non-financial) benefits from funding such as helping others, being part of a 
community (‘community benefits’) and supporting a cause (Belleflamme et al., 2014; Gerber 
& Hui, 2013). In an empirical study comparing reward and equity crowdfunding, Cholakova 
& Clarysse (2015) find that extrinsic motivation (receiving a reward/product or financial 
payoff) is the main driver of crowdfunder participation, rather than intrinsic factors (such as 
supporting a cause or helping others). Localized social capital and local altruism is found to 
drive investment in reward-based crowdfunding campaigns (Giudici et al., 2017). In the 
context of decentralized renewable energy investments, crowdfunders have been found to 
invest both for ‘gain’ (obtaining lower energy prices)  as well as for normative 
(environmental) reasons (Dóci & Vasileiadou, 2015).   
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If the main investment motive of some crowdfunders is to deliver societal benefits 
(‘impact’), we expect this to lower their information search efforts as opposed to (primarily) 
financially motivated crowdfunders. Other types of information are relevant to judge venture 
quality if the investment objective is societal impact: socially/environmentally motivated 
investors apply multiple ‘screens’ for their investments (Borgers & Pownall, 2014). 
Knowing what the societal impact objective is important information to judge the 
investment, as well as evidence on whether this objective can be reached with the proposed 
strategy.  
Also, information about the expected impact of an investment is often hard to obtain since - 
unlike financial return – societal impact is not automatically reported by ventures (Toxopeus 
et al., 2015). Although various methods exist to measure social impact (Maas & Liket, 2011), 
it is difficult to predict the potential impact of a certain investment if this specific impact has 
not been measured in the past. We therefore expect impact motivated crowdfunders to proxy 
for expected impact of their investment by paying attention to the (often anecdotal) 
narrative/storytelling of the venture (Downing, 2005) as communicated in the crowdfunding 
campaign. For example, many follow the sustainable narrative of sharing platforms, whereas 
their realized impact is often still unknown (Frenken & Schor, 2017).  
Finally, impact motivated funders may more easily be content with the information provided 
by the venture. The first reason for this is that the sustainable orientation of the venture may 
increase trust in the venture – reducing fears of moral hazard (Hörisch, 2015). A second 
reason for decreased information search is that impact motivated funders may engage in the 
investment-equivalent of warm-glow giving (Andreoni, 1990). Third, there could be an 
interaction effect between impact-motivated funders and their non-professional investor 
‘status’: non-professional investors are more likely to act on information given to them - 
unlike professional investors with predefined information needs (Hodge & Pronk, 2006). 
We expect impact motivation to have a negative relationship with information search effort 
and also impact motivation to be unevenly distributed between users and non-users. 
Users/consumers of sustainable enterprises may be part of social movements trying to create 
(sustainable) cultural change (Akemu, Whiteman, & Kennedy, 2016; Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 
2000) whereas non-users are more likely to invest for financial reasons. If user crowdfunders 
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are more often impact-motivated than non-users, impact motivation could drive part of the 
relationship between usership on the one hand and information search on the other. This 
means we expect there to not only be a direct effect from impact motivation on information 
search effort but also a positive interaction effect between impact motivation and user level. 
This makes impact motivation a variable which specifies the relationship between user level 
and information search effort (Sharma et al., 1981). Specification variables can be classified 
in one of four dimensions, based on whether they predict the dependent (criterion) or 
independent (predictor) variable and whether they interact with the predictor variable 
(Sharma et al., 1981). Based on this specification typology, we expect impact-motivation to 
be a quasi-moderator of the negative relationship between user level and information search 
effort (H3).  
H3 Impact motivation moderates the relationship between user level and information search 
effort (impact-motivated user funders will carry out lower information search efforts than 
financially motivated user funders) 
Similarly, we expect impact-motivated users to be less financially literate than financially 
motivated users. Impact motivated users will accept a lower threshold of their own financial 
literacy, because their investment objective is different. Financially motivated users, 
however, we expect to be more critical of their own ability to judge the quality of a venture. 
We therefore expect impact motivation to also moderate the relationship between usership 
and financial literacy (H4): 
 H4 Impact motivation moderates the relationship between user level and financial literacy 
(impact-motivated user funders will be less financially literate than financially motivated 
user funders) 
8.3 Methodology 
Research context 
As a research context we choose to study a crowdfunding campaign carried out by a sharing 
platform venture for in-depth analysis. Online sharing via platforms is defined as ‘consumers 
granting each other temporary access to under-utilized physical assets, possibly for money’ 
(Frenken & Schor, 2017). Much of the value created in (sharing) platforms is delivered by 
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users, themselves. They offer goods, take part in a market place and provide ratings to lower 
risks of transacting with unknown peers. However, in successful platforms, much of the 
value is captured by the platform itself, because it often obtains a natural monopoly due to 
strong network externalities (Frenken & Schor, 2017). Because of questionable 
distributional effects, an alternative proposed by (Frenken & Schor, 2017) is to distribute 
ownership of platforms to users through crowdfunding (Scholz, 2014). This could bring 
value creation in line with value capture (Lepak, Smith, & Taylor, 2007). However, 
considering the high-risk nature of such an investment (due to network externalities that 
define a platform’s success) informational asymmetries are typically large. The importance 
of online platform ventures and their user funding are expected to grow further in the coming 
decades due to evolving online technologies. The high informational asymmetries, large 
involvement of users and the expected further growth of platform ventures makes it a 
suitable case to test our hypotheses.  
We took a successful crowdfunding campaign (2016) carried out by a Dutch sharing 
platform called ‘Peerby’. Peerby is a platform venture that exists since 2011 which allows 
neighbours to borrow goods from each other so that they do not have to buy it, which can 
lead to a higher resource-efficiency (Martin, 2016). Peerby is meant for sharing goods 
between citizens that often lie idle (spare capacity) such as screwdrivers, ladders and/or party 
tables. After piloting a new rental service between neighbours in a few large Dutch cities, 
the Peerby management decided to run a crowdfunding campaign to expand internationally 
with their rental service called ’PeerbyGo’. The campaign targeted a minimum of €300.000 
and a maximum of €1,5 mln in funding (see Figure 2 in the appendix for a screenshot of the 
campaign website). In its crowdfunding campaign, Peerby offered funders convertible debt12 
starting at €250, for an interest rate of 6% (8% from €10.000 upwards). Debtors have the 
possibility to convert their loans into equity after four years.13  
                                                          
12 A convertible bond is a fixed-rate bond that may, at the option of the investor, be converted into the equity of 
the borrower or its parent. The price at which the bond is convertible into equity is set at the time of issue and 
typically will be at a premium to the market value of the equity at the time of issue (IMF, 2003) 
13 It was also possible to fund €50 in return for vouchers for the rental service PeerbyGo as a form of reward 
crowdfunding but almost no-one did.  
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Before opening the campaign14 to the public, Peerby raised €160.000 from its existing 
investors, mostly informal investors and venture capitalists. From 12th of April 2016 
onwards, existing investors from OnePlanetCrowd15 were allowed to fund. Within a few 
days the campaign opened up to the larger crowd, including the Peerby community 
(approximately 80.000 members). Between 15 – 22 April, 1055 crowdfunders joined the 
campaign for a total funding of €2 mn. Of these 1055 funders, 586 were members of Peerby 
before the campaign and 221 had used Peerby’s sharing platform (the other members 
received updates but had not used the service). 
Research design and data 
To test our hypotheses, we need to be able to clearly distinguish user levels of an venture 
financed by crowdfunding (Gamble, Brennan, & McAdam, 2016; Ordanini et al., 2011). We 
choose for a platform venture since users have an active role in these types of ventures, since 
they are part of the value delivery, and here we are also able to differentiate between different 
levels of use. We collected three different datasets concerning the crowdfunding campaign 
of Peerby. First, we obtained the investment data of this campaign (amount, timing of 
investment in relation to other investors). Secondly, we obtained information about the 
usership for each investor. This included if they were a member of Peerby, and if so, whether 
they had used the platform to date and how often. Third, we sent all investors a survey within 
a few weeks of the campaign, which was completed by almost half of all investors (see 
appendix 1). To match the three datasets we used exact email address matches and unique 
combinations of postal codes and amounts. We found 421 matches between all three datasets 
for our main variables. 
Full model 
From our hypotheses we derive an analytical model which we test statistically (Figure 8-1). 
User crowdfunders are hypothesized to exert lower information search efforts due to their 
access to local ‘sticky’ information about the venture (H1). Furthermore, user crowdfunders 
                                                          
14 For the project website of the Peerby campaign, see: www.oneplanetcrowd.com/en/project/138624/description 
15 https://www.oneplanetcrowd.nl. OnePlanetCrowd is a crowdfunding platform geared towards sustainable 
enterprises and facilitates reward, debt and equity (subordinated debt) crowdfunding campaigns.  
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are expected to be just as financially literate (H2) than non-user crowdfunders due to self-
selection based on the absorptive capacity argument. We expect these relationships to be 
moderated by the motivation of funders: impact motivated funders are expected to carry out 
a lower information search effort and have a lower financial literacy. 
 
Figure 8-1 Analytical model 
Dependent variables 
Our first dependent variable aims to improve our understanding of informational search 
costs of user (versus non-user) crowdfunders. Although it is difficult to observe whether 
users have local ‘sticky’ information that lowers their information search costs, we are able 
to measure their information search efforts which are expected to be lower due to their access 
to user-based information. Information search effort was operationalised by asking for the 
extent to which investors took the effort to look for information themselves (Polzin, 
Toxopeus, et al., 2017): (‘Did you look for other information outside the crowdfunding 
website before making your investment decision?’ Yes/No). Searching for information 
yourself, instead of only relying on the information that the enterprise/platform provides on 
the crowdfunding website, indicates higher information search efforts. 
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Second, financial literacy gives an indication of the ability (absorptive capacity) of the 
funder to process the information obtained to make a well-informed investment decision 
(van Rooij et al., 2011). We select two existing financial literacy questions (Lusardi & 
Mitchell, 2011; van Rooij et al., 2011) which measure understanding of compound interest 
rates and portfolio diversification (see survey questions in appendix). 
Independent variable 
In order to measure user level of crowdfunders in Peerby, we deploy data on the actual usage 
of Peerby’s services. There are different ways in which someone can use Peerby. The type 
of interactions we included as a ‘use’ are: the number of times a person sent out a sharing 
request; the number of times a person answered ‘yes’ to a sharing request of someone else; 
number of times person answered ‘yes, but’ to a sharing request of someone else. This 
unique empirical insight into user levels goes beyond existing work looking at user dynamics 
in crowdfunding campaigns (Giudici et al., 2017; Ordanini et al., 2011). We used this data 
to create a user level variable: 0=not a member/user, 1=a member but never used the service; 
2= a user who at least once answered positively to a request or placed a request; everything 
above 2= natural log of number of times person actually used Peerby’s services. We 
constructed the scale in these steps because we expect familiarity with the enterprise to 
increase once registered as a member (insight into value proposition), to increase drastically 
after using it at least once (insight into the value delivery of the enterprise) and to further 
increase after multiple use, but that familiarity increases only marginally after multiple uses. 
Moderating variable 
The a priori motivation to crowdfund in the enterprise Peerby is assumed to moderate the 
relationships between user levels and information search effort/financial literacy. Funding 
motivation may be primarily driven by societal impact or financial return (Calic & 
Mosakowski, 2016). To create this moderating variable we use the variable ‘_finvssocial’ 
where respondents were asked to choose their main motivation of the two (What was more 
important in your investment decision: financial or societal return? 0=financial 1=don’t 
know, 2=societal return). In order to distinguish two subgroups, we removed observations 
that answered “I don’t know” (33 observations), which leaves us with a dummy variable as 
a moderator.  
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Control variables 
To rule out other explanations besides usership that affect information search effort and 
financial literacy of (non-)user crowdfunders we add controls. Firstly, the amount 
(ln_invamount) impacts dependent variables significantly (Polzin, Toxopeus, et al., 2017; 
Vismara, 2016) as higher investments are associated with better information search and 
higher financial literacy. We control for income since this affects the relative size of the 
investment for the individual investor in relation to their wealth/portfolio. Investment timing 
(whether they were the first or the 1045th investor) was included to control for potential 
herding effects (Hott, 2009; Vismara, 2016). Furthermore, risk aversion is included as 
control using a basic risk aversion survey question (Kahneman & Tversky, 2012) because 
this is expected to affect information search effort. Investment experience influences the way 
crowdfunders perceive risks and gather information (Hodge & Pronk, 2006; Polzin, 
Toxopeus, et al., 2017; Vismara, 2016). We cumulate self-reported investment experience: 
in the stock market, as informal investors and in crowdfunding (all measured on a 5-point 
Likert scale, see survey questions in appendix 1) (Chan & Parhankangas, 2017; Polzin, 
Toxopeus, et al., 2017). We include gender and age since both are related to financial literacy 
(Lusardi & Mitchell, 2008) and investment experience (Barber & Odean, 2001; Korniotis & 
Kumar, 2011) and are used as standard control variables in crowdfunding research (E. 
Mollick, 2014; Polzin, Toxopeus, et al., 2017).  
8.4 Results 
After conducting a thorough descriptive analysis on our main and control variables (Table 
8-1) we ran pairwise correlations (Table 8-4, appendix). Based on these results we executed 
(ordinal) logistic regression analyses (Table 8-2). 
Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics (Table 8-1) give an overview of our main and control variables. 
This reveals that on average, respondents perceive their investment in Peerby as somewhat 
or quite risky. On the other hand, less than half of our sample searched for information that 
could inform their investment in Peerby outside of the information provided on the 
crowdfunding platform. Our main variable of interest shows that 63% of our respondents 
are registered members of Peerby, whereas 50% have used Peerby at least once. Whereas on 
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the average, users used Peerby 20 times, the distribution is skewed due to some intense users. 
The median use is 6 times (excluding the non-users). We find that respondents are evenly 
split between having financial return or societal impact as the more important motivation to 
invest in Peerby. Investment amounts range between the minimum of €250 and €40.000 with 
an average slightly above €2000. Due to the skewed distribution we converted this into a 
logarithmic scale. 12% of the funders had no investment experience. Our sample is biased 
towards male investors (74%). 74% of the respondents are between 25 and 54 years old, in 
line with empirical findings in other studies (Polzin, Toxopeus, et al., 2017; van der Lijn et 
al., 2016). 
Table 8-1 Descriptive statistics of main variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Information search effort 388 0,39 0,49 0 1 
Financial literacy 321 1,58 0,64 0 2 
Impact motivation 387 1,02 1,00 0 2 
User level 388 2,07 2,10 0 8,05 
Ln Invested amount 379 6,68 1,27 3,91 10,60 
Income 336 3,40 1,20 1 6 
Investment experience 379 4,85 3,43 0 15 
Investment timing 388 522 298 2 1045 
Risk aversion 388 0,42 0,49 0 1 
Gender 388 0,24 0,43 0 1 
Age 388 3,46 1,28 1 6 
 
The pairwise correlation analysis (Table 8-4, appendix) indicates that users have a lower 
likelihood of doing an extensive information search before investing and have a similar 
financial literacy as non-users. Also, increased user levels are significantly correlated with 
higher impact motivation (as opposed to financial motivation). Users are more often female, 
have lower investment experience, are more risk averse and invested slightly later in the 
campaign than non-users.  
  
Chapter 8 
192 
Determinants of information search and financial literacy of user crowdfunders 
We carry out a logistic regression to test our information search hypothesis as well as our 
financial literacy hypothesis (Hair, 2010; Kutner et al., 2005). Our results (Table 8-2) show 
support for our first hypothesis: higher user levels are significantly related to lower 
information search levels (H1). We find support for our second hypothesis that no significant 
differences in financial literacy exist between users and non-users; also the coefficient is 
small (0.05) (H2).  
Table 8-2 Full model results, without and with moderation tests (H1-4) 
 
Next, we test for an interaction effect of impact motivation on the relationship between user 
level on the one hand and information search / financial literacy on the other (Brambor, 
Clark, & Golder, 2006; Sharma et al., 1981). To test for moderation, we carry out moderated 
regression analysis (Sharma et al., 1981). We first add impact motivation as a separate 
H1 H3 H2 H4
VARIABLES information search information search financial literacy financial literacy
user level -0.160*** -0.185** 0.0582 0.227*
(0.0620) (0.0931) (0.0689) (0.122)
impact motivation -0.504*** 0.345
(0.178) (0.216)
impact mot*user level 0.0730 -0.282*
(interaction term) (0.128) (0.150)
invested amount 0.347*** 0.325*** 0.0407 0.0381
(0.105) (0.107) (0.129) (0.133)
Income -0.187 -0.208* 0.177 0.158
(0.114) (0.116) (0.149) (0.151)
Investment experience 0.0337 0.0243 0.168*** 0.186***
(0.0397) (0.0409) (0.0539) (0.0550)
Investment timing 0.000330 0.000423 -0.000606 -0.000669
(0.000418) (0.000432) (0.000470) (0.000483)
Risk aversion 0.100 0.152 -0.507* -0.497*
(0.258) (0.267) (0.292) (0.300)
Gender -0.337 -0.253 -1.302*** -1.229***
(0.320) (0.330) (0.328) (0.332)
Age -0.362*** -0.322*** 0.0424 0.0505
(0.103) (0.105) (0.114) (0.116)
Constant -0.935 -0.425 -2.052** -1.756
(0.789) (0.825) (1.018) (1.078)
R-squared 0.0838 0.1118 0.1608 0.1684
Observations 330 329 273 272
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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predictor variable (without interaction variable), and then add it as a moderating variable to 
test for interaction effects. 
Our results show that impact motivation has a strong negative relationship with information 
search effort but we find no interaction effect (H3): the relationships between user level and 
impact motivation on the one hand and information search on the other, are independent.  
Next, we carry out an interaction analysis between user level and impact motivation with 
financial literacy as a dependent variable. Although user level does not relate to financial 
literacy and impact motivation directly, we find a significant interaction effect between the 
two variables (H4). When we include this interaction term, we find that financially motivated 
users are on average more financially literate than non-users and impact motivated users are 
about as financially literate as non-users (the coefficients of the direct effect and the 
interaction effect approximately cancel each other out).  
Control variables 
Higher invested amounts are related to higher information search effort. Older funders and 
funders with a higher reported income carry out a lower information search effort, which 
could be explained by higher wealth: the investment may represent a less significant share 
of their investment portfolio. Investment experience and financially literacy are positively 
related whereas risk aversion is negatively related to financial literacy. Women are 
significantly less financially literate (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2008) and have less investment 
experience (Barber & Odean, 2001). 
Robustness checks 
To rule out correlations between our independent variables influencing the variance of our 
dependent variable (multi-collinearity) a variance-inflation factor test was carried out 
(Kutner et al., 2005). Individual values of maximum 1.32 and an average VIF of 1.19 remain 
below the suggested value 2 and the critical value of 5.  
To further assess the robustness of our analysis, we repeat the analysis using different 
measures for our main variables. We generate an alternative user level variable from the 
survey data (Table 8-5 in appendix). Respondents self-reported whether they were involved 
in a sharing transaction on Peerby. This data is different from the main user level variable in 
two ways: (1) it is self-reported (and therefore prone to mistakes) but (2) it gives us insight 
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into successful transactions, whether the user data tells us how often Peerby members have 
attempted a sharing transaction. All Peerby member respondents were asked whether (and 
how often) they lent out or borrowed something on the Peerby platform (lentout, borrowed). 
We used this to create an alternative variable for Peerby user level ‘user_sur’ which 
measures the number of self-reported transactions, both borrowing and lending to others). 
Our direct results for information search effort are robust to this alternative ‘user level’ 
variable: we find significant negative coefficients for both user level and impact motivation 
with information search effort. However, in the interaction model, the significance of both 
user level and impact motivation disappears, even though the coefficient remains large. For 
financial literacy, we find no significant differences for user level and impact motivation, 
which is the same as in our main model, but we no longer find an interaction effect (that 
financially motivated users are more financially literate).  
As a second alternative variable, we use a dummy variable obtained from the user data 
(Table 8-6 in appendix), taking a value of 1 if a funder has attempted to use Peerby at least 
once and a value of 0 if this is not the case (this dummy does not distinguish between 
members and non-members). We find that the coefficient in relation to information search 
effort remains negative but it is no longer significant. This suggests that variations in user 
level help explain information search effort. We do find a significant interaction effect with 
financial literacy: financially motivated users are more financially literate than non-users, 
impact-motivated users are less financially literate than non-users. This is in line with our 
previous result.  
As an alternative variable to test the relationship between user level and information search 
effort we use the response to the question whether funders looked at the investment sheet, 
(included on the crowdfunding campaign website in a separate tab as a PDF) to make their 
investment decision (Table 8-7 in appendix). The investment sheet is part of the 
crowdfunding campaign website and contains organisational, strategic and financial 
information about the venture Peerby. Funders need to exert more effort to read the 
investment sheet than to read the – highly available and easy to process – project description 
and video. Therefore we use this dummy variable (yes/no) as a proxy for information search. 
We find no significant differences between user levels and their propensity to read the 
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investment sheet of the firm. We do find that financially motivated funders more often report 
to have read the investment sheet than impact motivated funders.  
As an alternative measure for absorptive capacity, we use investment experience (now a 
control variable). This leads to slightly different results (Table 8-7 in appendix): both users 
and impact motivated funders have less investment experience, but we do not find an 
interaction effect between them. This gives additional insight into the absorptive capacity of 
users and impact motivated funders: although on average, financial literacy of users is the 
same as non-users, their investment experience is significantly lower. Furthermore, 
financially motivated users are more financially literate but do not have more investment 
experience than financially motivated non-user funders.  
8.5 Discussion and conclusions 
Users represent new sources of risk-carrying capacity for (impact-driven) innovation finance 
but at the same time their involvement in crowdfunding fuels concerns of uninformed 
investment decision-making. Therefore the main research question guiding our inquiry was: 
Are information search efforts and absorptive capacity of user crowdfunders different than 
for non-user crowdfunders? We also investigate the moderating role of impact motivation 
versus financial motivation as a primary reason to invest for both user and non-user 
crowdfunders. To analyse these questions empirically, we undertook an in-depth analysis of 
a successful crowdfunding campaign carried out by a sharing platform for neighbours in the 
Netherlands (Peerby). 
By combining investment, user and survey data on this large campaign, we find that users 
put in lower information search efforts than non-users. Also, impact motivated funders put 
in significantly lower information search effort, independent of whether they are a user. 
Financially motivated users are on average more financially literate but have less investment 
experience than non-users; impact motivated users are less financially literate and have less 
investment experience than non-users. Our results indicate that users and impact motivated 
crowdfunders both represent newer –less experienced - investor groups, with variations in 
investment decision quality. Crowdfunders who are primarily impact motivated display 
lower financial literacy and lower investment experience, which could be explained by the 
lower importance of financial return. Our results are summarized in Table 8-3. 
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Table 8-3 Matrix of crowdfunder investment decision making characteristics 
 
The rise of crowdfunding as a source of financing for start-up ventures has raised the 
question  how crowdfunders overcome informational asymmetries (Ahlers et al., 2015; Lin 
et al., 2012; Polzin, Toxopeus, et al., 2017; Vismara, 2016). Of particular interest are new, 
non-professional investors, recruited from a venture’s own users (Brem et al., 2017; 
Ordanini et al., 2011) and/or investing with different motivations (Allison et al., 2015; Calic 
& Mosakowski, 2016). There is little research on user funding which corresponds to scarce 
insight into ‘embedded’ investment decisions (Uzzi, 1999) of users.  
The scarce research that there is to date focuses on how crowdfunding facilitates users to 
become entrepreneurs (Brem et al., 2017). We use unique empirical data to shed light on the 
quality of investment decisions by users versus non-users, with a focus on overcoming 
informational asymmetries. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to quantitatively 
integrate insights from the user innovation literature into crowdfunding research to attempt 
to explain how user crowdfunders overcome informational asymmetries differently. We find 
that users exert lower information search effort than non-users, which could indicate their 
use of proprietary local  ‘sticky’ information obtained as venture user (Lüthje et al., 2005; 
von Hippel, 1994, 1998).  
We investigate the absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) of users by measuring 
their financial literacy and (alternatively) investment experience. We find no significant 
difference between financial literacy of user and non-user crowdfunders which is in line with 
research showing that investors self-select into equity investment based on their financial 
literacy (van Rooij et al., 2011). However, users have less investment experience than non-
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users, which suggests that users are a ‘new’ investor group which self-selects based on its 
absorptive capacity.  
Another defining characteristic of crowdfunders are their diverse motivations to invest in 
comparison to traditional financial markets. Research suggests crowdfunders may be more 
keen on investing in sustainable/social enterprises than regular enterprises due to affinity 
with a venture’s socio-economic goals (Calic & Mosakowski, 2016; Hörisch, 2015; Lehner, 
2013). However there has been little effort undertaken to understand how motivation for 
‘impact’ versus financial return relates to crowdfunder investment decision making. We 
pioneer this literature by showing that funders with an impact motivation – both users and 
non-users - put in a significantly lower information search effort than funders who are 
motivated primarily by financial return. This confirms our expectations from the literature 
based on several arguments. First, we expect information about expected impact of a 
sustainable venture to be more difficult to obtain (Frenken & Schor, 2017), leading 
crowdfunders to ‘proxy’ for impact using the narrative provided by the venture itself 
(Downing, 2005). Second, impact-motivated funders have different ‘screens’ (Borgers & 
Pownall, 2014) and based on these could be more satisfied with the information provided on 
the crowdfunding website (video, description) which lowers their information search effort, 
as well. Third, the sustainable orientation of a venture may increase trust/lower fears of 
moral hazard, therefore lowering information search efforts (Hörisch, 2015). Finally, impact 
motivated funders may be primarily interested in the ‘warm glow’ effect of their investment 
rather than realisation of impact, which makes overcoming informational asymmetries – and 
information search - less important (Allison et al., 2013; Andreoni, 1990).   
As an additional result, we find that female investors display lower financial literacy 
(Lusardi & Mitchell, 2008) and have less investment experience (Barber & Odean, 2001). 
Females are overrepresented among both user and impact-motivated crowdfunders in our 
study; in other words, more ‘new’ investors in this crowdfunding population are women.  
Policy implications 
Based on our findings, investment decision making by crowdfunders with different 
characteristics can be better understood to inform policy and regulation. Policy makers 
worry that new, less experienced investor groups entering into debt/equity investing may not 
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be capable of assessing the risks they are taking (AFM, 2014). Our results confirm their 
lower investment experience but at the same time paint a nuanced picture of their financial 
literacy. In general, users that choose to crowdfund do not appear less financially literate. 
Financially motivated user crowdfunders are even more financially literate than non-users. 
Both users and impact-motivated funders exert lower information effort, something we 
expect to be due to usage of local information but this mechanism we cannot observe 
directly. While more research is needed, the direction that this study guides policymakers 
towards is recognition and inclusion of diverse motivations of investing into consumer 
(investment) protection regulatory frameworks. While crowdfunders need to be monitored 
with regard to their ability to judge the quality of an enterprise, this monitoring should 
recognize both financial and societal impact goals of crowdfunders. Regulators could 
develop free online education for crowdfunders how to screen (high risk) crowdfunding 
investments, including how to tailor their screening to their investment goals.  
Users and impact-motivated funders represent new sources of innovation finance, thereby 
helping overcome a funding gap. From a macro-perspective, increased finance for 
innovation can lead to economic growth (King & Levine, 1993). However, crowds need to 
be able to select high quality projects (Mollick & Nanda, 2015), both from a financial and 
societal impact perspective. The challenge for policy makers lies in further understanding 
the decision-making of new investor groups and facilitating these groups to enter the field 
wisely, and protecting them from excessive risk-taking.  
In particular impact-motivated investors may need more guidance in their investment 
decision-making. They show a lower information search effort, lower financial literacy and 
lower investment experience. There appears to be a large inflow of impact-motivated female 
funders with this profile. One implication could be that this group has lower financial return 
expectations (they invest lower amounts). At the same time, this group of retail investors 
may need guidance on how to invest smartly based on their personal preferences, because 
enterprises that are not able to sustain themselves financially will have difficulty to reach 
their societal goals, as well. Guidance on how to invest for societal impact in crowdfunding 
is currently missing, leading crowdfunders to rely on crowdfunding website descriptions. 
Furthermore, just like financial default rates in debt/equity crowdfunding are still opaque, 
societal impact of sustainable/social enterprises often remains unevaluated. The 
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development of methods to fill this gap is one of our main policy recommendations, to allow 
for using personal (impact) preferences smartly as a basis for investment decisions.  
Limitations and further research 
Our study has several limitations. Firstly, while the use of only one case is helpful to keep 
campaign and venture characteristics constant, it limits the transferability of our results to 
other crowdfunding investments. Therefore further research should build data on a larger set 
of crowdfunding campaigns, which can be compared using project fixed effects. Second, we 
do not have data on users that choose not to crowdfund, meaning that we cannot say anything 
about how the user crowdfunders relate to user non-crowdfunders in terms of absorptive 
capacity (financial literacy / investment experience). Third, the campaign was carried out 
using convertible debt, a financial tool which is quite uncommon in crowdfunding up to date 
(but its use is growing in the Netherlands). Convertible debt is a form of equity but also 
allows investors to choose not to convert, which means it can also be a debt agreement in 
the end. We expect there to be differences in information search effort and absorptive 
capacity of crowdfunders between debt and equity due to differences in risk levels. Therefore 
further research should make sure equity, debt and convertible debt campaigns are studied 
to complement our understanding of investment decision making of (user) crowdfunders. 
Finally, we need to develop measures that allow us to better understand the mechanisms 
behind differences in information search effort, which we are not able to confirm with our 
current instruments. 
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8.6 Appendix  
 
Figure 8-2 Screenshot of Peerby’s campaign website (during campaign) 
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Table 8-5 User level: survey data 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
User_survey -0.206*** -0.180** -0.107 -0.0700 -0.0872 -0.127
(0.0715) (0.0732) (0.100) (0.0762) (0.0771) (0.121)
Impact motivation -0.417*** -0.280 0.0912 0.0206
(0.127) (0.181) (0.153) (0.227)
User_survey*impact motivation -0.156 0.0664
(0.148) (0.158)
Invested amount 0.378*** 0.351*** 0.346*** 0.0400 0.0467 0.0536
(0.106) (0.107) (0.107) (0.129) (0.133) (0.134)
Income -0.223* -0.239** -0.233** 0.186 0.167 0.162
(0.115) (0.116) (0.116) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150)
Investment experience 0.0350 0.0285 0.0330 0.160*** 0.171*** 0.169***
(0.0396) (0.0405) (0.0407) (0.0541) (0.0548) (0.0551)
Investment timing 0.000324 0.000371 0.000343 -0.000570 -0.000468 -0.000452
(0.000418) (0.000427) (0.000429) (0.000470) (0.000473) (0.000475)
Risk aversion 0.0915 0.158 0.182 -0.448 -0.521* -0.531*
(0.258) (0.265) (0.266) (0.291) (0.295) (0.296)
Gender -0.399 -0.287 -0.277 -1.281*** -1.261*** -1.265***
(0.321) (0.328) (0.329) (0.326) (0.330) (0.330)
Age -0.351*** -0.310*** -0.311*** 0.0558 0.0608 0.0635
(0.103) (0.105) (0.104) (0.115) (0.116) (0.117)
R-squared 0.0881 0.1130 0.1156 0.1610 0.1619 0.1623
Observations 330 329 329 273 272 272
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Information search effort Financial literacy
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Table 8-6 User level: dummy variable 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
User dummy (pbuserdum) -0.374 -0.351 -0.557 0.220 0.169 0.938**
(0.249) (0.254) (0.347) (0.301) (0.303) (0.456)
Impact motivation -0.451*** -0.561*** 0.0638 0.418*
(0.125) (0.178) (0.151) (0.218)
User dummy*impact motivation 0.444 -1.399**
(0.505) (0.608)
Invested amount 0.351*** 0.327*** 0.330*** 0.0437 0.0412 0.0310
(0.104) (0.106) (0.107) (0.129) (0.132) (0.133)
Income -0.183 -0.203* -0.206* 0.170 0.155 0.156
(0.114) (0.116) (0.116) (0.151) (0.151) (0.153)
Investment experience 0.0409 0.0324 0.0308 0.168*** 0.178*** 0.182***
(0.0394) (0.0405) (0.0406) (0.0541) (0.0548) (0.0550)
Investment timing 0.000286 0.000344 0.000397 -0.000620 -0.000520 -0.000694
(0.000414) (0.000425) (0.000430) (0.000472) (0.000475) (0.000487)
Risk aversion 0.0795 0.166 0.152 -0.510* -0.569* -0.516*
(0.257) (0.264) (0.265) (0.294) (0.298) (0.302)
Gender -0.342 -0.237 -0.274 -1.308*** -1.273*** -1.196***
(0.318) (0.327) (0.329) (0.329) (0.333) (0.336)
Age -0.365*** -0.321*** -0.328*** 0.0407 0.0470 0.0593
(0.103) (0.105) (0.106) (0.115) (0.116) (0.117)
R-squared 0.0732 0.1030 0.1048 0.1603 0.1597 0.1722
Observations 330 329 329 273 272 272
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Information search effort Financial literacy
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Table 8-7 Alternative variable information search effort: investment sheet 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3)
User level 0.0419 0.0566 -0.139
(0.0604) (0.0617) (0.0973)
Impact motivation -0.315** -0.653***
(0.126) (0.186)
User level*impact motivation 0.325**
(0.127)
Invested amount 0.605*** 0.585*** 0.597***
(0.120) (0.120) (0.122)
Imcome 0.0299 0.0123 0.0154
(0.114) (0.116) (0.117)
Investment experience 0.0614 0.0569 0.0486
(0.0396) (0.0402) (0.0409)
Investment timing 0.000790* 0.000841** 0.00102**
(0.000416) (0.000423) (0.000434)
Risk aversion -0.251 -0.201 -0.297
(0.251) (0.256) (0.262)
Gender 0.263 0.358 0.292
(0.308) (0.315) (0.318)
Age -0.451*** -0.413*** -0.433***
(0.105) (0.106) (0.108)
R-squared 0,109 0,1225 0,1372
Observations 330 329 329
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Investment sheet
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Table 8-8 Absorptive capacity: investment experience 
 
  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
User level -0.159*** -0.146*** -0.234***
(0.0476) (0.0479) (0.0760)
Impact motivation -0.165 -0.315**
(0.101) (0.142)
Impact motivation*user level 0.146
(0.0977)
Ln invested amount 0.0849 0.0768 0.0717
(0.0819) (0.0823) (0.0823)
Income 0.360*** 0.358*** 0.358***
(0.0898) (0.0896) (0.0901)
Investment timing -0.00104*** -0.00108*** -0.000991***
(0.000339) (0.000339) (0.000345)
Risk aversion -0.137 -0.0940 -0.131
(0.208) (0.208) (0.210)
Gender -1.108*** -1.112*** -1.132***
(0.250) (0.252) (0.253)
Age 0.137* 0.149* 0.147*
(0.0804) (0.0810) (0.0810)
R-squared 0.0554 0.0577 0.0591
Observations 330 329 329
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Investment experience
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9 Conclusion 
This dissertation set out to address the research question: What factors enable enterprise 
access to finance for sustainable innovation? To address this question, both conceptual and 
empirical work were undertaken. The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework developed by Ostrom (2010a) was used to map the institutional setting of finance 
for sustainable innovation. Building on the innovation finance literature, principal-agent 
theory and collective action theory, three important market failures facing sustainable 
innovation finance were identified (see also Figure 1-1 in the introduction). First, credit 
rationing occurs for innovation finance due to principal-agent problems (adverse selection, 
moral hazard and informational asymmetries), in particular in the case of innovation finance 
due to lack of track record and collateral (B. H. Hall, 2010). Second, a market failure occurs 
due to the public good nature of innovation leading to knowledge externalities: investment 
into knowledge is easily spread to other sectors/firms and its value is very uncertain due to 
high failure rates (Mazzucato, 2013). Third, environmental/social (‘positive’) externalities 
arise in the context of sustainable innovation. While this is indeed the objective of 
sustainable innovation, for financiers it raises the question whether they will capture enough 
financial value from the environmental/social value that is created. In the context of eco-
innovation the simultaneous occurrence of these externality problems has been referred to 
as the double externality problem (Faber & Frenken, 2009; Rennings, 2000).  
 
Figure 9-1 Three enablers of sustainable innovation finance per theoretical lens 
In this dissertation, banks and crowdfunding platforms were studied because these financial 
intermediaries can realistically provide finance for sustainable innovation; they are the 
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largest and the fastest growing providers of entrepreneurial finance, respectively. In the 
course of this dissertation, for each of the two theoretical lenses (principal agent and 
collective action) three main enablers for sustainable innovation finance were identified 
(Figure 9-1). These enablers were derived conceptually (Ch 4&5) and studied empirically 
from different angles (Ch 5-8). 
9.1 Lens 1: Overcoming principal-agent problems for sustainable 
innovation finance 
To find ways to overcome principal-agent problems for sustainable innovation finance (lens 
1), we grouped the screening mechanisms used by banks into cash flow-based, asset-based 
and relationship-based lending technologies (Ch 5). All three types of lending technologies 
– and combinations between them - provide opportunities for alleviating principal-agent 
problems to access innovation finance. Although financing based on past cash flows is 
difficult for innovative activities due to lack of track record, financing can sometimes be 
obtained through partnerships with players in the supply chain (Ch 5). Enabling access 
through partnerships can be particularly relevant for sustainable innovation finance, since 
cooperation in the supply chain is often required to shift towards a sustainable production 
process. Another situation in which  past cash flows can be used as a basis for financing is 
when innovative activity is carried out within an established firm: banks show more 
willingness to finance innovative activities if such innovation is in line with existing business 
that is already generating cash flows. This enabler is not unique to sustainable innovation 
but enables innovation finance, in general. It shows that for existing firms, alignment of 
sustainable innovation activities with existing (profitable) business can enable access to 
external finance.  
In the absence of past cash flows, proof of future cash flows can enable access to finance. 
Signed client contracts and pre-orders are important signals to overcome asymmetric 
information between an innovating firm and a financier. Finance based on future cash flows 
is particularly relevant for financing sustainable product-service innovation since incoming 
cash flows become periodic, requiring a larger upfront investment. This shift from a sales to 
a service business model is aimed for by many production firms to profit financially from 
the often increased lifespan of a sustainable/circular product (Linder & Williander, 2015; 
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Tukker, 2015). The upfront financing that this type of innovation requires can be enabled by 
showing proof of expected incoming client payments based on signed contracts as well as 
by demonstration of stick rates along with contract design (Ch 5). 
When turning to asset-based lending, empirical evidence in this dissertation (Ch 5) confirms 
existing evidence that innovative assets often suffer from uncertain residual value due to 
context- and firm specificity, making banks hesitant to lend (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002a). 
However, the longer lifetime of sustainable or circular assets – either durable, modular or 
standardized – has improved the underlying collateral value in some sectors, such as real 
estate and office furniture. To benefit from sustainable asset characteristics in asset-based 
lending more broadly, proof of long-term market value, e.g. through secondary asset markets 
or high contract stick rates, is needed to provide attractive residual (collateral) values. Since 
these markets are lacking for most innovative asset types, buyback constructions with 
suppliers are an alternative way to ascertain residual value for asset-based lending, both for 
banks and crowdfunders. 
This dissertation confirms relationships to be an important enabler in overcoming principal-
agent problems to obtain finance for innovation (Boot, 2000; Brancati, 2015). In sustainable 
innovation, in particular, relationships emerge as being crucial to understand the larger 
context within which a loan is provided, to ascertain that the economic activity to be funded 
‘serves society’ (Ch 3). Empirical evidence in this dissertation suggests that many bank loans 
for enterprises engaged in circular business model innovation were facilitated by relationship 
building between the enterprise and a bank, through exchange of soft information and 
increased trust in uncertain innovation contexts (Ch 5). Furthermore, the relevance of 
relationships extends beyond the firm-financier relationship: relationships between the firm 
and its suppliers and/or clients increase trust in future cash flows and thereby facilitating 
access to finance (Ch 5).  
Pre-existing relationships seem to enable successful crowdfunding, as well. We find that ties 
between an entrepreneur and crowdfunders alter informational needs of funders, indicating 
different ways of overcoming asymmetric information (Ch 6). Crowdfunders with pre-
existing ties to an entrepreneur attach more importance to information about the entrepreneur 
than crowdfunders without such ties. Furthermore, empirical evidence from a crowdfunding 
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campaign of a sharing platform suggests that users of such a platform are less likely than 
non-users to look for objective information about the venture before investing (Ch 8). The 
user innovation literature predicts the presence of ‘sticky’ local information with users, 
which we offer as a mechanism explaining the above result (von Hippel, 1994, 1998). 
Although both users and impact-motivated funders have less investment experience than 
financially motivated non-user crowdfunders – indicating that these are novel investor 
segments - we find no significantly lower financial literacy than for non-user crowdfunders 
(Ch 8). Financially motivated user crowdfunders show to be more financially literate than 
other funder categories. Our results suggest that engaging social networks can help 
overcome informational asymmetries  in crowdfunding of sustainable innovation. 
9.2 Lens 2: Overcoming collective action problems for sustainable 
innovation finance 
Collective action theory was used  to discover three enablers in the institutional setting of 
crowdfunding that can enhance collective action for sustainable enterprise (including 
innovation) finance: use of social networks; heterogeneous costs and benefits; and 
aggregation within thresholds (Ch 4). Building on this conceptual contribution, three 
empirical chapters (Ch 6,7,8) investigate crowdfunding decision making in the light of these 
enablers as well as in relation to overcoming informational asymmetries between firm and 
financier.  
Pre-existing ties (social networks) between crowdfunders and entrepreneurs are widespread 
and relate to different informational needs of crowdfunders (Ch 6). Furthermore, in survey 
data, sustainable enterprise crowdfunders report to be more impact motivated and more 
financially motivated than crowdfunders in regular enterprises. While theory predicts a 
trade-off between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (Bénabou & Tirole, 2003) and we do 
find such a trade-off between financial motivation and impact motivation for crowdfunders 
of regular enterprise, this does not seem to be the case for crowdfunders of sustainable 
enterprises. This finding suggests that expectations of crowdfunders in sustainable 
enterprises follow the narrative of sustainable entrepreneurship, that societal value creation 
and financial value creation go hand in hand (Shepherd & Patzelt, 2011). This ‘value-
stacking’ approach could perhaps explain the success of crowdfunding for sustainable 
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(versus regular) projects as documented by some researchers (Calic & Mosakowski, 2016). 
This finding also confirms the relevance of heterogeneous benefits for crowdfunders in 
sustainable enterprises that we derived theoretically as an enabler of collective action in 
crowdfunding (Ch 4).  
The interaction between being part of a social (user) network of a sustainable platform 
enterprise and financial decision making was subject of study in Ch 8. We investigate a 
campaign where the user community of a (sustainable) platform enterprise represents a large 
proportion of the participating crowdfunders. While being part of a social network facilitates 
collective action according to our conceptual work (Ch 4), we also address the fear of policy 
makers that non-professional investors – such as users – have more difficulty to overcome 
asymmetric information problems. User crowdfunders report to be a ‘new’ investor group 
with less investment experience than non-user crowdfunders. At the same time, in this 
particular campaign, user crowdfunders are on average not less financially literate than non-
user crowdfunders. User funders who are primarily financial motivated are even more 
financially literate than all other funders groups that we studied. This result suggests self-
selection of user crowdfunders based on their investment capabilities, which is in line with 
findings on self-selection into stock market participation (van Rooij et al., 2011).   
9.3 Key contributions of this dissertation 
Table 9-1 gives a schematic overview of each chapter’s contribution to this framework. 
Across chapters, this dissertation offers the following key contributions. 
Applying a new theoretical lens: collective action in sustainable innovation finance 
While suggested by academics (Cauwels & Sornette, 2012), the application of collective 
action theory to research in the context of the financial sector has been minimal. This 
dissertation offers a novel and relevant application of collective action theory to address the 
double externality problem embedded in sustainable innovation finance. Collective action 
as an additional theoretical lens offers a ‘way out’ of the sole focus on enabling private value 
capture in financial decision-making (Friedman, 2007; Lepak et al., 2007). A collective 
action perspective does not rely on altruism, but is instead aimed at obtaining higher 
collective value through cooperation.  By applying collective action theory to analyse the
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institutional setting of crowdfunding as well as connecting these mechanisms – social 
networks, heterogeneous benefits – to the more traditional question of overcoming 
information asymmetries, this dissertation builds on and extends current research on 
(sustainable) innovation finance.    
This dissertation suggests that innovating firms and crowdfunding platforms need to 
understand how to organize collective action between potential financiers of sustainable 
innovation. By drawing on insights from collective action theory, individuals (and 
financiers) can be stimulated to invest in sustainable (collective) benefits by creating the 
right institutional settings (Vollan & Ostrom, 2010). Collective action can create benefits for 
financiers at multiple levels (Ostrom, 2010b): at a global level, sustainable innovations are 
likely to improve long-term profits of large investors whereas at a local level, collective 
action for sustainable innovation can be enabled by offering local/individualized benefits 
(e.g. impact motivation, product user and/ or community benefits) or by engaging social 
networks (Ch 6,7,8). Furthermore, the institutional setting in which funding is requested can 
enable conditional cooperation through transparency and  thresholds (Ch 4; Cheng & 
Bernstein, 2014). 
Combining theoretical lenses: relationships as a ‘double’ enabler of sustainable 
innovation finance 
By applying two theoretical lenses, this dissertation shows that relationships between 
financiers and sustainable entrepreneurs can help overcome asymmetric information (lens 
1) and facilitate cooperation for investment to create societal value (lens 2). Relationships 
between financiers and an innovating enterprise emerge as an important enabler of access to 
finance, which confirms earlier findings in relation to banks (Brancati, 2015) and 
crowdfunders (Agrawal et al., 2015). The first reason is quite well known: innovation 
finance suffers from asymmetric information and moral hazard problems more than regular 
finance due to lack of track record and intangibility of assets, which relationships between a 
firm and both banks (Ch 3,5) and crowdfunders  (Ch 6, 8) can help overcome. An additional 
result that emerges from this dissertation is that the type of relationships between firm and 
banks versus firm and crowdfunders is different. Bank-based relationship lending requires a 
formal relationship with bank professionals, specifically for the purpose of lending. In 
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crowdfunding, pre-existing relationships between firm and financiers (friends, 
acquaintances, users, customers) are mobilized to attract funding, indicating that ‘new’ 
investment groups enter the financing market place.  
While these new entrants can alleviate financing constraints through collective action 
mechanisms (Ch 4), this raises the question how such less-experienced investors overcome 
principal-agent problems. Empirical evidence in this dissertation – based on one large 
crowdfunding campaign - suggests that on average, crowdfunders recruited from a firm’s 
own user network are not less financially literate than other crowdfunders in the same 
campaign (Ch 9) and may therefore be just as well positioned to make ‘wise’ financial 
decisions (Mollick & Nanda, 2015).  
This dissertation also shows that the importance of relationships for obtaining sustainable 
innovation finance extends beyond the firm – financier relationship. It shows that 
relationships between firms and its value chain partners – such as suppliers, clients and users 
- also facilitate successful financing, both in the context of banks and crowdfunding. Joint 
ventures and/or buyback agreements with suppliers and pre-order/equity crowdfunding from 
customers and users are shown to facilitate bank loans and debt crowdfunding (Ch 5,8). 
Relationships with more established value chain partners can overcome lack of track record 
for start-up enterprises. Buyback agreements with producers of a (sustainable) product 
facilitate asset-based lending since this guarantees a minimum (residual) asset value. Pre-
order crowdfunding alleviates market risk for subsequent financiers, whereas equity 
crowdfunding by users alleviates the financing challenge even more directly. Value chain 
relationships as an enabler of finance is particularly relevant for sustainable innovation since 
collaboration in the supply chain is often needed to deliver a sustainable value proposition, 
and thus can serve both the purposes of value delivery and financing.  
Relationships also help overcome the ‘double externality problem’ by creating willingness 
to cooperate for innovation and societal value creation, benefits which are difficult to 
appropriate as a private financier (Faber & Frenken, 2009; Rennings, 2000). By examining 
the institutional setting of  crowdfunding and applying empirical evidence from collective 
action theory, we find that social networks can help organize collective action in financing 
sustainable entrepreneurial activity (Ch 4).  
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Finally, relationship-based lending naturally allows lenders to include contextual 
information into their lending decision (Ch 3). Since relationships produce ‘soft’ information 
about the borrower and its context, this can be used to judge whether a loan is sustainable or 
not. Transaction-based lending requires hard information to screen an enterprise on its 
sustainability, which is often more difficult to obtain. Therefore screening for sustainability 
of an enterprise - in the absence of sustainability metrics - is facilitated through relationship 
lending.   
Relationship-based finance in times of technological development  
The importance of relationship-based finance for sustainable innovation runs counter to the 
current development of algorithm-driven financial decision-making (Ch 3). It points at a 
perhaps necessary split between lending technologies for innovation versus mainstream 
enterprise finance. Current developments show an increase in transaction-based lending 
which could lower the willingness to invest in contextual relationship-based lending decision 
for (sustainable) innovation. Relationships create both the information needed and the 
willingness to invest in sustainable innovation, dealing with opaqueness and lack of 
collateral as well as moral hazard and cooperative behaviour. Between bank lending and 
crowdfunding we witness relationships coming ‘online’, which lowers transaction costs of 
obtaining funding through (social) networks. The current dissertation raises the expectation 
that due to opaqueness, context-dependence and the double externality problem of 
sustainable innovation and entrepreneurship, relationships will remain a crucial enabler of 
sustainable innovation finance. However, standardization of sustainability-related data (i.e. 
greenhouse emission and material waste metrics) will facilitate more efficient funding and 
inclusion into transaction-based financing decisions.  
Financing sustainable product innovation: two opposing effects for asset-based 
lending 
An important contribution of this dissertation stems from Chapter 5, which identifies 
innovation for increased sustainability (durability, modularity and/or flexibility) of an asset 
to affect access to finance in two opposing directions. Intuitively, if assets last longer and 
therefore have a higher, longer market value, they should be able to serve as collateral more 
easily. However, the innovativeness that is needed to develop sustainable products often 
decreases their ability to serve as collateral, since innovative assets suffer from asset- and 
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firm-specificity, absence of secondary markets and therefore low  market value when a firm 
defaults (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002a). These are opposing effects which need to be taken 
into account when enterprises try to obtain finance based on their assets.  
Evidence in some markets shows that longevity and flexibility of assets, which are popular 
characteristics of sustainable product innovations, can increase access to finance. In the real 
estate sector for example, sustainable characteristics of office buildings - such as high energy 
efficiency and flexible usage of space -  translate into lower market risk (high chance of 
having tenants) for a bank. In the office furniture and printer market – markets where assets 
generally last long but are not so innovative - the existence of secondary markets provides 
proof of long-term (‘timeless’) market value of assets. When a firm shifts an existing product 
from a sales to a service model, finance based on assets is easier when such market value 
has been displayed, and also through buyback guarantees with the producer. In sum, asset-
based lending is a promising route for sustainable innovation finance but requires 
entrepreneurs to ‘prove’ long-term market value, first. Building on existing products that 
have such ‘proven’ value is therefore a promising route.   
Motivations for investing into sustainable enterprises: financial and/or impact 
motivation? 
This dissertation provides empirical insight into motivations of crowdfunders to invest in 
sustainable enterprises (Ch 7, 8). First we show that crowdfunders of sustainable enterprises 
are motivated by financial return and impact, both more so than crowdfunders of regular 
enterprises (Ch 7). Second, we relate the motivations of crowdfunders to invest in a 
sustainable enterprise to their investment experience and financial literacy (Ch 8). When we 
ask crowdfunders of one sustainable enterprise (a platform venture) to identify whether their 
main motivation is financial or impact, we find on average that crowdfunders of sustainable 
enterprises who indicate that impact is their main motivation have less investment 
experience and a lower financial literacy than those crowdfunders who indicate that financial 
return is the most important one of the two motivations. Chapters 7 and 8 together contribute 
to our understanding of why crowdfunders invest in sustainable enterprises, and how their 
motivations relate to their ability (investment experience and financial literacy)  to screen 
the enterprise, in other words to overcome asymmetric information.  
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9.4 Classifying academic contributions of this dissertation 
Conceptually the use of principal-agent and collective action theory is replicated. Chapter 5 
contributes to the principal-agent literature by regrouping lending technologies ((Berger & 
Udell, 2006) into cash flow, asset and relationship-based lending technologies. Existing 
theories in finance are extended by building on collective action theory for crowdfunding of 
sustainable enterprises (Ch 4) and by combining the user innovation literature with (user) 
crowdfunding research (Ch 8).  
From a methodological perspective,  existing survey and qualitative research methods are 
replicated, using regression models and case study techniques for data analysis. Extending 
rule classification analysis - part of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework 
(Ostrom & Crawford, 2005) to crowdfunding research (Ch 4) is a methodological 
innovation. Also, this dissertation includes a novel, qualitative approach for understanding 
bank lending decisions for circular innovation based on both enterprise interviews and 
workshops/focus groups with banks (Ch 5).  
Table 9-2 Classification of contributions 
  Replication Extension Innovation 
Conceptual Use of principal-agent, 
social network and 
collective action theory 
(all chapters) 
Re-grouping lending 
technologies into cash 
flow- asset-, and 
relationship-based lending 
technologies (Ch 5) 
Application of collective 
action theory to 
crowdfunding (Ch 4); 
combination of user 
innovation and 
crowdfunding literature 
(Ch 8) 
Methods Use of survey and 
qualitative research 
methods (empirical 
chapters 5,6,7,8) 
Extending rule 
classification analysis 
(part of IAD) to 
crowdfunding research 
(Ch 4) 
Use of qualitative research 
methods for bank lending 
research, in particular 
focus groups (Ch 5) 
Applications Fine-grained insight into 
information use and 
motivations of 
crowdfunders (Ch 6,7,8) 
  
 
 
The main contribution of this dissertation from an application perspective is to the young 
and evolving field of crowdfunding research, in particular adding fine-grained insight into 
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information use and motivations of crowdfunders, including their interaction with social 
networks and usership (Ch 6,7,8).  
9.5 Practical implications 
This dissertation has practical implications for financiers, innovating enterprises and policy 
makers.  
Practical implications for innovating enterprises 
Firms need to develop sustainable/circular business models to make their sustainable 
innovations profitable (Bocken et al., 2014; Boons & Lüdeke-Freund, 2013). If value can be 
captured privately in the process of societal value creation (Lepak et al., 2007), enterprises 
and their financiers become more willing to innovate sustainably. This can be done by 
innovating within the current system or even by changing the rules of the game in a specific 
sector to make certain sustainable business models financially lucrative (Pacheco et al., 
2010). The business model that best exemplifies this approach for enterprises is the shift 
from a sales to a product-service model, a central example of circular business model 
innovation where incentives for producers are brought in line with sustainability objectives 
(Tukker, 2015).  
Another implication of this dissertation for firms is that they need to think about how they 
expect to attract finance already during their innovation process, not afterwards. Product and 
contract design can affect access to financing, as does the creditworthiness of targeted clients 
and cooperation in the value chain, for example with suppliers (Ch 5). Innovation choices 
should not only be made from a standpoint of profitability but also taking risk levels (a 
financiers perspective) into account. Furthermore, building relationships in the value chain, 
with customers, suppliers and financiers, seems to be a crucial enabler of access to finance 
in the context of sustainable innovation. Relationships in the value chain do not only 
facilitate the delivery of sustainability objectives but also enables the sharing of risks (and 
benefits) of sustainable innovation. We see examples of external finance being facilitated by 
banks (loans), customers (crowdfunding) and suppliers (buyback constructions and joint 
ventures) alike (Ch 5,8). When all parties involved have a motivation to shift to a more 
sustainable way of doing business, such relationships create trust and enable risk sharing.  
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Table 9-3 Examples of innovating enterprise characteristics and ways to obtain finance 
Characteristic of enterprise Ways to obtain finance 
Existing enterprise carrying out 
sustainable innovation 
Loan from existing bank relationship  
Cash flow based lending based on other (steady) business 
Internal finance as a back-up / collateral 
Innovate in partnership with 
established supply chain player(s)  
Joint venture with large supply chain partner increases 
opportunities for cash flow-based lending 
Innovating from sales to service 
model with an existing 
sustainable asset 
Asset-based lending based on market value of assets and/or 
buyback agreement with (external) producer  
Early stage consumer-facing 
product and service innovation 
Engage early adopters through reward crowdfunding 
campaign  
Growth phase for consumer-
facing sustainable products and 
services 
Reward/debt/equity crowdfunding campaign, engaging both 
user/consumers and mainstream crowdfunders 
Community / platform-based 
innovation 
Debt/equity crowdfunding campaign, engaging both 
user/consumers and mainstream crowdfunders 
 
To make our results practical for individual innovating enterprises, enablers for obtaining 
finance should be matched to characteristics of innovating enterprises. This dissertation 
contributes to practitioners by providing concrete conclusions for examples of different 
innovation/enterprise characteristics that were encountered. This can be developed into a 
full-fledged typology in the future (Table 9-3).  
Practical implications for financiers 
Increasing the ability of financiers to finance sustainable innovation requires the inclusion 
of sustainability criteria (contextual information) into financial decision-making (Ch 3). 
Such assessment criteria can be an effort at the level of individual financial institutions or a 
collective effort to develop such metrics in a standardized way. Also, financial institutions 
need to develop a ‘learning loop’ for impact (Ch 2): by evaluating which investments 
delivered on their impact goals, their financial allocation can be improved for maximum 
impact. 
Financiers need to develop expertise to assess whether sustainable innovations are expected 
to meet their financial risk-return requirements. Banks and crowdfunding platforms (and 
probably other financiers as well) therefore need to develop expertise surrounding 
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sustainable/circular business models, to become better at screening such innovations on their 
financial merit. If, for example, sustainable innovations lead to more valuable underlying 
assets, a financier needs to be able to account for this in their decision-making. Similarly, if 
sustainable innovation entails setting up cooperation or joint ventures between value chain 
players (which is often the case), financiers need to be able to value such cooperation as a 
crucial ingredient for successful delivery of a sustainable product or service.  
Financiers could also play a role in advising innovating entrepreneurs / firms how to set up 
their sustainable innovation so that it becomes more financeable. In the context of banks this 
could for example be realised by advising existing firms on how to successfully shift from a 
sales to a circular product-service model by optimizing contract and asset design (Ch 5). 
Determining the creditworthiness of enterprise clients is a crucial part of lending for product 
service innovation of firms. Banks could even develop standardized credit scoring models 
and offer these to entrepreneurs as part of their client acceptance procedures, which can 
facilitate the firms access to finance. More generally, relationship building with innovating 
entrepreneurs and piloting new financing constructions with them can help make larger scale 
finance available in a tailored way for sustainable innovation (Ch 5). Also, selling off loan 
portfolios in aggregate to more long-term investors such as pension funds could facilitate 
banks to take on risks for sustainable innovation.  
Within the context of crowdfunding platforms this can also mean assistance in how to build 
and communicate with a network as a basis for a successful crowdfunding campaign (Ch 
6,8). Furthermore, (sustainable) crowdfunding platforms can advise sustainable 
entrepreneurs on how to set up their crowdfunding campaign so that it answers to both the 
impact motivation and the financial motivation of potential funders (Ch 7).  
Finally, financial intermediaries need to continue to innovate their instruments so that they 
become a cornerstone in helping develop impactful and profitable sustainable innovation. 
One promising route to do this is by sharing risks between financial, government and market 
players for example through buyback constructions, guarantees, user crowdfunding and joint 
ventures (Ch 5,8).  
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Practical implications for policy makers 
In the context of sustainable innovation finance, policy makers need to deal with two main 
issues. On the one hand policy makers can assist in creating conditions that stimulate private 
finance for sustainable innovation. While a thorough analysis of the policy requirements for 
sustainable innovation finance lie beyond the scope of this dissertation, regulation and policy 
which strengthen sustainability requirements of sectors will boost the profitability of 
sustainable innovation and their underlying business models. Also, regulatory support can 
signal to financial markets that sustainable innovation is inevitable and make such 
investments relatively more attractive in relation to non-sustainable investments.  
Furthermore, policy makers should recognize that sustainable innovation in many cases 
requires a different way of doing business and obtaining finance, with increased cooperation 
in value chains and a longer lifetime of assets and their components. Both market and 
financial regulation should be continuously updated to facilitate and regulate capital 
allocation for sustainable innovation.  
From a regulatory perspective, the rise of new financial intermediaries such as crowdfunding 
platforms have led to concerns with respect to investor protection (AFM, 2014). While 
crowdfunding platforms provide a promising alternative source of finance for sustainable 
innovation by enabling new investors, to enter (Ch 4,7) the lack of investment experience of 
some of these crowdfunders – such as users/customers - leads to fears of unwise investment 
decisions (Ch 8). The challenge for policy makers and regulators is how to protect 
inexperienced crowdfunders from investing with unrealistic financial return expectations, 
while enabling risk sharing among crowdfunders of sustainable innovations that they may 
be particularly willing to support (in spite of recognized risks). This dissertation confirms 
lower investment experience levels for crowdfunders that enter into campaigns through the 
user network of an enterprise, but also shows that these user crowdfunders are not less 
financially literate than others crowdfunders in the same campaign. Also, this dissertation 
proposes that in the context of (inherently high risk) innovation finance, user/consumers may 
be able to access certain proprietary (local, ‘sticky’) information through their familiarity 
with the enterprise, that could add ‘wisdom’ to the decision-making process as a whole 
(Mollick & Nanda, 2015). The suggestion to policy makers and regulators is therefore to 
understand both the motivations and the expertise of crowdfunders into sustainable 
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innovation, and allow for a different regulatory framework for smaller amounts than for 
large investments to allow for fine-grained collective action for sustainable innovation but 
protecting them from large financial losses.  
9.6 Limitations and future research 
In spite of its relevance, this research inevitably has its limitations. A straightforward 
limitation is the empirical research context which is the Netherlands; results can be improved 
by obtaining cross-country evidence, in particular in the young but growing field of 
crowdfunding research where comparative studies are still in development. Data sources 
need to be extended to encompass more and diverse crowdfunders and campaigns. Also, 
survey methodology was employed in three of the empirical studies and has its limitations 
as noted in the individual chapters (selection bias, common method bias), and therefore 
should be further enhanced through triangulation with other data sources (Jick, 1979).  
Furthermore, within the theoretical lenses that we use some constraints and enablers have 
been addressed more than others. Within principal-agent problems, the main focus of this 
dissertation has been on alleviating asymmetric information. More research is needed to shed 
light on adverse selection and moral hazard in combination with sustainable innovation 
finance, in particular. Within the collective action lens, the empirical chapters zoom in on 
social networks and heterogeneous benefits as enablers of sustainable innovation finance. 
Aggregation in thresholds as an enablers has been identified conceptually based on empirical 
research from many other contexts, but needs to still be addressed empirically.  
Below, key routes to promising future research are highlighted. 
Experimental evidence to identify enablers of collective action in the financial sector 
The motivational findings and collective action enablers pinpointed in this dissertation need 
further grounding using randomized, controlled experimental evidence, to observe real 
decision-making as opposed to self-reported motivation. Similarly, the enablers of collective 
action in crowdfunding derived (in Ch 4) using collective action theory and evidence need 
empirical testing and refinement. Future research in this field should include experiments 
which are able to capture individual mechanisms involved in enabling collective action for 
sustainable finance. Furthermore, these experiments should be able to isolate conditional 
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cooperation from herding behaviour by controlling for the sustainability aspect of the 
enterprise.  Field experiments at financial institutions can more generally help understand 
what types of interventions really lead to financial decisions that serve society and clients 
(Harms et al., 2018). 
Applying collective action theory to facilitate sustainable investments in the financial 
sector 
Collective action (enablers) can also play a role in organizing increased sustainable 
investments from larger financial players such as banks, pension/investment funds and 
universal owners. One specific train of thought argues for collective action by universal 
owners: since these financial players own such a large part of the world’s assets, they have 
an incentive to invest in common pool and public goods in order to secure their own financial 
profit on the long term (Hawley & Williams, 2007). The general argument that collective 
action is easier to realize in small groups is influenced by several important factors such as 
complexity and cost of providing a type of good and heterogeneity of players (Oliver & 
Marwell, 1988; Olson, 2009).  Similarly, at levels of pension funds and banks there may be 
situations that coordination among players can lead to collectively higher levels of 
investment into common goods than if each one acts alone. This idea is not new: many banks 
have signed up to the Equator principles which were designed to assure project investment 
in line with sustainable development (Scholtens & Dam, 2007) and some financial 
institutions engage with the Sustainable Development Goals. However, an analysis of how 
collective action theory can be systematically applied to facilitate such processes 
successfully is missing: future research and engagement can fill this gap to understand and 
facilitate collective action for sustainable investments for different types of financial 
intermediaries.  
Further specification of enablers of finance for different types of sustainable 
innovation 
This dissertation builds a framework for enablers of sustainable innovation finance, in 
general. Sustainable innovation does create some common characteristics, such as more 
durable or flexible asset bases, a need  for value chain collaboration to deliver on  the 
sustainability promise and the frequent wish to shift to a service model. However, the 
empirical research that was carried out also unveiled a diversity of enterprises carrying out 
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sustainable (or circular) innovation based on size, sector, activities and asset base. This leads 
to a diversity in funding needs (and solutions) which begs for a more fine-grained and 
structured specification of financing enablers in relation to specific types of sustainable 
innovation. For example, when zooming into sustainable innovation that uses nature to 
innovate for reaching sustainability goals (‘nature-based solutions’), finance for an extensive 
green roof  could be provided through crowdfunding by neighbours (for aesthetic, 
community and air quality benefits), whereas large scale sustainable innovations such as 
sustainable drainage systems will often depend on  larger amounts of (public) finance. 
Creating a typology of sustainable innovation characteristics, business models employed and 
potential funding types is a potentially impactful research avenue to enable sustainable 
innovation (Bocken et al., 2014; Toxopeus & Polzin, 2017). Finally, for addressing 
principal-agent problems and collective action problems simultaneously, an in-depth 
analysis of public-private financing solutions can be  a promising route, as well. 
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English summary 
In the past decades, the importance of transitioning to a sustainable economy has become 
increasingly urgent. A crucial ingredient of such a transition is sustainable innovation by 
new or existing enterprises, which allows enterprises to carry out their activities profitably 
and in line with sustainability goals. By innovating, sustainable enterprises can realise both 
financial value and societal value (e.g. biodiversity enhancement, climate change prevention 
or cultural value) simultaneously (Shepherd & Patzelt, 2011). 
While sustainable innovation by enterprises is important for a transition to a more 
sustainable economy, obtaining finance for such innovation is often a challenge due to three 
main causes. Firstly, innovative firms struggle to obtain finance due to principal-agent 
problems such as asymmetric information, moral hazard and adverse selection. In short, this 
means that financiers have less information than the entrepreneurs do about the quality and 
risks of the enterprise as well as about the effort put in by the entrepreneur, making them 
hesitant to provide capital. While this is an issue for external finance in general, this problem 
is aggravated in the context of innovative activities due to lack of track record and collateral 
as ways to reduce these principal-agent problems (Hall, 2010).  
Furthermore, finance for sustainable innovation suffers from two different types of 
externalities, also referred to as the ‘double externality problem’ (Faber & Frenken, 2009; 
Rennings, 2000). Innovation in general produces knowledge-based externalities, because 
R&D expenditures often also benefit the competitors in a market (for example when an 
employee leaves or because innovations are imitated). Secondly, sustainable innovations 
aim to develop societal (social and/or ecological) value, and the investment made into such 
value creation does not always lead to value capture for the enterprise itself and its financiers.  
The lack of willingness of financiers to finance these externalities can be viewed as a 
collective action problem (Ostrom, 2010; Pacheco, Dean, & Payne, 2010). While society 
benefits collectively from having a high level of investments into sustainable innovation, the 
– financial and societal - return at the level of the individual financier is highly insecure. The 
total return of the individual investment into sustainable innovation depends on the 
willingness of others to also finance sustainable innovation to enable the sustainability 
transition.  
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In light of the above, this dissertation addresses the question: What factors enable enterprise 
access to finance for sustainable innovation? This question is approached from two main 
theoretical perspectives: principal-agent theory (in particular asymmetric information) and 
collective action theory. This dissertations researches two financial players who play an 
important role in enterprise finance: banks (because of the large size of their enterprise 
finance portfolios) and crowdfunding platforms (because of the fast growth as enterprise 
financier, in particular for sustainable innovation). The analysis in this dissertation consists 
of conceptual work (Chapter 2-5) and empirical work (Chapter 6-9), positioned within an 
overriding analytical framework that is based on the Institutional Analysis and Development 
(IAD) framework (Ostrom, 2010). 
In this dissertation we distinguish three main types of lending technologies, adapted from 
Berger & Udell (2006): cash-flow-based, asset-based and relationship-based lending 
technologies. These lending technologies indicate how asymmetric information between a 
bank and a sustainable, innovative enterprise can be mitigated in order to enable financing.  
In both the theoretical and the empirical analysis we conclude that building relationships 
between an enterprise and a bank is a crucial enabler of innovation finance, in particular 
when expected cash flows and underlying assets are insecure or missing. Additionally, we 
conclude that relationship building between an innovating firm and her suppliers and/or 
clients enables financing by lowering the perceived risk of future cash flows.  
While sustainable innovation is often geared towards developing physical assets that last 
longer (by improving durability and/or shifting to a modular product), the value of such 
assets as collateral in the financing process is often obstructed by the innovative nature of 
these underlying assets. We  conclude that the role of asset-based finance appears most 
relevant in those sectors with relatively slow product innovation (real estate, office furniture) 
where long-term market value has already been proven (for example through the existence 
of secondary asset markets and rental contracts). Another way to enable asset-based finance 
for sustainable innovation is through buyback agreements with producers of sustainable 
physical assets.  
While past and expected cash flows of innovative enterprises are often too insecure to serve 
as an enabler of financing, we find that - in the context of product-service business models 
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- signed contracts with clients can build trust with financiers about future cash flows, thus 
enabling successful financing.  
By applying collective action theory (Ostrom, 2010) to the context of crowdfunding, this 
dissertation identifies three ways in which the institutional setting of crowdfunding can 
facilitate finance for sustainable innovation, namely through engagement of social networks, 
delivery of different types of benefits (such as financial return, societal impact, products or 
services and feeling part of a community) and by making investments conditional to reaching 
a certain target within a set timeframe. These three institutional settings (´rules’) that are 
embedded in crowdfunding have shown to be successful facilitators of collective action in 
other contexts and seem to play an important role again, here.  
An important question for sustainable innovation finance is not only that it is enabled, but 
also that financiers are able to overcome informational asymmetries in order to make a well-
founded financing decision. Relationships between crowdfunders and entrepreneurs often 
facilitate successful crowdfunding, and they influence the importance of different types of 
information for crowdfunders. We also find that specifically the user/client communities of 
sustainable, innovative enterprises are being engaged as a source of finance. While this is a 
logical step from a collective action perspective, it raises the questions whether users are 
able to make a sound judgment of the risks of their investment. Based on a large 
crowdfunding campaign of a sustainable sharing platform this dissertation concludes that 
users have less investment experience but on average are not less financially literate. 
However, we find a difference between financially motivated users – who are highly 
financially literate – and impact-motivated users, who are less financially literate (but also 
rate financial return as less important than impact). While some wise self-selection based on 
expertise seems to take place among users in their financing decision, broader research 
covering more diverse campaigns is needed. 
 This dissertation also researches and compares the motivations of crowdfunders in regular 
and sustainable enterprises. In line with expectations, crowdfunders of sustainable 
enterprises report to be more motivated to create societal impact than crowdfunders of 
regular enterprises. It is more surprising that crowdfunders of sustainable also report to be 
more financially motivated than crowdfunders for regular enterprises and that – in contrast 
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to crowdfunders in regular enterprises and theoretical expectations – no trade-off is found 
between these two motivations. The fact that crowdfunders of sustainable enterprises are 
motivated both by societal and financial return (heterogeneous benefits) could explain the 
relatively high success of crowdfunding campaigns of sustainable enterprises that is 
confirmed by some studies.  
By applying collective action theory in the context of sustainable innovation finance, this 
dissertation offers a new perspective (and solution) to enable such financing. The dynamics 
of collective action appear particularly relevant in the emergence of decentralized financial 
instruments like crowdfunding and Initial Coin Offerings (ICO’s). It will be crucial to 
continue to combine the collective action perspective with the more traditional principal-
agent perspective to stimulate finance for sustainable innovation while safeguarding 
financial expertise and risk carrying capacity among financiers.     
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Nederlandse samenvatting 
Het belang van een transitie naar een duurzame economie is in de afgelopen decennia steeds 
groter geworden. Duurzame innovatie, waarmee bedrijven hun activiteiten kunnen 
aanpassen zodat ze in lijn zijn met duurzaamheidsdoelstellingen, is een cruciaal ingrediënt 
van een dergelijke transitie. Door te innoveren richten duurzame ondernemers zich op zowel 
financiële als maatschappelijke waarde creatie, zoals biodiversiteit, voorkomen van 
klimaatverandering en culturele waarde (Shepherd & Patzelt, 2011).  
Het financieren van duurzame innovatie is echter een struikelblok voor veel bedrijven; dit 
heeft drie hoofdoorzaken. Ten eerste is het voor innovatieve bedrijven lastig om financiering 
op te halen vanwege principaal-agent problemen zoals asymmetrische informatie, moral 
hazard en adverse selectie. Kort samengevat wil dit zeggen dat financiers minder informatie 
hebben dan de ondernemer zelf als het gaat om de kans van slagen van de innovatie en de 
kwaliteit en inzet van de ondernemer, waardoor ze niet durven te financieren. Dit is altijd 
een probleem bij externe financiering maar wordt bij innovatieve activiteiten verergerd 
vanwege gebrek aan zekerheid met betrekking tot toekomstige inkomsten en gebrek aan 
onderpand. Daarnaast heeft (financiering van) duurzame innovatie last van twee 
verschillende externaliteiten, ook wel het ‘dubbele externaliteiten probleem’ genoemd 
(Faber & Frenken, 2009; Rennings, 2000). Ten eerste produceert innovatie in het algemeen 
kennis-gerelateerde externaliteiten, omdat R&D uitgaven van innovatie ook vaak 
concurrentie ten goede komt (bijvoorbeeld als een medewerker vertrekt of doordat 
innovaties worden nagemaakt). Ten tweede is duurzame innovatie erop gericht om 
maatschappelijke – sociale of ecologische - waarde te creëren, en is het voor ondernemingen 
vaak lastig om deze maatschappelijke investering terug te verdienen voor haar financiers. 
Het gebrek aan bereidheid van financiers om deze externaliteiten te financieren is een 
collectieve actie probleem: hoewel we als samenleving gezamenlijk beter worden van 
investeringen in duurzame innovatie, is het verwachte individuele rendement op het niveau 
van de individuele financier en per project, hoogst onzeker. Het totale rendement van de 
eigen investering in duurzame innovatie is afhankelijk van de investering van anderen om 
de duurzaamheidstransitie als geheel te financieren: een klassiek collectieve actie probleem 
(Ostrom, 2010a; Pacheco et al., 2010).  
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Dit proefschrift adresseert de vraag: hoe kan financiering van duurzame innovatie van 
ondernemingen worden gefaciliteerd? Deze vraag wordt onderzocht vanuit het principaal-
agent probleem (met name asymmetrische informatie) aan de ene kant en het collectieve 
actie probleem aan de andere kant. Er wordt in dit proefschrift onderzoek gedaan naar twee 
financiële spelers die hierbij een belangrijke rol spelen: banken (vanwege de omvang van 
bedrijfsfinancieringen) en crowdfunding platformen (vanwege de snelle groei als 
bedrijfsfinancier, zeker voor duurzame innovatie). In de analyse is zowel conceptueel 
(hoofdstuk 2-4) als empirisch werk verricht (hoofdstuk 5-8) binnen een overkoepelend 
analytisch model gebaseerd op het Institutional Analysis en Development (IAD) raamwerk 
(Ostrom, 2010a).  
Vanuit de principaal-agent theorie onderscheidt dit proefschrift drie leen-technologieën, 
aangepast vanuit Berger & Udell (2006): gebaseerd op kasstromen, fysieke activa (assets) 
en relaties. Deze leen-technologieën geven in grote lijnen aan hoe asymmetrische informatie 
tussen een bank en een duurzaam, innovatief bedrijf kan worden gemitigeerd om deze te 
financieren.  
In de empirische analyse concluderen we dat de opbouw van relaties tussen onderneming en 
bank vaak een cruciale facilitator is van de financiering van innovatie, met name wanneer 
kasstromen en fysieke activa te onzeker zijn. Daarnaast blijkt dat ook relaties tussen een 
onderneming en haar leveranciers of klanten financiering vergemakkelijken door de 
zekerheid over de realisatie van toekomstige kasstromen te verhogen. Hoewel duurzame 
innovatie er vaak op gericht is om de fysieke activa van een onderneming langer mee te laten 
gaan (door betere kwaliteit en/of modulaire opbouw van activa) wordt de waarde van deze 
activa als onderpand in de financiering vaak tegengewerkt door het innovatieve karakter van 
de onderliggende producten. Vooral in sectoren met relatief langzame product innovatie 
(vastgoed, kantoormeubilair) lijken duurzame/circulaire fysieke activa een rol te spelen als 
onderpand vanwege bewezen hoge marktwaarde op de langere termijn. Ook door middel 
van terugkoopafspraken met leveranciers kan de verhoogde waarde van duurzame fysieke 
activa worden ingezet voor succesvolle financiering. Hoewel kasstromen in innovatieve 
ondernemingen vaak te onzeker zijn om als basis voor financiering te dienen, kunnen 
contractafspraken met klanten in product-dienst innovatie meer zekerheid geven over 
toekomstige kasstromen, op basis waarvan soms financiering kan worden verstrekt.  
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Vanuit de collectieve actie theorie (Ostrom, 2010a) identificeert dit proefschrift drie 
manieren waarop de institutionele setting van crowdfunding collectieve actie voor 
financiering van duurzame innovatie kan faciliteren. Crowdfunding faciliteert collectieve 
actie voor duurzame innovatie door middel van de inzet van sociale netwerken, het 
aanbieden van verschillende soorten baten (zoals financieel rendement, maatschappelijke 
impact, producten/diensten en gemeenschapsgevoel) en conditionele bijdrages totdat het 
streefbedrag is gehaald. Deze onderdelen van de institutionele setting (‘regels’) van 
crowdfunding hebben zich in andere contexten bewezen als succesvolle facilitators van 
collectieve actie en lijken hier opnieuw een belangrijke rol te spelen.  
Relaties (tussen crowdfunders en ondernemer) worden ook in crowdfunding ingezet om 
financiering te verkrijgen, en beïnvloeden het belang dat crowdfunders hechten aan 
verschillende types informatie. Ook het klant/gebruikersnetwerk van duurzame 
ondernemingen wordt ingezet als bron van financiering. Hoewel dit vanuit een collectieve 
actie perspectief een logische stap is, is de vraag of gebruikers wel in staat zijn om de risico’s 
van hun investering voldoende in te schatten (principaal-agent perspectief). Op basis van 
een grote crowdfunding campagne van een deelplatform concludeert dit proefschrift dat 
gebruikers wel minder investeringservaring hebben, maar niet minder financieel geletterd 
zijn. Sterker nog, financieel gemotiveerde gebruikers zijn zelfs meer financieel geletterd dan 
de andere crowdfunders. Er lijkt bij gebruikers die crowdfunden een verstandige zelfselectie 
plaats te vinden op basis van de eigen investeringscapaciteit, al is breder onderzoek nodig 
om deze bevindingen te staven. 
Tot slot onderzoekt dit proefschrift de motivaties van crowdfunders in reguliere en duurzame 
ondernemingen. Zoals verwacht leidt dit tot de conclusie dat de motivatie om 
maatschappelijke impact te creëren voor crowdfunders in duurzame ondernemingen, hoger 
is dan die van crowdfunders in reguliere ondernemingen. Het is wellicht verrassender dat 
crowdfunders in duurzame ondernemingen ook meer financieel gemotiveerd zijn dan 
crowdfunders in reguliere ondernemingen, en dat er – in tegenstelling tot bij crowdfunders 
in reguliere ondernemingen – geen wisselwerking plaatsvindt tussen deze twee motivaties. 
Dit is een mogelijke uitleg voor het succes van crowdfunding campagnes van duurzame 
ondernemingen: de (crowd)financiers verwachten dubbele (heterogene) baten - een 
verwachte facilitator van collectieve actie.  
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Het toepassen van collectieve actie theorie op financiering van duurzame innovatie is een 
belangrijke bijdrage van dit proefschrift, die daarmee een nieuwe kijk aanreikt voor het 
zoeken naar oplossingen om financiering voor duurzame innovatie te coördineren zodat de 
risico’s  - en ook de baten – gedeeld kunnen worden. De dynamiek van collectieve actie lijkt 
vooral betekenisvol voor het inzetten van decentrale financieringsinstrumenten zoals 
crowdfunding en Inititial Coin Offerings (ICO’s). Er zal steeds naar een evenwicht gezocht 
moeten worden tussen het stimuleren van collectieve actie voor impactvolle duurzame 
innovatie en het waarborgen van voldoende investeringskennis bij onervaren financiers.  
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Financing sustainable 
innovation
From a principal-agent to a collective action perspective
HELEN SELINDE TOXOPEUS
The importance of transitioning to a sustainable economy - one which safeguards ecological life-support 
systems and provides equity within and between generations - has become increasingly urgent. A 
crucial ingredient of such a transition is sustainable innovation by new or existing enterprises, to develop 
business activities that realise both societal and fi nancial value. However, obtaining fi nance for sustainable 
innovation is often a challenge due to both principal-agent and (double) externality problems. While 
society benefi ts from investments into sustainable innovation, the – fi nancial and societal - return for 
individual fi nanciers is highly insecure. 
This dissertation explores how to enable fi nance for sustainable innovation, with a focus on banks 
and crowdfunding platforms. It makes use of two theoretical lenses. First, it studies how to overcome 
principal-agent problems through di erent lending technologies. Second, and more novel, it takes 
a collective action perspective to address the double externality problem embodied in sustainable 
innovation fi nance. This research fi lls a gap because there exist empirically well-defi ned mechanisms for 
solving collective action problems that have not yet been applied to the fi nance domain. Furthermore, 
the dynamics of collective action appear particularly relevant in the emergence of technologically driven, 
decentralized fi nancial instruments like crowdfunding. 
This dissertation draws conclusions regarding the role of relationships, cash fl ows and assets as enablers 
of sustainable innovation fi nance, as well as regarding motivations of crowdfunders to undertake such 
investments. It highlights the challenge of enabling sustainable innovation fi nance while guarding the 
quality of the investment decisions in line with the motivation of the fi nancier. 
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onderzoekschool) in 
the fi eld of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are the 
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE). ERIM was founded 
in 1999 and is o  cially accredited by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The 
research undertaken by ERIM is focused on the management of the fi rm in its environment, its intra- and 
interfi rm relations, and its business processes in their interdependent connections.
The objective of ERIM is to carry out fi rst rate research in management, and to o er an advanced doctoral 
programme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three hundred senior researchers and PhD 
candidates are active in the di erent research programmes. From a variety of academic backgrounds and 
expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating 
new business knowledge.
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